

**Study  
Report  
2006-09**

**Assessment of the FY 05 Basic Officer  
Leader Course (BOLC) Phase II:  
Instructor Certification Program (ICP)  
and Single-Site Initial Implementation**

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
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# ASSESSMENT OF THE FY 05 BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE (BOLC) PHASE II: INSTRUCTOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (ICP) AND SINGLE-SITE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Research Requirement:

The U.S. Army Accessions Command (AAC) requested the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) perform an independent assessment of the ICP and the initial implementation of BOLC II at Fort Benning, GA prior to the final implementation of the course in June 2006. The purpose of the ICP was to prepare selected cadre as BOLC II trainers capable of teaching, coaching and mentoring new lieutenants. BOLC entails a three-phase process of officer initial entry training. After Phase I (pre-commissioning), all new lieutenants receive a seven-week core program of instruction (Phase II) at a shared location focusing on leadership, confidence building, and Soldier skills in a field intensive environment. Phase III focuses on branch-specific officer training. The study had two primary objectives: 1) review and assess the training/certification of the BOLC II cadre to determine if they are adequately prepared to execute the course and; 2) review the BOLC II course and assess its overall ability to adequately prepare Warrior leaders to operate in the contemporary operating environment (COE).

### Procedure:

ARI personnel developed and administered surveys to the cadre members who attended the ICP in April 2005 and to the lieutenants who attended the BOLC II single-site initial implementation in July 2005. The cadre completed a demographic survey and an end of course survey.

The lieutenants were administered a demographic survey, a knowledge test, a situational judgment test (SJT) and an end of course survey. In addition, the lieutenants rated how prepared they were to execute the Warrior battle drills and how confident they were in executing the Warrior tasks.

Finally, the BOLC II cadre rated the lieutenants on four dimensions of adaptability and on 23 leadership dimensions including Warrior Ethos from FM 22-100. The cadre also rated the lieutenants on these leadership dimensions throughout the course.

The survey data were supplemented by observations of the actual ICP and BOLC II training events. ARI researchers attended classroom instruction, watched physical training events, viewed field exercises, and noted the training and the lieutenants' reactions to the training. Throughout the course, the BOLC II lieutenants and cadre members talked informally with ARI and shared their impressions of both the ICP and the single-site initial implementation.

### Findings:

#### ICP

- Overall, the cadre felt that the quality of instruction from the class subject matter experts (SME) was high. Training observations indicated, however, that a disproportionate

amount of time (75%) was spent familiarizing and developing cadre proficiency on individual Warrior tasks. Concentration in this area came at the expense of training the cadre how to train the lieutenants.

- Critical soft skills training in small group instruction, counseling, After-Action-Reviews, and risk management was either abbreviated or not conducted. Similarly, little emphasis was placed on ensuring that the cadre possessed the necessary diagnostic/assessment skills to improve lieutenants' performance in basic rifle marksmanship, urban operations, battle drills, and land navigation.
- Training observations also indicated an insufficient focus on the leadership aspects of the tasks (e.g., urban operations). Training in these areas focused on only the fundamentals (e.g., 4-man stack to clear a room). An integrated strategy for improving lieutenant leadership skills, particularly decision-making/adaptive responding in COE situations was not emphasized.
- The overall findings indicated that the five-week ICP was insufficient for training the cadre on individual tasks, train-the-trainer skills, adaptive responding/decision-making strategies and formally certifying the cadre members as qualified BOLC II trainers capable of teaching, coaching, and mentoring lieutenants.

#### BOLC II Single-Site Initial Implementation: Overall Findings

- The training focus mirrored that of the ICP, revolving primarily around the Warrior tasks. The lieutenants' survey ratings showed statistically significant improvements in how prepared they felt they were to lead a platoon in executing the Warrior battle drills and their confidence in executing the majority (87%) of Warrior tasks following BOLC II.
- The COE training events (urban operations, convoy operations, advanced rifle marksmanship, and improvised explosive device classes) were well received by the lieutenants. The lieutenants felt that the COE events trained important skills needed for future assignments and indicated that they would like to see the COE training blocks expanded. Although the lieutenants reported too much redundancy between the BOLC I and BOLC II training, BOLC I knowledge test scores suggested a need for refresher training on certain tasks.
- The end of course survey results showed that the BOLC II training did not meet the lieutenants' expectations. The responses from the lieutenants were generally unfavorable regarding whether BOLC II affected their commitment to the Army and excitement about being an Army officer as well as whether it successfully met the course objectives.

#### BOLC II: Leadership Training

- The lieutenants identified a number of specific areas where leadership training could be improved (e.g., how to prepare an operation order, classroom instruction on leadership doctrine, troop leading procedures). They also felt that more time should be devoted to preparing for their role as platoon leaders and learning how to take charge of a platoon.

- Observations indicated that more opportunities for lieutenants to be assessed in leadership roles need to be incorporated in the Program of Instruction (POI). Further, key leadership assessment events were not adequately structured to fully assess leadership positions. Events were structured such that only the lieutenant assigned as the platoon leader for the specific event benefited from the experience.
- Lack of emphasis of counseling training, to include the use of specific assessment tools, was apparent during the single-site implementation. Frequent changes in the training schedule and the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the course caused many of the cadre to fall behind in counseling the lieutenants on their performance.
- The professional treatment of the lieutenants continues to be an issue in BOLC II. Most of the non-commissioned officer (NCO) cadre members have not trained and counseled officers prior to becoming BOLC II instructors. The challenges of this unique relationship should receive more emphasis in the ICP.

#### BOLC II: Training Execution

- Due to the relative short duration of BOLC II, training opportunities must be maximized wherever possible. Areas in the course where execution could be improved were identified and discussed. The areas include: **Mission planning.** Increase the number opportunities for lieutenants to participate in the planning process, e. g., issue mission brief to entire platoon and require each squad to create a platoon order versus briefing the mission only to the lieutenant designated as platoon leader. **Concurrent training.** Maximize concurrent training opportunities through the development of standardized hip-pocket training materials to refresh previously learned skills and reinforce specific training areas, e. g., leader skills related to decision-making and adaptive thinking. **Platoon level training.** Ensure training is consistent across platoons. Lieutenants must receive similar experiences both within and across BOLC II training sites. **Train to Army standards.** Ensure training is conducted to Army standards. Standards must be clearly articulated and enforced.

#### BOLC II: Recurring Issues

- For BOLC II to fully meet the training objectives envisioned by course developers, issues observed during earlier implementations should be carefully examined and the appropriate steps taken to ensure they are addressed prior to final implementation of the course in June 2006. Many of these issues were apparent during the single-site implementation. They focused on the following areas: select and prepare motivated cadre, set/enforce course and graduation standards, develop a balanced POI focused on lieutenant skills, improve counseling training, treat lieutenants like commissioned officers, and ensure cadre and lieutenants understand the BOLC II purpose.

#### Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

The results of the BOLC II training observations have been briefed throughout the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) community. Recommendations based on these observations together with both cadre and lieutenant feedback have resulted, in part, in noticeable changes in the execution of the next ICP and the two-site initial implementation of the

course in January 2006. ARI will continue to monitor these changes and their effects on both the preparation of the cadre and on the BOLC II leadership training.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FY 05 BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE (BOLC) PHASE II:  
INSTRUCTOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (ICP) AND SINGLE-SITE INITIAL  
IMPLEMENTATION

CONTENTS

	Page
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE .....	1
STUDY OBJECTIVES .....	2
SECTION I: CADRE SELECTION AND TRAIN-UP (OBJECTIVE 1) .....	4
WHY HAVE AN INSTRUCTOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (ICP)? .....	4
DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES .....	4
RESULTS .....	5
Cadre Prerequisites .....	5
Relevant NCO Demographic Data .....	8
Platoon Mentor Demographic Data .....	9
Recommended Pre-ICP Training .....	11
Cadre Combat Experience .....	12
Instructor Certification Program Qualifications .....	12
Instructor Qualifications: Summary .....	12
SUMMARY OF ICP TRAINING OBSERVATIONS .....	13
WEEK 1 .....	14
Tactics Certification Course (TCC) .....	14
WEEK 2 .....	17
Hot Weather Injuries/Use of Supplements .....	17
Call for Fire .....	17
Leadership/Counseling .....	17
Counseling .....	18
Communications .....	19
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection .....	19
Land Navigation .....	19
WEEK 3 .....	21
Squad Designated Marksmanship .....	21
Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (ARM - Iron Sight 100 – 400 meters) .....	21
ARM (M68 – Close Combat Optic (CCO) 100 – 400 meters) .....	21
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures .....	22
Reflexive Firing .....	23
Night Infiltration Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT)/Execute .....	23
Convoy Operations Training (Check Fire) .....	24
WEEK 4 .....	25
First Aid .....	25
Warrior Tasks .....	25
Warrior Battle Drills .....	26
Extended Land Navigation .....	26
WEEK 5 .....	27
Urban Operations .....	27
WEEK 6 .....	28
Advanced Infantry Marksmanship Strategies and Standards (AIMSS) - Classroom .....	28
U. S. Weapons .....	28

## CONTENTS

---

	Page
BOLC I Brief.....	28
M4 Confirmation and Zero .....	28
CADRE END OF COURSE SURVEY .....	30
ICP TRAINING ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	33
Training Focus .....	33
Inform Cadre of Training Objectives and Their Roles .....	33
Certification Process .....	34
Standardization of Training Across Platoons.....	36
Specific Class Observations.....	36
BOLC II End State Objectives .....	38
SECTION II: BOLC II SINGLE SITE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION (OBJECTIVES 2 - 3).....	40
STUDY DESIGN OVERVIEW .....	40
INSTRUMENTS.....	41
Pre-BOLC II Instruments (in-processing).....	41
BOLC II Instruments During Training .....	42
Post-BOLC II Instruments .....	43
RESULTS .....	45
Lieutenant Demographics .....	45
SUMMARY OF BOLC II TRAINING OBSERVATIONS .....	47
WEEK 1 .....	50
1SG Brief/Medical Records Screen.....	50
Company Commander Orientation.....	50
Battalion Commander Orientation .....	50
Regimental Commander Welcome.....	50
In-processing .....	51
S4/Central Issuing Facility (CIF) Equipment Issue .....	51
Warrior Ethos/Soldier Creed .....	51
Army Sexual Assault Prevention .....	51
Equal Opportunity/Sexual Harassment .....	51
Army Substance Abuse Program .....	51
Initial BOLC II Counseling .....	52
Tactical Foot March (6.5KM).....	52
Law of Land Warfare.....	52
Adjust Indirect Fire/Call for Fire.....	52
Employ Close Air Support.....	52
First Aid 9.....	53
Heat Mitigation Practical Exercise (PE).....	53
Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) 1.....	53
BRM 2.....	53
AIMSS Module 1 .....	53
AIMSS Module 2A.....	53
Confidence Course .....	53
WEEK 2 .....	54
AIMSS Module 2B (Zero and Qualify with CCO) .....	54
AIMSS Module 3 .....	54
AIMSS Modules 4 and 5 .....	54
ARM.....	54



## CONTENTS

	Page
Individual Movement Technique (IMT) - Buddy Shoot .....	55
Tactical Foot March (9.7KM) .....	55
WEEK 3 .....	56
Basic Combatives .....	56
Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) .....	57
Small Unit Operations and Tactics .....	57
Participate in a Media Interview .....	57
Land Navigation Classroom Training .....	57
Global Positioning System (GPS) Training .....	57
Day/Night Land Navigation .....	58
WEEK 4 .....	59
Introduction to Warrior Battle Drills .....	59
Introduction to U.S. Weapons (M2, M240B, M249, MK19, M203, M136, AT4) .....	59
Extended Land Navigation Situational Training Exercise (STX) .....	60
WEEK 5 .....	61
Mounted Battle Drills/IED React to Contact Practical Exercises .....	61
Handle Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) / Civilians On the Battlefield (COBs) PEs .....	61
Operate Road Block/Checkpoint PEs .....	61
Tape Drills .....	61
Urban Operations .....	62
Night Infiltration Course .....	63
Tactical Foot March (16 KM) .....	63
WEEK 6 .....	64
Convoy Operations .....	64
NBC .....	64
First Aid .....	64
WEEK 7 .....	65
Basic Combatives .....	65
Final APFT .....	65
PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING (PT) .....	66
LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT MEASURES .....	67
Proficiency in Warrior Battle Drills and Tasks .....	67
Leadership Assessment Report Book .....	67
End of Course Leadership Assessment .....	68
Adaptability .....	68
SJT .....	69
BOLC II Leadership Assessment: Conclusion .....	69
END OF COURSE SURVEY .....	70
RECURRING ISSUES .....	73
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	76
Leadership Training .....	77
Training Execution .....	78
Can BOLC II Produce Better Small Unit Leaders? .....	79
REFERENCES .....	81
APPENDIX A BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE (BOLC) CADRE DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY .....	E-1
APPENDIX B END OF COURSE ICP SURVEY RESPONSES: CADRE .....	F-1

## CONTENTS

---

	Page
APPENDIX C BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE (BOLC) LIEUTENANT DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY .....	G-1
APPENDIX D BOLC II ENTRY LEVEL ASSESSMENT SURVEY .....	H-1
APPENDIX E PLATOON LEADER SITUATIONS – VERSION A.....	I-1
APPENDIX F BOLC CLASS EVALUATION FORM.....	J-1
APPENDIX G END OF COURSE SURVEY RESPONDES: LIEUTENANTS.....	K-1
APPENDIX H END OF COURSE LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT REPORT.....	L-1
APPENDIX I END OF COURSE ADAPTABILITY RATING SCALE .....	M-1
APPENDIX J BOLC II END OF COURSE SURVEY: CADRE .....	N-1
APPENDIX K WARRIOR BATTLE DRILLS AND TASKS.....	O-1
APPENDIX L ACRONYMS .....	P-1

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. PLATOON CADRE PREREQUISITES .....	6
TABLE 2. DRILL SERGEANT SELECTION CRITERIA FOR THE NCO CADRE.....	7
TABLE 3. PRIOR NCO POSITIONS .....	8
TABLE 4. NCO PRIOR EXPERIENCE AS AN INSTRUCTOR.....	9
TABLE 5. PLATOON MENTOR DEMOGRAPHICS, OFFICER POSITIONS, AND INSTRUCTOR EXPERIENCE .....	10
TABLE 6. RECOMMENDED PRE-ICP COURSES .....	11
TABLE 7. CADRE PRIOR COMBAT EXPERIENCE .....	12
TABLE 8. ICP SCHEDULE - PLANNED .....	13
TABLE 9. TIME ALLOCATED FOR SPECIFIC ICP CLASSES .....	30
TABLE 10. CADRE RESPONSES TO SELECTED ICP TRAINING ISSUES .....	31
TABLE 11. BOLC II STUDY DESIGN .....	40
TABLE 12. LIEUTENANT DEMOGRAPHICS .....	45
TABLE 13. MEAN PERCENT CORRECT SCORES ON BOLC I KNOWLEDGE TEST BY COMMISSIONING SOURCE .....	46
TABLE 14. BOLC II TRAINING SCHEDULE.....	48
TABLE 15. BOLC II CLASS BY INSTRUCTOR - Unit/Organizational Affiliation .....	49
TABLE 16. OVERALL REACTIONS TO BOLC II TRAINING .....	72
TABLE 17. SUMMARY OF RECURRING ISSUES .....	76

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. PROPOSED ICP MODEL OF THE FUTURE .....	35
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# **ASSESSMENT OF THE FY 05 BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE (BOLC) PHASE II: INSTRUCTOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (ICP) AND SINGLE-SITE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION**

## **Background and Purpose**

In June 2000, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, chartered the formation of the Army Training and Leader Development (Officer) Panel (ATLDP) to study training and leader development in light of Army Transformation and the new operational environment. One of the major findings that emerged from the ATLDP study was that the Officer Education System (OES) did not provide company grade officers (second lieutenants, first lieutenants and captains) the necessary skill sets for successfully operating across the full spectrum of operations (U. S. Army Training and Leader Development Panel, 2003). The panel recommended that the current OES be changed for lieutenants from the two-phase design which consisted of pre-commissioning training followed by a branch-specific officer basic course (OBC), to a three-phased training approach which included a two-part OBC.

TRADOC adopted the three phase concept and created the model for a new BOLC program (U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003). In this model, BOLC I encompasses all military training conducted by traditional pre-commissioning sources and provides the foundation for the common skills, knowledge, and attributes desired of all officers.

BOLC II is the initial entry course providing basic small unit combat training to all lieutenants at selected TRADOC school sites. (Until January 2006, all previous BOLC II training including cadre training had occurred at Fort Benning.) This phase was designed as a six week, branch immaterial course in small unit leadership and tactics. The intent was to develop Army-centric officers (rather than branch specific officers as under the previous system) who are tactically proficient, knowledgeable in fieldcraft, and confident in their abilities to lead a platoon.

Following successful completion of BOLC II, lieutenants report to their BOLC III training sites, the branch-technical phase. During this phase, the proponent schools (e. g., Infantry, Military Intelligence, Armor, Field Artillery) provide training on platoon-level, branch-specific technical and tactical skills.

In October 2000, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training (DCSOPS&T), TRADOC, requested that ARI perform an independent assessment of the new BOLC. ARI was asked to study the iterative development of the Phase II course and its effects. Four pilot studies and one cadre train-up were conducted between 2001 and 2002. The results from these studies are detailed in six reports (Salter, Centric, & Beal, 2003; Salter, Centric, & Wampler, 2003; Salter, Centric, Wampler, Rich, & Beal, 2003; Salter, Wampler, Centric, & Dlubac, 2003a; Salter, Wampler, Centric, & Dlubac, 2003b; Salter, Wampler, Centric, Dlubac, & Beal, 2003). The findings were briefed to TRADOC. Specific recommendations were provided for improving the course. The recommendations were incorporated in a revised BOLC Phase II POI.

In June 2004, the AAC, TRADOC, requested ARI to conduct another assessment to determine the effectiveness of the revised course in preparing new officers for service in the field and in the COE. In addition, AAC requested that ARI perform an assessment of a revamped ICP. The purpose of the ICP is to prepare selected BOLC II cadre as trainers capable of teaching, coaching and mentoring new lieutenants. An assessment of the ICP was conducted in April 2005. An assessment of the BOLC II single-site initial implementation was conducted in

July, 2005. ARI also was tasked to assess the two-site initial implementation of BOLC II at Forts Benning and Sill in January 2006. (Training observations and survey data collection were completed in February 2006.) The findings from these studies will be used to make recommendations regarding modifications to the course of instruction. The intent is to make any adjustments to the ICP and the BOLC II training focus and content prior to final implementation of the course in June 2006 at these two locations. (BOLC II two-site implementation findings and recommendations were briefed to AAC, DCSOPS&T, Leader Development Directorate, and BOLC II leadership at Forts Benning and Sill in May and June 2006. These findings will be provided in a separate report.)

### **Study Objectives**

The primary objectives of this study as defined in the TRADOC Studies Proposal (U. S. Army Accessions Command, 2004a), and the Memorandum for Record between ARI, AAC, and DCSOPS&T (U. S. Army Research Institute, November, 2004) were the following:

- (1) Review the training/certification of BOLC II cadre to determine if they are adequately prepared to serve as trainers in assigned BOLC II subject areas.
- (2) Review the linkages and appropriateness of BOLC I and II core tasks. Determine if lieutenants are adequately prepared to attend BOLC II.
- (3) Review the BOLC II course and assess its overall ability to adequately prepare Warrior leaders to operate in today's COE.
  - (a) Determine if BOLC II adequately develops agile and adaptive leaders while introducing complexity in training.
  - (b) Develop metrics/measures of effectiveness of the course to train newly commissioned officers.
  - (c) Determine if the tasks are sufficiently focused on leadership competencies and meet the demands of the COE.

Due to time constraints inherent in the TRADOC studies process, issues related to whether the addition of BOLC II develops lieutenants who are better able to effectively lead Soldiers in the COE could not be clearly determined. This would require a comprehensive, multi-tiered longitudinal investigation that addresses short-term issues (reaction, - lieutenants' overall satisfaction with the course; learning - increases in specific knowledge and skill sets, changes in attitudes), mid-term issues (behavioral changes resulting from the training), and long-term issues (results - unit effectiveness, casualties, retention, morale, other tangible indicators of the effectiveness of the training received). Ideally, a control group also would be included in the study to compare responses across the various measures. The inclusion of a control group allows researchers to eliminate alternative factors (other than the training) that could have caused the behavioral changes.

Assessing changes in behavior and the impact of these changes on the Army, requires multiple measures over extended periods of time (with a control group) to accurately determine the effectiveness of the training (see Kirkpatrick, 1998). This could not be accomplished under the current study design; consequently, only the relatively short-term indicators of BOLC II training effectiveness could be assessed in this study. Specifically, the primary focus of this

study was limited to an assessment of selected issues that could be reasonably examined over a relatively brief time duration, i.e., lieutenants' reactions to the training, BOLC I knowledge, perceived skill improvements, and cadre assessments of lieutenant leadership characteristics demonstrated during the course. In addition, ARI examined the BOLC II training approaches and course content to determine the overall training quality and subject appropriateness.

## **SECTION I: CADRE SELECTION AND TRAIN-UP (OBJECTIVE 1)**

### **Why Have an Instructor Certification Program (ICP)?**

The importance of a successful ICP cannot be overstated. The BOLC II cadre will form a critical team in the training of the Army BOLC II lieutenants. However, they will be more challenged to accomplish their training tasks than were their predecessors. The facilitation of the previous officer basic course concept was easier, by comparison. Infantry Officers taught only Infantry Officers, Quartermaster Officers taught Quartermaster Officers, and Signal Officers taught Signal Officers. In BOLC II, cadre personnel from all branches work together as a team to teach lieutenants from all branches. This requires careful coordination, planning, and preparation.

Although most of the BOLC II training events should be familiar to the cadre, many of the cadre members may not be current on the skills that they must train. Further, some cadre members may not be accustomed to training lieutenants, or, enough time has passed that they need refresher training. The cadre members also may need time to familiarize themselves with the latest field manuals to master the materials they will be using. A structured ICP that encompasses a formal process for ensuring cadre are proficient to assume their responsibilities as BOLC II trainers is critical for the long term success of the course.

### **Data Collection Instruments and Procedures**

The BOLC II ICP was assessed to determine whether the cadre were adequately prepared to instruct the BOLC II classes. Assessments were made to determine whether the ICP: 1) provided the cadre with the requisite knowledge to instruct the lieutenants, 2) prepared the cadre for the classes/courses by offering strategies, techniques, lessons learned to coach, mentor, and train lieutenants, and 3) provided a structured process for certifying the cadre member's ability to teach assigned subject matter.

The following assessments were made to determine whether the ICP met these objectives. First, the ICP training schedule was examined to determine whether there was adequate time to prepare and rehearse lessons or topic areas. Second, selected portions of the ICP were observed including both classroom instruction and field events to determine the focus of the classes. Third, informal interviews were conducted with the cadre whenever possible. Fourth, demographic and end-of-course surveys were administered to the cadre. The demographic survey focused on background information (e. g., branch, commissioning source, MOS, prior combat experience, gender, military courses completed) and relevant training experience (e. g., time as an instructor, experience training officers). The end-of-course survey captured cadre feedback regarding the adequacy of time spent on POI topics and the pace, quality, and instructional approaches used during the ICP. The data from these four sources were summarized and key trends/issues were identified and are discussed in this report.

## Results

### ***Study Objective # 1: Review the training/certification of BOLC II cadre to determine if they are adequately prepared to serve as trainers in assigned BOLC II subject areas.***

This objective was accomplished by examining cadre selection prerequisites, performance and observational data, and cadre feedback regarding the ICP training.

#### ***Cadre Prerequisites***

An assessment was made to determine whether the BOLC II cadre met the critical selection prerequisites as published by AAC (U. S. Army Accessions Command, 2004b). Table 1 provides a summary of these prerequisites along with a comparison of the data obtained from the BOLC II Cadre Demographic Survey to these standards (see Appendix A). Specifically, the focus was to determine whether each of the five BOLC II platoons (Alpha CO, 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN) consisted of the appropriate combination of cadre members as recommended by AAC. Data were collected from 32 cadre members. Two members were assigned to HQ CO. Each platoon consisted of six cadre members (one captain, one Sergeant First Class, and four Staff Sergeants).

***Platoon instructors.*** AAC recommended that each platoon should have at least one ranger qualified and one female instructor. Table 1 shows that at least one ranger qualified instructor was assigned to each platoon. However, since only two instructional platoons were assigned a female instructor, the prerequisite of having at least one female instructor per platoon was not met (one female was assigned to the HQ CO).

***Selection criteria results for platoon mentors.*** Each platoon also was required to consist of one branch immaterial or one branch qualified Captain as a platoon mentor. The cadre met this prerequisite with three branch qualified Captains and two branch immaterial Captains (see Table 1).

***Selection criteria results for Sergeant First Class (SFC).*** Each platoon was required to have one SFC who had an 11B MOS, TO&E platoon sergeant experience, and met the drill sergeant selection criteria listed in AR 614-200, *Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management* (U. S. Department of the Army, 2005). Table 1 shows that three platoons were assigned a SFC with an 11B MOS. Although two other platoons were assigned SFCs with combat arms MOSs, they were not 11Bs. Overall, one SFC did not have TO&E platoon sergeant experience.

Table 1

*Platoon Cadre Prerequisites*

Prerequisites	Platoon Cadre					
	1 <sup>st</sup> PLT	2 <sup>nd</sup> PLT	3 <sup>rd</sup> PLT	4 <sup>th</sup> PLT	5 <sup>th</sup> PLT	
<b><u>Captain</u></b> Branch (BI or BQ)	BI	BQ	BQ	F BQ	BI	
<b><u>SFC</u></b> Each platoon must have 1 SFC: MOS 11B TO&E PSG Experience Drill Sergeant Criteria	R 11B TO&E PSG	14S (CA) TO&E PSG	14S (CA) TO&E PSG	11B	R 11B TO&E PSG	SFC 14T (CA)
<b><u>SSG</u></b> Each platoon must have 2 SSG: MOS CA and 2 SSG: MOS IM Drill Sergeant Criteria	11C (CA)	R 11B (CA)	R 11B (CA)	R 11B (CA)	14E (CA)	
<b><u>SSG</u></b> MOS	13B (CA)	19D (CA)	13B (CA)	21N (IM)	R 11B (CA)	
<b><u>SSG</u></b> MOS	14S (CA)	31B (IM)	25P (IM)	14E (CA)	13B (CA)	
<b><u>SSG</u></b> MOS	11B (CA)	88M (IM)	F 42L (IM)	14S (CA)	SGT 91D (IM)	

*Notes. Each platoon must have at least one Ranger qualified and one female trainer per platoon. PLT = Platoon; PSG = Platoon Sergeant; SSG = Staff Sergeant; SGT = Sergeant; BI = Branch Immaterial; BQ = Branch Qualified. R = Ranger (Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) G) or Ranger Parachutist (ASI V) Qualified. F = Female. (CA) = Combat Arms MOS: 11 = Infantry, 13 = Field Artillery, 14 = Air Defense Artillery, and 19 = Armor. (IM) = Immaterial MOS: Military Police (31B), Motor Transport Operator (88M), 25P = Microwave System Operator-Maintainer, 42L = Administrative Specialist, 21N = Construction Equipment Supervisor, and 91D = Operating Room Specialist.*

Additionally, the SFCs met the following drill sergeant selection criteria (see Table 2).

- Minimum general technical (GT) score of 100
- Minimum physical profile of 111221
- Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) graduate
- High school graduate/general education development (GED) test equivalency
- Minimum four years active continuous service
- No speech-related difficulties
- No major counseling actions/statements in the past five years



Some of the SFCs did not meet the following drill sergeant criteria (see Table 2).

- Qualified with the M16A2 within the last six months
  - Five SFCs (71%) qualified with their assigned weapon in the last six months (2 qualified with an M16A2, 1 qualified with an M4, and 2 did not specify the weapon).
- 24 months remaining in service

Five SFCs indicated that they had 24 months remaining in service, one SFC indicated less than 24 months, and one SFC did not respond.

Table 2

*Drill Sergeant Selection Criteria for the NCO cadre*

Selection Criteria	Frequencies/Percentages	
	SFC # Met (%) (n = 7)	SSG # Met (%) (n = 20)
Rank of SFC or SSG	7 (100)	19 (95)
Minimum GT of 100 Not Specified	7 (100) <b>Mean GT = 108.3 (SD 4.1)</b>	19 (95) 1 (5) <b>Mean GT = 113.9 (SD 8.2)</b>
Minimum PULHES of 111221 Did not report exact score	6 (86) 1 (14)	17 (85) 2 (10)
BNCOC graduate	7 (100)	17 (85)
HS Graduate/GED Some College 2-year College Degree 4-year College Degree Missing	6 (86) 3 (43) 2 (29) 1 (14) 1 (14)	20 (100) 14 (70) 2 (10)
Minimum 4 yrs active continuous service	7 (100) <b>Mean Years = 16.6 (SD 3.7)</b>	20 (100) <b>Mean Years = 12.0 (SD 3.7)</b>
Qualified with weapon M16A2 M4 Not Specified	5 (71) 2 (29) 1 (14) 2 (29)	7 (35) 3 (15) 4 (20)
24 months remaining in service Not Specified	5 (71) 1 (14)	14 (70) 4 (20)
No speech impediment	7 (100)	20 (100)
No temporary waivers Not Specified	7 (100)	18 (90) 2 (10)
No counseling actions	7 (100)	18 (90)

Note. PULHES = Physical, Upper, Lower, Hearing, Eyes, Psychiatric.

**Selection criteria for Staff Sergeants (SSGs).** Each platoon was required to have two SSGs with combat arms MOSs and two SSGs with branch immaterial MOSs. Table 1 shows that not all platoons were assigned two SSGs with branch immaterial MOSs. Only the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> platoons met this requirement. The 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> platoons were each assigned 1 SSG with a branch immaterial MOS, and the 1<sup>st</sup> platoon was assigned SSGs with all combat arms MOSs.

The SSGs assigned to each platoon also were required to meet the drill sergeant selection criteria. Table 2 shows that the platoon instruction cadre met the following criteria.

- Minimum GT score of 100 (1 person did not report a score)
- High school graduate/GED equivalency
- Minimum four years active continuous service
- No speech-related difficulties
- No major counseling actions/statements in the past five years (2 people did not respond)

Only a few ( $n = 1-3$ ) of the SSGs did not meet the drill sergeant criteria of the minimum physical profile of 111221, BNCO graduate, and 24 months remaining in service, 13 SSGs had not qualified with the M16A2/M4 within the last six months (see Table 2).

### **Relevant NCO Demographic Data**

The following demographic information was collected from the NCO cadre to provide additional information regarding both their professional and teaching experiences.

**NCO positions.** Table 3 reveals that the majority (92%) of the cadre had served as squad leaders, and all of the SFCs had served as PSGs. The one SGT assigned as an instructor also served as a PSG. Further, some of the SSGs (47%) had held Staff positions and served as recruiters while some of the SFCs (57%) had served as recruiters and drill sergeants.

Table 3

#### *Prior NCO Positions*

Position	Rank		
	<u>SGT</u> ( $n = 1$ )	<u>SSG</u> ( $n = 19$ )	<u>SFC</u> ( $n = 7$ )
	# (%)	# (%)	# (%)
Squad Leader	1 (100)	17 (90)	7 (100)
Platoon Sergeant	1 (100)	6 (32)	7 (100)
First Sergeant	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (14)
Battalion Staff	0 (0)	4 (21)	0 (0)
Brigade Staff	0 (0)	3 (16)	0 (0)
Drill Sergeant	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (29)
Recruiter	0 (0)	2 (11)	2 (29)

**Prior instructor experience.** Table 4 indicates that the SGT had experience not only as an instructor but also with training officers. Six SSGs (32%) had experience as instructors and three of them had experience training officers. Five of the SFCs (71%) had experience as instructors, and one of them had experience training officers. Finally, eight SSGs (42%) and two SFCs (29%) had additional skill identifiers for Instructor. Overall, 44% of the cadre had prior experience as an instructor. Only 18% of the cadre had any experience training officers.

Table 4

*NCO Prior Experience as an Instructor*

Rank	n	Prior Instructor Experience	Trained Officers	"H" ASI
		Yes # (%)	Yes # (%)	Yes # (%)
SGT	1	1 (100)	1 (100)	0 (0)
SSG	19	6 (32)	3 (16)	8 (42)
SFC	7	5 (71)	1 (14)	2 (29)

Note. "H" is the ASI for Instructor.

**Platoon Mentor Demographic Data**

**Officer demographics.** Table 5 provides the background information for the platoon mentors including their source of commissioning, whether they were prior enlisted, level of civilian education, years active service, time in grade, MOS, and skill identifiers. Additionally, although the platoon mentors were not required to meet the drill sergeant criteria, this information was collected as all individuals were given the same survey. As can be seen in Table 5, all of the platoon mentors met the following drill sergeant criteria.

- Minimum physical profile of 111221
- Minimum four years active continuous service
- No speech-related difficulties
- No major counseling actions/statements in the past five years
- 24 months remaining in service

However, only one platoon mentor had qualified with the M16A2 within the last six months. It must be noted that, depending on the branch and assignment, officers typically do not qualify with this weapon.

**Officer positions.** Table 5 also shows that the majority (4 of 5) of the platoon mentors had been platoon leaders. Further, many of the platoon mentors had held unit or staff positions.

**Prior experience as an instructor.** Table 5 indicates that only one platoon mentor had experience as an instructor, which was training officers in the Infantry Officer Basic Course.

Table 5

*Platoon Mentor Demographics, Officer Positions, and Instructor Experience*

Demographics	Platoon Mentors					
	<i>n</i>	1 <sup>st</sup> PLT	2 <sup>nd</sup> PLT	3 <sup>rd</sup> PLT	4 <sup>th</sup> PLT	5 <sup>th</sup> PLT
Commissioning source	5	ROTC	ROTC	ROTC	USMA	ROTC
Branch qualified (BQ)	5		BQ	BQ	BQ	
Prior enlisted	5	X				
Years active service	5	5	8	9	8	6
Years in grade	5	8	4	5	4	2.5
MOS	5	42Z	19A	13A	35E	11A
Skill identifiers	2		5P, 5K, Sapper		Sapper	
National Guard/Reserve	5	X				
Officer positions held	5					
Platoon Leader		X	X	X		X
Company XO			X	X	X	
Company Commander (CDR)			X	X	X	
Battalion XO						
Battalion Staff		X	X	X	X	X
Brigade Staff			X		X	
Instructor experience	5	No	No	No	No	Yes
Experience Training Officers	3	No	No			Yes
Level of civilian education	5					
Bachelors Degree			X	X	X	X
Advanced Degree		X				
Qualified with weapon	5	No	Yes	No	No	No
M16A2			√			
M4						
24 months remaining in service	5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Speech related difficulties	5	No	No	No	No	No
Waivers	5	No	No	No	No	No
Counseling actions	5	No	No	No	No	No
PULHES 111111	5	X	X	X	X	X

*Notes.* PLT = Platoon; XO = Executive Officer; ROTC = Reserve Officer Training Corps; USMA = United States Military Academy; OCS = Officer Candidate School; PULHES = Physical, Upper, Lower, Hearing, Eyes, Psychiatric. Skill Identifiers: the Sapper skill identifier is awarded to Officers who complete the Sapper Leader Course for Combat Engineers at Ft. Leonard Wood. It does not yet have a skill code. 5P is Officer Parachutist, and 5K is Officer Instructor.

### **Recommended Pre-ICP Training**

ARI previously recommended that the cadre receive specific training prior to the ICP at Fort Benning (Salter, Centric, & Wampler, 2003). Table 6 shows the frequencies/percentages of cadre members who attended or were scheduled to attend the recommended classes/courses, which were adopted by TRADOC, either prior to the ICP, during BOLC II at Ft. Benning, or post BOLC II at the site where they were scheduled to be instructors for BOLC II. Table 6 reveals that course attendance varied from 100% (e. g., Tactics Certification Course) to 0% (e. g., Army Mail Handler's Course).

Table 6

#### **Recommended Pre-ICP Courses**

<b>Site Selection Training – Survey Data (N = 30)</b>	<b>Course Attended Frequencies/Percentages</b>
Combat Life Saver	30 (100)
Combatives (Skill Level I)	30 (100)
Defensive Driver Course <sup>2</sup>	26 (87)
TCC <sup>1</sup>	25 (83)
Total Army Instructor Training Course	25 (83)
Small Group Instructor Training Course	14 (47)
<b>BOLC Site Training – Survey Data (N = 30)</b>	<b>Course Attended Frequencies/Percentages</b>
Range Safety Officer Certification Class (at the site where you will train BOLC)	24 (80)
Suicide Prevention Class	18 (60)
Range Officer in Charge (OIC) Safety Certification Class (at the site where you will train BOLC)	15 (50)
Ammunition Handling Class	14 (47)
Army Mail Handler's Class <sup>2</sup>	0
Risk Management – <b>Observational Data</b>	0
<b>POI Related Training Certification – Observational Data</b>	
Offensive/Defensive Tactics <sup>1</sup>	30 (100)
Battle Drills <sup>1</sup>	30 (100)
Introduction Combat Operations <sup>1</sup>	30 (100)
Land Navigation	30 (100)
Counseling	0
After-Action Review (AAR)	0
Supervise Platoon Combat Service Support Operations	0

Note. <sup>1</sup> Completed as part of ICP; <sup>2</sup> Select personnel only at BOLC site (one each platoon).

### ***Cadre Combat Experience***

Table 7 shows the combat experience of the cadre. The frequencies/percentages of cadre members who were involved in each operation are reported. Many cadre members had prior combat experience in either Operations Iraqi Freedom (53%) or Enduring Freedom (47%).

Table 7

#### ***Cadre Prior Combat Experience***

<b>Operation</b>	<b>Frequency (Percentage) (N = 30)</b>
Iraqi Freedom (May 03 - present)	16 (53)
Enduring Freedom (Oct 01 - present)	14 (47)
Joint Forge (98-04)	1 (3)
Joint Guard (96-98)	2 (7)
Joint Endeavor (95-96)	1 (3)
Able Sentry (Jul 94 – Feb 99)	1 (3)
Restore Hope (Dec 92 – May 93)	3 (10)
Southern Watch (Aug 92 – May 03)	2 (7)
Northern Watch (Dec 96 – Mar 03)	2 (7)
Provide Comfort (Apr 91 – Dec 96)	2 (7)
Desert Storm (Jan 91 – Feb 92)	7 (23)
Desert Shield (Aug 90 – Jan 91)	6 (20)
Just Cause (Dec 89 – Jan 90)	2 (7)

### ***Instructor Certification Program Qualifications***

Performance data were collected regarding whether the cadre passed/qualified on key events conducted during the ICP. Data were available for the TCC, land navigation and weapon qualification. All cadre passed the TCC final exam with a score of at least 70%; one buddy team, two individuals, did not pass the land navigation test (day - 5 of 7 points and night - 3 of 5 points) after the retest; all cadre qualified with the CCO on a standard record fire range (hit at least 23 of 40 targets). Final Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) scores were unavailable.

#### ***Instructor Qualifications: Summary***

The cadre members, with a few exceptions, met the recommended BOLC II selection prerequisites. Many of the cadre members had attended the recommended classes and had recent combat experience in Iraq (53%) or Afghanistan (47%). Of particular interest for BOLC II was that 44% of the cadre had prior experience as instructors and only 18% had experience training officers. (A key component of the ICP is to provide the NCO cadre the necessary instructional techniques and strategies for effectively engaging new lieutenants.)

## Summary Of ICP Training Observations

The ICP was conducted from 25 April to 10 June 2005. Approximately four weeks separated the end of the ICP and the start of BOLC II (10 July 2005). Thus, cadre members had additional time beyond the ICP to prepare for their assigned classes (e. g., reading class material, murder boards). The class consisted of five officers and 25 NCOs from multiple branches and MOSs (see Table 1). The ICP's primary focus was to provide the cadre with the necessary information to accurately discuss Infantry doctrine and tactics and familiarize them with the Warrior tasks and BOLC II training events. The ICP schedule is summarized in Table 8.

ARI researchers observed the majority of the classroom and field events, including the live fire marksmanship training and the Extended Land Navigation course to observe cadre participation and team building. The foot marches, AIMSS (classroom) training and the final APFT were not observed. Also, although the convoy blank/live fire was not observed (Week 7), the convoy operations walk through (Week 3) where the blank and live fire procedures were explained to the cadre was observed. The research team observed what was being taught and by whom. Brief descriptions of the classes are provided by week.

Table 8

### *ICP Schedule – Planned*

Week	Major Training Events
1	Orientations Welcomes In-processing Tactics Certification Course Leadership Development and Assessment Risk Management
2	Machine Gun Theory Hot Weather Injuries/Use of Supplements Call for Fire Leadership Counseling Communications (Radio) Land Navigation
3	BRM Training ARM (Zeroing with iron sight and CCO) ARM (Reflexive firing) Night Infiltration Course Convoy Ops (Check fire) 6-Mile Shuttle March*
4	First Aid Warrior Tasks Milstakes** Extended Land Navigation Tactical Decision Game** Call for Fire - Training Set Forward Observer** IED
5	Media on Battlefield** Urban Ops
6	10-Mile Footmarch* AIMSS Training* U.S. Weapons BOLC Briefing
7	Convoy Blank/Live Fire* APFT*

Note. \* Not observed, \*\* Not conducted.

## Week 1

The first week of training included basic administrative activities such as in-briefings from the First Sergeant, Company Commander, Battalion Commander and the Regimental Commander, welcomes, and in-processing. In addition, two classes were conducted.

### **TCC**

The TCC is a 48 hour (six training days) course of instruction designed to insure standardization of Infantry doctrine for incoming instructors who are primarily responsible for teaching Infantry tactics. The TCC focuses on Army doctrine and the foundations for tactical planning and execution to include basic doctrine, TLP, combat orders, operational terms and graphics, the organization of an infantry rifle company, platoon, and squad, and offensive and defensive operations. Students also participate in a Light Infantry Platoon attack TEWT (U.S. Army Infantry School, 2006).

The course also is taught by a mobile training team to other units on demand as a means to provide continuation training to NCOs and Officers (regardless of MOS or branch), insuring that current Infantry doctrine is passed on to instructors throughout the force who teach Infantry tactics. The course is typically scheduled for five days (the TEWT is excluded).

BOLC II cadre must be able to correctly speak with “one voice.” This was a recurring problem during the earlier BOLC II pilots. Because of their varied backgrounds, the cadre lacked a common working vocabulary and an understanding of some Infantry branch-specific terms and acronyms (the vehicle used to teach basic leadership and tactics). To solve this problem, ARI recommended that several existing courses be considered as prerequisites for BOLC II cadre training (see Table 7). One of these courses was the TCC.

A condensed version (42.5 hours) of the course was included as part of the ICP program of instruction and taught on site at Fort Benning by Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate (CATD) instructors. The cadre members could not continue through the remainder of the ICP unless they passed all the quizzes (daily) and the final exam. Additional learning activities included daily homework assignments and PEs. Course organization was clearly described. All cadre members were provided with a complete set of course materials including FMs, handouts, templates, protractor, and four colored pens. The TCC was broken into five parts which are described in the following sections.

***Introduction to Army operations.*** Prior to the start of this block of instruction, the Director of CATD provided a short briefing that covered how people learn most effectively, which provided a paradigm for the cadre to use in training BOLC II lieutenants. He also solicited from the cadre possible ways for institutionalizing BOLC II training.

The stated purpose of this block of instruction was to provide standardized instruction on approved doctrine common to all Army operations. Instruction focused on the following areas:

- Five types of Infantry
- Definition of doctrine
- Definition of tactics
- Definition of procedures
- Definition of the science and art of tactics



- Definition of the three levels of war
- Foundation of Army Operations
- Nine principals of war
- Five tenets of Army operations
- Five elements of combat power

**Operational terms and symbols.** The objective of this class was to provide the cadre with a foundation for using map overlays. The instructor first presented the definitions of the specific symbols followed by the pictures of the symbols. The cadre members were then given PEs using terms and symbols. During the PEs, the cadre used templates and markers to draw symbols. The instructor provided both individual feedback to cadre members during the exercises as well as group feedback to the class after completion of the exercises.

**Troop leading procedures.** The purpose of the class was for the cadre to identify and explain the eight steps of the TLP process. The instruction included a discussion on the use of the following: (1) various combat orders (operation order [OPORD], operation plan, warning order, and fragmentary order [FRAGO]) and their use in the TLP process; (2) factors of mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, troops and support available, time, and civil considerations to analyze the mission (METT-TC); (3) military aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment); (4) backward planning and the 1/3 - 2/3 general rule of planning time allocation; (5) time/distance relationship to estimate travel times; (6) the impacts of fire distribution and the time rates of fire on the mission; (7) analysis the civil considerations (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events); (8) the third, fourth, and fifth steps of the military decision-making process, course of action (COA) development, COA analysis and COA comparison; (9) the five risk assessment steps (identify hazards, assess hazards to determine risk, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate) to compare COAs; and (10) confirmation briefs and brief backs to ascertain the level of mission understanding by subordinates.

The cadre also were given the opportunity to develop a platoon plan for a mission. The cadre members were divided into three groups and worked independently to develop one COA (one per group). A cadre member from each group was assigned to explain the platoon plan and COA to the other cadre and the instructor. The instructor provided feedback on aspects of the plan for further discussion and consideration.

**Small group instruction.** This class (added in the middle of the TCC) was not originally scheduled as a block of instruction in the ICP. It was presented in lieu of the scheduled class on risk management, which was moved to a later point in the training schedule. The purpose of the class was to provide the BOLC II cadre with teaching techniques employed by small group instructors. The class included the following topics:

- Creating competent leaders by providing training/practice
- Challenging lieutenants
- Communicating doctrine
- The art of the leading question
- Breaking down barriers
- Listening skills
- Challenges in the classroom

The application of small group instructional techniques to the AAR process, presented in the course outline, was not covered. The instructor modified the class to include group discussions on the reasons for the introduction of the BOLC II program (first hour) and the importance of BOLC II cadre to the program.

***Offensive and defensive operations.*** The first half of the class introduced the cadre to the purpose of offensive operations. The instructor covered the five forms of maneuver and the tactical forms of offensive operations. In addition, the following topics were addressed:

- Methods of fire control
- Direct fire considerations
- Indirect fire
- Tactical employment of mortars
- Mortar fire planning

The second half of the class covered defensive operations and why they are conducted. Key topics addressed included:

- Characteristics of defensive operations
- Framework for the defense
- Planning factors
- Defensive techniques
- Defensive considerations
- Conduct of the defense

## Week 2

**Machine gun theory.** This was the fifth section under TCC. The purpose of the class was to assist the cadre in defining and describing the employment of machine guns and types of fire in both a defensive and an offensive role in accordance with FM 3-22.68, *Crew-Served Machine Guns, 5.56mm and 7.62mm* (U. S. Department of the Army, 2003). The instruction included: defining general characteristics of pertinent systems (M249 SAW light machine gun, M60 medium machine gun, M240 B/C/D/G medium machine gun, and M2 HB heavy machine gun), identifying common terminology used in employing machine guns (line of sight, burst of fire [6-9 rounds], trajectory, maximum ordinate, cone of fire, beaten zone, effective beaten zone, plunging fire, dangerous space, dangerous zone, frontal fire, flanking fire, oblique fire, enfilade fire), describing the effects of range and ground on the beaten zone, identifying factors effecting the burst of fire, and identifying the objectives of machine gun marksmanship (obtain accurate initial burst, traverse and search the machine gun effectively, observe and effectively engage targets, and operate the machinegun with speed).

### **Hot Weather Injuries/Use of Supplements**

The scheduled class was *Hot Weather Injuries/Use of Supplements*. The class presented was *Heat Injury Risk Management*. The class was taught by a Medical Department Activities officer. The class was scheduled for one hour; however, it was completed in 30 minutes. The purpose of the class as outlined was threefold: (1) identify the five steps of heat injury management (identify hazards, assess hazards, develop controls, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate); (2) identify heat injuries; and (3) identify the potential risks of liquid intoxication.

### **Call for Fire**

The class was taught by the Fire Support Branch, CATD. It was scheduled to be an introductory class in call for fire operations with a follow-on simulator class scheduled later in the ICP using the Training Set Forward Observer Simulator at the Ranger Training Brigade. However, the simulator was unavailable, and the second option, the Guard Unit Armory Device Full Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer at the Soldier Battle Lab Simulation Center, also was unavailable. Thus, the cadre only received the four-hour introductory classroom training on call for fire. The training support package for the Infantry Officer Basic Course class CR9B14 *Fire Support Call For Fire* was used as the basis for the class.

The purpose of the class was to request and adjust indirect fire using: the six elements of the call for fire request (observer identification, warning order, target location, target description, method of engagement [polar plot, grid, and shift from known point], and method of fire control) to adjust rounds using the mil-relationship formula (1 mil equals 1 meter at 1,000 meters distance) and the successive bracketing technique to within 50 meters of the target using a maximum of five rounds in accordance with FM 3-09.30 (U. S. Department of the Army, 2001).

### **Leadership/Counseling**

The class title was changed (from *Leadership/Counseling*) to *Leadership Development and Assessment*. The 1-11<sup>th</sup> battalion commander was the primary instructor for this block of instruction. The commander provided a thorough rationale for the importance of conducting accurate assessments during BOLC II. He emphasized that the purpose of BOLC II is to show and teach

lieutenants what right looks like and make corrections if appropriate, so they, in turn, will be able to train/teach their Soldiers.

For BOLC II, the cadre would evaluate the lieutenants on the values, attributes, skills, and actions emphasized in FM 22-100 (U. S. Department of the Army, 1999). These qualities/behaviors were similar, if not identical to the ones assessed during ROTC, USMA, and OCS training. In addition, the cadre also would evaluate lieutenants on Warrior Ethos, Warrior tasks and battle drills.

The cadre were given copies of the Leader Assessment Report book. The books contained the dimensions/qualities described above. The commander explained the organization of the book (ratings of values, Warrior Ethos, and attributes, skills and actions, summaries of critical incidents - what to sustain/improve, and ratings of Warrior tasks and battle drills) and the situations (formal and informal leadership opportunities) when assessments could be made. The purpose of the books was to provide a standardized leadership assessment tool that the cadre could use to help structure the counseling sessions with lieutenants. Sections of the book were very similar to an officer efficiency report.

The commander emphasized the importance of the cadre consistently identifying behaviors and making accurate ratings and provided a number of evaluation tips, e. g., try not to immediately fix problems for the lieutenants, let the lieutenants lead the way (unless safety related).

The commander described the seven processes underlying the Leadership Development Assessment Program (recognize, record, classify, rate, counsel, train, and assess) that would be used for BOLC II. He then presented several film clips and written examples of various leader behaviors in which the cadre identified the particular qualities being portrayed by using the definitions found in the books. He also provided suggestions for improving assessments. Finally, the cadre members watched film clips and practiced rating leader behaviors using the books.

### ***Counseling***

The purpose of this class was to teach the cadre effective techniques for counseling the BOLC II lieutenants. An instructor from CATD covered the following points:

- Counseling techniques
- Corrective actions
- Counseling skills
  - Active listening
  - Responding
  - Questioning
  - Respect
  - Self and cultural awareness
  - Credibility
  - Empathy
- Types of counseling
  - Event based
  - Performance based
- Counseling errors
- Counseling preparation
- Conducting counseling
  - Discuss the issue

- Support points with facts/observations = link to unit goals
- Develop a plan of action
- Close
- Follow-up

### ***Communications***

The instruction for this class was provided by CATD. The instruction involved small group discussion, a slide presentation, and a PE in which the cadre operated the single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS). The purpose of the class was to ensure that all cadre members knew how to operate the radio in front of the lieutenants. The instructor polled the cadre at the beginning of the class and only 50% of the class had operated the radio before; only one cadre had a signal MOS. The instructor then went step-by-step through the procedures of how to operate the radio.

### ***NBC Protection***

The class was conducted by an NBC instructor from CATD. The instruction involved small group discussions, a slide presentation, and a demonstration. The instructor covered the following information:

- M40 Mask
  - Proper fitting of the mask. The instructor emphasized that once the lieutenants fit their masks, the cadre members need to instruct them to not adjust the top straps because the mask will no longer seal properly.
  - The instructor emphasized that the mask can be donned in any position (not just standing).
  - Standard for donning is 9 seconds.
- Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) Suit
  - Standard is 8 minutes.
  - The instructor suggested that the lieutenants should have a buddy help them or that they should help their buddy if they are finished; some people will not meet the standard.
- M8 Paper
- M9 Paper
- M291 Paper

Two cadre members modeled how to don the mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear (the M40 mask and JSLIST suit). This was not a scheduled class; the cadre expected a leadership/counseling class.

### ***Land Navigation***

For this block of instruction, the land navigation *test* was the class. The five-hour applied map reading class that is normally a prerequisite for land navigation training was not conducted. Thus, this class did not provide instruction to the BOLC II cadre regarding how to teach land navigation. The cadre were required to perform a compass check, pace course, and a standard safety briefing before starting the course. The plan was to have the cadre complete the test in buddy teams (two-Soldier teams) - two times during the day, and then one time at night.

Personnel from the 2-29<sup>th</sup> IN ran the range, gave a safety brief, and were responsible for grading the BOLC II cadre. Some instruction was provided (i.e., attack points, handrails, backstops). However, there was insufficient time to address any area in depth due to the late arrival of the cadre and the plan to run the course two times during the day,

The actual day and night tests were not observed by ARI. Of the 16 buddy teams, 10 teams passed the test. After re-testing, only one buddy team failed to meet the requirements.

## Week 3

### ***Squad Designated Marksmanship***

The class, *Squad Designated Marksmanship*, was condensed for the BOLC II ICP. Instructors from the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit (USAMTU) taught the class. The purpose of the class was to provide the BOLC II cadre with the fundamentals of Army marksmanship, to prepare them for the live-fire zero (to immediately follow), and to train them to be trainers and firing coaches at their home station BOLC II site. The class addressed the principals of shooting. The major points included:

- Sight alignment (sight picture, dominant eye and center of mass)
- Trigger control (smooth application, follow through, sight alignment)
- Firing positions
- Six factors of a steady firing position (positioning of non-firing hand, positioning of rifle butt, stock weld, positioning of firing hand, positioning of elbows, and breathing control)
- Ballistics and Zeroing: (a) parts of trajectory (line of sight, line of bore, and trajectory); and (b) explanation of minutes of angle
- Wind and weather impacts: (a) factors impacting trajectory (gravity, drag, temperature, wind, velocity, and effects of light; and (b) wind formula using the clock method of estimating windage
- Shooter/Target Analysis: 2-step process of observation and correction

### ***ARM (Iron Sight 100 – 400 meters)***

The class, *Zero an M4 Rifle*, was conducted by instructors from USAMTU on a known distance (KD) range. The purpose of the class was to teach the BOLC II cadre how to zero the M4 Rifle using USAMTU rifle marksmanship training methodology. This would enable the BOLC II cadre to apply what they learned and serve as coaches and trainers for BOLC II lieutenants at their home station. Prior to firing, the following training was conducted:

- Review of firing positions and firing techniques
- Range Operations briefing on a KD range
- Use of the weapon sling to provide a stable firing position
- Setting up firing orders

Firers shot from five different ranges to attain both a zero and gain confidence in applying what they learned. The group was broken down into three firing lines, each consisting of a firer, a firing coach, and a target puller to raise and lower each target and mark round strikes on the targets. Firers initially fired 30 rounds from a range of 300 meters using five-shot groups to attain centerline target acquisition. The firers then fired four 5-shot groups at the 100, 200, and 300 meter target ranges, respectively, to zero and confirm their zero using only iron sights (the CCO class was scheduled for later in the ICP). The firers then fired 20 rounds using the slow fire technique (fire a single round, target is lowered, round impacts are marked and the target is raised) at a range of 400 meters to serve as a confidence builder.

### ***ARM (CCO 100 – 400 meters)***

Cadre zeroed at 300 meters, firing one round at a time until they zeroed. They received feedback after each round for adjusting their rifle, firing position, etc. Once they zeroed, the

cadre members shot two 5-round groupings at 100 and 200 meters, three 5-round groupings at 300 meters, and 10 rounds at 400 meters.

Before the cadre zeroed with the CCO, an Army Marksmanship Unit instructor provided approximately 15 minutes of instruction regarding the CCO, (i.e., how to affix it to the rifle, how to adjust the laser, and reinforced shooting techniques). All cadre members zeroed.

### ***Counter-IED Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***

The instructor was a member of the training advisor team of the DoD Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force. The purpose of the class was to review the lessons learned in dealing with IEDs in the Iraqi Theater of Operations as well as ways to increase awareness of enemy use, tactics, employment techniques, and effective procedures to minimize their impact.

The instruction included the following: the four main initiating systems for IEDs (i.e., radio controlled, command detonated, victim based, and timed), common sites for placing IEDs, (i.e., road medians, shoulders of roadways, elevated areas, boundary turn around points, culverts, and previous sites where the enemy has had success with an IED), and indicators of the possible presence of IEDs (i.e., new dirt or gravel piles, personnel on overpasses, absence of the ordinary, and obstacles in the roadway). The instruction also emphasized the increasing use of ruse or hoax IEDs employed to canalize U.S. Soldiers or used to slow IED removal efforts and daisy-chained (linked in a series) IEDs.

Convoy tactics were an integral part of the briefing. The key points that were discussed included: knowing the rules of engagement and basic Soldier tasks, maintaining a standoff from IED devices, controlling tactical dispersion of vehicles to 75 to 100 meters, not massing people or vehicles, and escalating the force to match the threat. The instructor stressed the importance of having (and rehearsing) contingency plans for wrecks, flat tires, located IEDs, and stalled vehicles. He also emphasized keeping space between vehicles, looking for existing holes or previous IED sites, freshly covered holes, new dirt piles and red wires. He provided additional tips including avoiding overpasses, potholes, manhole covers and driving in the center of the road. He emphasized that every convoy is to be treated as a combat operation and that Soldiers need to project an aggressive posture to make them less likely to be singled out for attack.

The following tips were also provided for combat patrols:

- Don't set patrol patterns or use common turn-around sites
- Execute TLPs
- Drive fast and safe based on factors of METT-TC
- Drive without lights on in daylight
- Cover vehicle reflectors and turn signals
- Conduct AARs after missions
- Travel in the center lane; keep vehicle gunner in defilade, not exposed to IED blast
- Keep ballistic glass up; non-ballistic glass down
- Use mylar film or tape over glass
- Vehicle top gunner uses a back-up rifle in addition to crew-served weapon for overhead cover fire
- Drivers concentrate on driving – not shooting



- Always wear hearing/eye protection; try to obtain unmanned aerial vehicles or helicopters to support your combat patrols
- Each vehicle must have communications
- Train everyone on basic first aid
- Maintain trained Combat Life Saver-qualified personnel and travel with a medic
- Keep aid bags updated; conduct counter-ambush drills
- Report contact/IED locations as soon as possible
- Use the 5/25 drill – at temporary halts everyone scans five meters around the entire vehicle/at extended halts, dismounts, moves out and searches 25 meters in all directions of the vehicle

The keys for IED success were presented. They included: know the area; ask for intelligence reports of the area; concentrate on high threat areas; consider anything out of place a threat; vary actions – don't set patterns of action; searching for IEDs should appear random, not deliberate; view the route and terrain from the enemy's perspective; and, use the 5 'Cs' to handle located IEDs (i.e., confirm, clear the area, call, cordon, and control).

### ***Reflexive Firing***

This class was taught by instructors from USAMTU. The purpose of the class was to provide the cadre with the fundamentals of the Reflexive Firing Technique, the preferred method of immediate action firing (rapid target engagement firing technique). Reflexive firing requires the firer to acquire a rapid sight picture using the rifle sights to provide an accurate first kill capability from a quick fire firing stance.

The class consisted of two days of training. On the first day, the initial training consisted primarily of an introductory class that included the firing stance, trigger control, use of peripheral vision, body movement, the three types of magazine reloading (administrative, tactical, and combat) and safety considerations on a live fire range. At the live fire range (following the safety briefing), each firer engaged a point bullseye target from 25 yards firing 10 rounds within 1 minute, then firing 10 rounds within 20 seconds, and then 10 rounds within 10 seconds.

The second day of training consisted of basic reflexive firing techniques, barricade firing, and firing from the kneeling and prone positions. After a safety briefing, each firer engaged a point bullseye target from 25 yards firing 10 rounds within 1 minute, then firing 10 rounds within 20 seconds, and then 10 rounds within 10 seconds. Firing then shifted to 10 yards where firers engaged a series of eight small bullseye targets. The third series of firing also was at the 10 - yard range where firers engaged a series of vertical targets. After a break, the cadre executed a series of firings at 15 yards including firing from behind a barricade and transitioning from the standing to the kneeling position and the prone firing positions.

### ***Night Infiltration TEWT/Execute***

The cadre members did not actually go through the course themselves. The Non-commissioned Officer in Charge for the training site (2-29<sup>th</sup> IN) performed a terrain walk, provided a safety briefing, and described in detail the execution of the course. The cadre then observed one iteration of a basic training company executing the course. The primary purpose of this training event was to hear the safety briefing so the cadre members understood the safety procedures that were taken.

### ***Convoy Operations Training (Check Fire)***

The training included a talk through, walk through, and a blank fire engagement. No live fire training was planned. The purpose of the class was to introduce the BOLC II cadre to the new convoy operations live-fire training in the BOLC II course. The live-fire range is run by the 2-29<sup>th</sup> IN. The instructor from the 2-29<sup>th</sup> IN provided a general range safety and vehicle dismount briefing. The actions and responsibilities of the 2-29<sup>th</sup> IN and BOLC II cadre were clearly outlined by the (2-29<sup>th</sup>) instructor to ensure the cadre were familiar with their responsibilities for conducting the convoy live-fire training event during BOLC II.

A briefing on the facilities and general training area was conducted using a series of highly detailed sand tables. The execution of the live fire training concept was described. It consists of a series of three engagements conducted from a loop route that traverses the live fire range. The engagements include two close ambushes where the Soldiers return fire while remaining mounted in the vehicles and one far ambush where the Soldiers dismount and engage enemy targets while sweeping the objective. The first engagement takes place along the left side of the route while the second and third engagements take place along the right flank. The third engagement is the far ambush where the platoon reacts to contact. Three banks of targets are arrayed. The ambush is initiated by simulated IED striking the lead vehicle and a pneumatic machinegun opening fire. Once the vehicles halt, the platoon deploys to the right flank. Once in position, the platoon engages the first bank of targets. The squads then maneuver their fire teams to each subsequent bank of targets and engage each bank as they appear. Once the objective is swept, casualty evacuation is conducted and select personnel check enemy dead and retrieve priority intelligence requirements such as weapons, types of uniforms, types of unexploded IEDs, initiating devices, etc.

## Week 4

### **First Aid**

The A CO, 1-11<sup>th</sup> (BOLC II) commander stated that the purpose of this class was to provide general medical information to offset potential medical support shortfalls. The first part of the class was on the use of the Skedco stretcher. Two NCOs from Medical Department Activities were the instructors. The instructors demonstrated how to set up the Skedco (not an acronym) stretcher. After the demonstration, a hands-on portion of the class allowed groups of cadre members to set up the stretcher using a volunteer patient.

The second portion of the class was a discussion of new medical equipment. A medic from the 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN was the instructor. The new medical equipment included the Z-Medica Battle Pack that contained QuickClot Powder. The Israeli Bandage, and the Asherman Chest Seal were briefly discussed. The instructor also discussed the bee sting kit with two doses of epinephrine injections and the new medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) procedures on Fort Benning. Then, the instructor went through a scheduled slide presentation on general medical treatment information.

The third part of the class addressed the nine-line MEDEVAC request message and establishing a landing zone (LZ). Cadre were given the opportunity to practice marking an LZ.

### **Warrior Tasks**

The purpose of the class was to provide a review of the content and establish minimum standards for the BOLC II instruction (i.e., what must the cadre know and what is the minimum level of training for lieutenants). The instructor was from the 2-11<sup>th</sup> IN (Infantry Officer Basic Course). Six major areas of instruction were covered: (1) content review of the current BOLC II POI; (2) fundamentals of small unit operations; (3) pre-combat inspections; (4) Warrior battle drills; (5) EPW handling; and, (6) minimum instruction on tactical convoy operations.

The instructor emphasized the material that should be taught during BOLC II and provided examples of how to teach the material to lieutenants. He pointed out the common problems the lieutenants will face when learning the material. He suggested that the cadre members continually question the lieutenants about their decisions to help the lieutenants assess their decision-making processes and the effects of their decisions. The instructor emphasized that the BOLC II POI did not contain any exercises to make the leaders (lieutenants) react and require them to make decisions. The cadre, therefore, would play a major role in molding the lieutenants' ability to think critically and make sound decisions.

The title of the class was *Warrior Tasks* but these tasks were not explicitly addressed in any detail during this time. (Some discussion was provided on movement in urban environments.) The Warrior tasks consist of approximately 39 tasks clustered into five categories: shoot (e.g., engage targets, employ M-18 claymore mine, hand grenades); move (e.g., determine location on ground, prepare a vehicle in a convoy); communicate (e.g., make a spot report, use visual signaling techniques); fight (e.g., move under direct fire, select a temporary fighting position, evaluate a casualty); joint urban operations (e.g., perform movement techniques and engage targets during urban operations). One of the BOLC II end-state objectives is to develop new (platoon) leaders who are proficient in the Warrior tasks and battle drills (see Section 2 - BOLC II single site implementation, Blocker, 2004).

### ***Warrior Battle Drills***

This class used a squad, experienced in basic small unit operations, to model each battle drill (i.e., react to contact, react to blocked/unblocked ambush, react to indirect fire, react to chemical attack, break contact, dismount a vehicle, evacuate injured personnel from a vehicle, secure at a halt). After each demonstration, the instructors and experienced squad members explained key points. Then, the remaining cadre members broke into squads and practiced drills against an opposing force (OPFOR). The cadre practiced four battle drills during this time period. Only two drills were observed, react to contact and break contact).

### ***Extended Land Navigation***

This event was planned as the primary leadership assessment vehicle for BOLC II. This class was conducted as a TEWT. The intent was to have the cadre walk each of the five lanes of the course with comments provided by the TEWT leader (A CO commander) describing how each mission would unfold by lane. The cadre completed only three lanes. This event was designed to be a platoon-size exercise. The five BOLC II platoons would run through the course at the same time, but would have different start points and simply rotate through the lanes in a staggered fashion. The platoons would be allowed up to eight hours to complete a lane. As described in the TEWT, the platoon would receive a mission at the beginning of a lane. Six lieutenants would be selected by the cadre as leaders for the mission (platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and four squad leaders). The focus for the cadre would be on the platoon leader's plan, tactical movement and response(s) at the objective. Leader performance would be assessed by the cadre. After the completion of the mission, roughly midway through the lane, the cadre would conduct an AAR, issue a FRAGO, and select new leaders for the next mission. This process would be repeated for each of the five lanes.

During the TEWT, the cadre were shown possible ambush sites, acceptable versus unacceptable tactical routes, etc. and were encouraged to adjust the scenarios to the capabilities of the lieutenants in the leadership positions. The TEWT leader emphasized that the cadre members should question the lieutenants about their decisions and have them provide reasons for their actions. The cadre members also were encouraged to discuss different strategies, approaches, safety considerations, etc. involved in executing each lane.

## **Week 5**

### ***Urban Operations***

The purpose of the class was to ensure that the cadre understood the proper procedures for executing a four-man stack, clearing a room, clearing a stairway, clearing a hallway, clearing a building, and moving tactically down a street as a member of a squad and platoon while conducting a presence patrol.

The urban operations training consisted of approximately 34 hours of training at a Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) site over a four-day period. Training on Day One (7 hours) consisted of doctrinal classes by the 2-11<sup>th</sup> IN on room clearing operations including the four-man stack, clearing hallways and stairs, and movement in and around buildings, culminating with multi-squad building clearing operations. Training was limited to dry-fire operations. Day Two (10 hours) consisted of reinforcement training by experienced cadre members using their room and building clearing experiences and lessons learned from Iraq. It included three phases of training. The first phase served to fine-tune the earlier doctrinal training classes. The second phase consisted of dry fire training on the earlier instruction, including practicing and refining techniques, and a presentation by an Iraqi War veteran cadre member who integrated lessons learned from Iraq on clearing stairs and hallways. The third phase focused on fire team and multi-team movement in and around buildings. Day Three (10 hrs) included squad-level forced entry (breach) classes by the Fort Benning Military Police Search and Rescue Team, introduction to presence patrolling, and forced entry and clearing operations using night vision devices. Day Four consisted of force-on-force training while conducting presence patrolling (react to contact) and mounted patrols reacting to contact.

## **Week 6**

### ***AIMSS - Classroom***

Due to unanticipated changes in the training schedule, ARI observers were not able to attend this training. A brief discussion with the A CO XO indicated that the classroom portion of the class was taught by two BOLC II cadre members with formal experience in the subject matter area. The topics addressed included the AN/PAS13 (thermal sighting system), CCO, borelight as well as the PEQ-2/PAQ4 (aiming lights). The instruction was completed in eight hours.

### ***U. S. Weapons***

The purpose of this class was to familiarize the BOLC II cadre with the following weapons systems: the AT4 Missile, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), M240B Machine Gun, M2 50 cal. Heavy Machine Gun, and MK19 Grenade Machine Gun.

The training consisted of assembly, disassembly, and maintenance instruction on all of the weapons except for the AT4, which was not available for training (reason unknown). The training was executed in a round robin fashion. The BOLC II cadre were organized into five groups by platoon. Each group rotated through all the weapon station/classes. Each 30-minute station/class presented the weapon characteristics, how to load, clear, and reduce stoppage (in the weapon), how to disassemble/assemble the weapon, and maintenance issues (briefly covered). ARI observed two iterations of the stations and noted that the M2 was not available for these iterations.

The day portion of the training concluded with a live-fire exercise. However, since no ammunition was available for the MK19 and M2, the cadre only fired the M240, M249, and M203. The planned night portion of the training was a live fire of the M240B with the AN/PAS 13 Thermal Sight. The night training was not observed.

### ***BOLC I Brief***

This briefing was conducted by representatives from each of the three commissioning sources: OCS, ROTC, and USMA. The objective of the class was to provide the cadre with an overview of the training provided by each of the commissioning sources and to provide a realistic perspective of the skill levels of lieutenants participating in BOLC II.

### ***M4 Confirmation and Zero***

The purpose of this class was to have the cadre qualify with the M4 Rifle using the CCO. The tasks included identifying the characteristics of the Close Combat Optic, performing preventative maintenance checks and services on the CCO, placing the CCO into operation, and zeroing and qualifying with the CCO. Borelights were not used during this training.

The training included confirming the cadre members' CCO 300 meter zero obtained on another range. The range was operated by the 2-29<sup>th</sup> IN, who indicated that their mission was to provide access to the range facilities and not to provide any instruction. All instruction was to be done by the "user unit," A CO 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN.

The training began with the BOLC II platoon sergeants (PSGs) as range safeties and all other cadre members firing. After the safety brief, the cadre members were issued 30 rounds to confirm their zero. The range procedures were lock step (i.e., everyone up, move down range, return to firing line, load the next three-round magazine, etc.). As cadre members zeroed, the PSGs were replaced as range safeties and rotated into the firing line. Most cadre members fired from the prone supported position while a few fired from the prone unsupported position.

When only three cadre members confirmed their zero in nine rounds or less, the 2-29<sup>th</sup> cadre moved up and down the range and assisted the cadre members who had not zeroed. All cadre eventually zeroed and qualified.

## Cadre End of Course Survey

A survey (see Appendix B) was administered to the cadre at the end of the ICP. The cadre provided feedback regarding the amount of time provided for specific training, overall training, and whether certain courses should be included in future ICPs. All cadre members ( $N = 30$ ) completed the survey.

**Time allocated for POI training.** The cadre provided feedback regarding the amount of time allocated for specific training by using the following 5-point scale (1 = Not Nearly Enough, 2 = Not Quite Enough, 3 = About Right, 4 = A Little Too Much, 5 = Entirely Too Much). See Appendix B for descriptive statistics for each item.

Table 9 summarizes the cadre members' responses for selected Warrior tasks, drills, and training events. To provide a more complete interpretation of the results, the responses are reported according to whether the cadre members were Infantry or non-Infantry. Since the Warrior tasks and battle drills had a heavy Infantry component, it was expected that the infantry cadre would view this as refresher training and respond that too much time was spent training in these areas compared to the non-Infantry cadre.

Interestingly, for squad level battle drills, individual movement tasks, and marksmanship, the Infantry cadre tended to report that more time was needed training in these areas. On the other hand, the non-Infantry cadre felt that the right amount of time was allocated for these classes. For the Tactics Certification Course, land navigation and convoy operations live fire exercise (LFX), there was no agreement either between or within the groups on the adequacy of time spent in these areas. For urban operations, the Infantry cadre also were divided in their responses. Some reported that too little time was spent on this training while others reported that too much time was spent training. In contrast, the non-Infantry cadre felt very strongly that the appropriate amount of time was allocated for urban operations training.

Table 9

*Time Allocated for specific ICP Classes (% Too Little/OK/Too Much)*

	Infantry ( $n = 9$ )			Non-Infantry ( $n = 21$ )		
	Too Little	OK	Too Much	Too Little	OK	Too Much
Squad Level Battle Drills	44	56	0	10	90	0
Individual Movement Tasks	44	56	0	14	86	0
Marksmanship	44	56	0	10	75	0
Tactics Certification Course	44	22	33	35	25	40
Land Navigation	44	22	33	29	43	29
Convoy Operations LFX	22	44	33	11	58	32
Urban Operations	22	56	22	5	95	0

One explanation for the pattern of results showing that the Infantry cadre thought more, not less time should be given to certain tasks is that these cadre members know what is involved in developing proficiency in these tasks/drills and, therefore, felt that the time allocated was not adequate.



**Overall training.** The cadre members also provided feedback on a number of other training-related issues using the following four-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly Agree). Table 10 summarizes the cadre's responses (Infantry and non-Infantry) on selected training issues concerning the quality of training and how to train lieutenants. See Appendix B for descriptive statistics for each item.

Table 10

*Cadre Responses to Selected ICP Training Issues (% Agree and Strongly Agree)*

	Infantry (n = 9)	Non-Infantry (n = 21)
Confident teaching content of assigned classes	100	85
Quality of instruction from SMEs was high	67	81
Training conducted to standard not to time	56	67
Training clearly addressed how to train LTs	44	57
Standardized instruction provided for classes I will teach	33	48

Table 10 shows that most cadre members felt very confident in teaching their assigned classes. The high agreement for this question may be the result of the command leadership assigning cadre members to classes that matched their MOSs. Thus, they were very familiar with the content area. For example, the call for fire class was assigned to a field artillery officer who was quite familiar with the content area and key teaching points. For basic rifle marksmanship (BRM), Infantry cadre or cadre with drill sergeant experience were assigned to serve as lane instructors.

The majority of the cadre (Infantry and non-Infantry) felt that the quality of instruction from the SMEs was high and that training was conducted to standard not to time. However, the majority of the Infantry cadre felt that the ICP did not clearly address how to train lieutenants on the related subject material. Both groups, particularly the Infantry cadre, felt that standardized instruction was not provided across the classes (i.e., variations in class organization, instructional approach, and preparation). For the last four items (see Table 10), the Infantry cadre tended to be less positive in their responses compared to the non-Infantry cadre.

The survey also included 10 open-ended response questions. Particular attention was given to those questions focusing on aspects of the ICP that should be changed, deleted, or modified and identifying the most effective training methods that prepare the cadre members to teach their BOLC II classes. (The remaining questions yielded very little useful information to warrant inclusion in this report.) Several themes were identified and discussed in the following sections. With the exception of the TCC, the themes identified were generated by the cadre.

**TCC.** Although approximately 15% of the ICP training time was allocated to the TCC, over 30% of the cadre recommended that the full TCC class be conducted, not the condensed version taught in the ICP. The material presented during the reduced version tended to overwhelm many cadre members who were not familiar with it. Overlays, for example, were only allotted one day, but some cadre members felt that at least two days should be devoted to this topic to include an ample number of PEs. However, 20% of the cadre recommended reducing or modifying the TCC to fit specific ICP needs and/or conducting the course at home station prior to coming to Ft. Benning.

**Time needed to develop instructional expertise.** Many of the cadre members did not have the combat arms skill sets necessary to teach Warrior tasks to lieutenants. The cadre indicated that the length of the ICP (5 weeks) was not adequate for the non-infantry MOSs to achieve the level of expertise needed to teach classes in these areas. A few cadre members recommended that all of the instructors should be infantry or combat arms Soldiers.

**Preparation to teach BOLC II classes.** Learning how to teach officers was not the focus of the ICP. Survey feedback indicated that most cadre members lacked the skills to teach officers (lieutenants). The cadre stressed that a comprehensive training and certification process should be established to include training the skill, testing the skill, training how to teach the skill, and certifying that the cadre members can, in fact, teach the skill.

**Convoy live fire training.** Although the cadre recognized the benefits of convoy operations training in general, the convoy live-fire exercise did not, from the cadre's perspective, support the development of platoon leader decision-making or adaptive thinking skills. The safety considerations were too restrictive and produced a "canned" experience that makes this event very unrealistic. Some cadre recommended that the convoy live fire exercise be replaced with another culminating event.

**Urban operations.** A number of cadre members felt that the instruction on urban operations was the best part of the ICP. However, the cadre members were sometimes confused when instructors from different units based their instruction on unit tactics, techniques, and procedures. This occurred often during the urban operations training. Thus, the cadre were exposed to different techniques for executing the same tasks. This distracted the training focus and clouded the cadre members' understanding of what "right" looked like.

**Marksmanship.** Many of the cadre members felt that the instruction provided by the AMU was outstanding. However, the focus of the training was primarily on reflexive firing and involved large amounts of ammunition (1000 rounds per Soldier), which makes this approach untenable for BOLC II. Moreover, as some cadre members noted, the focus of the AMU instruction was to make the cadre members better marksmen. Thus, little information was provided to the cadre regarding the appropriate instructional techniques for training basic marksmanship skills to lieutenants.

The cadre also felt that more time was needed to develop proficiency in the use of the CCO. This is an important issue because many of the lieutenants will not have fired with the CCO prior to BOLC II. Thus, the cadre members must be knowledgeable in this area so that they can provide the lieutenants with the correct instruction and feedback to make the appropriate site adjustments.

**Land navigation.** The results from the land navigation test and survey feedback indicated that some of the cadre members were not proficient in land navigation. In general, the cadre felt that some type of refresher (classroom) map reading and land navigation training is required prior to executing the land navigation course.

## **ICP Training Issues and Recommendations**

The following sections present the key training issues that emerged from ARI's military analysts' training observations with suggested recommendations. Some of these issues are systemic in nature while others pertain to specific classes or blocks of instruction. The cadre also noted many of these same issues and felt they should be addressed to ensure that the ICP meets the BOLC II objectives.

### ***Training Focus***

The cadre represented a variety of military branches. While this diversity is important to instilling the Warrior Ethos mentality in all cadre (as well as lieutenants from different branches), it does have practical ramifications. Since many of the cadre members did not have the requisite combat arms skill sets, much of the ICP (75% of the scheduled training time) involved providing basic knowledge and skill training in these areas. The varying levels of skill proficiency across the different MOSs require more time for these cadre to become SMEs who can effectively teach lieutenants.

The primary focus of the ICP should be on teaching the cadre how BOLC II will be executed from the macro view (week-by-week) down to the micro view for specific classes. As a collective group, the cadre should learn how to conduct the classes, run the ranges, and hone teaching/coaching/mentoring techniques. The ICP should be a mission rehearsal; the cadre should know exactly how each day of the course will unfold from the layout of the class to support requirements. Moreover, ICP instructors should thoroughly discuss how specific scenarios/questions/vignettes will be implemented in the specific training/assessment events or classes during BOLC II to develop lieutenants' adaptive thinking and decision-making skills.

The cadre should be trained in the requisite individual skills either at home station before the ICP or scheduled for this training after the ICP. If cadre members demonstrate deficiencies in key skill areas during the ICP, then remedial training would be required on an individual basis at home station. The Fort Benning ICP should merely certify that the cadre members possess the required skills.

### ***Inform Cadre of Training Objectives and Their Roles***

The survey responses suggested that not all of the cadre members were clear about the purpose of BOLC II or their roles as trainers. These objectives and roles should be clearly identified and defined at the beginning of the ICP. The following key points should be addressed:

- Identify the purpose of BOLC II (e.g., end state objectives)
- Define the role of the cadre (e.g., small group instructor, mentor, coach) and the steps required to prepare for these roles
- Specify how BOLC II will be executed, e.g., week-by-week description of training events
- Clearly articulate command expectations of cadre performance

Like their drill sergeant counterparts, *all* BOLC cadre must possess a level of proficiency to act as mentors to answer the lieutenants' technical questions, operate a shadow box to zero an M4 rifle, boresight an AN/PVS-4, conduct a map resection, etc.

## **Certification Process**

The length of the ICP (**five weeks**) was insufficient for training fundamental Warrior skills, train-the-trainer skills, developing proficiency in teaching small unit leader adaptive thinking and decision-making skills, and certifying the cadre. More time must be allotted for performing activities that will certify that the cadre members can teach specific skills such as:

- Observing SME-led training on the subject material
- Conducting murder boards
- Conducting other coaching activities

In addition, cadre members should be cross-trained at the platoon level as back-up instructors. All principal instructors and assistant instructors must be clearly identified. Time must be allotted to accomplish the following activities:


- Train the cadre on the required skills to perform the training
- Test the cadre members' knowledge and performance of the skill
- Train the cadre how to teach the skill
- Train the cadre how to diagnose errors and assess the skill (this is especially relevant for BRM, urban operations, battle drills, and land navigation events)
- Conduct remedial training where necessary

Moreover, the ICP must include a standardized written document that clearly describes the certification process. The documentation should include a clearly articulated set of requirements that the cadre members must master and demonstrate before teaching their classes. The requirements must contain clear, measurable performance objectives. Documenting these requirements will help the cadre members prepare for their various roles. Finally, unit leaders must maintain a record of cadre progress to ensure instructors meet certification requirements.

Based on the demands inherent in a comprehensive ICP, ARI initially recommended the program be extended to 12 weeks. Clearly the pilot ICPs are unique in that large numbers of cadre (30-100) must be trained at one time, and time constraints/costs/limited resources have limited the time available to adequately train potential cadre members. Once BOLC II becomes a mature program, replacement trainers will be integrated into BOLC II assignments in fewer numbers, and they will have more time to develop their skills under veteran cadre members before assuming their roles as teachers, coaches and mentors.

*The ICP model of the future.* The ICPs conducted to date have differed noticeably in their focus and execution as they were tailored to fit the vision of the particular BOLC II pilot/implementation. The current vision of BOLC II is that the course should have a leadership focus. ARI's proposed ICP model of the future is illustrated in Figure 1.

# ICP Process



\*Attend tested TCC training, or TCC instruction package/tailored instruction (TBD).

Figure 1. Proposed ICP model of the future.

Figure 1 shows that once the new cadre members are notified of their BOLC II instructor assignments, they move from their current duty assignments to BOLC II assignments, which are either at Fort Benning or Fort Sill. Then, they proceed to a centralized location, either at Fort Benning or Fort Sill, to receive BOLC II specific training. As can be seen in Figure 1, the focus of this block of instruction is on the key soft skills for the cadre members to be successful coaches and mentors for the lieutenants. Training soft skills is the most difficult block of instruction. For this reason, it is best accomplished by resident experts in the sub-areas listed in Figure 1 at a centralized location rather than at each of the BOLC II sites. It should be noted, however, that these skills would be desirable for trainers in a number of Army courses, not just BOLC II.

BOLC II cadre training also should include two blocks of requisite training, general and site-specific. Both types of training support the BOLC II mission. General requisite training (conducted at the centralized location) would involve such courses/classes as the Total Army Instructor Training Course, Combat Life Saver, combatives, defense driver course, driver licensing, and human relations training. Site-specific training would include such classes as range safety operations, ammunition handling, and the mail handlers course.

Once this training is completed, cadre members begin the final phase of instruction, which is BOLC II POI-related. At this point, the cadre members are assigned peer mentors and begin preparing to teach their assigned classes. The cadre should go through murder boards and, if necessary, receive additional mentoring and remedial training before being certified to teach in their assigned areas. Upon receiving written certification by the commander, the cadre

would be officially qualified as BOLC II trainers/coaches. Ideally, the length of the entire certification process would be approximately 10 weeks, and the cadre would be on temporary duty status in route. That is, the cadre would be on temporary duty status during their time at the centralized training facility. The cadre must successfully complete this training before returning to their BOLC II units to complete the rest of the certification process.

### ***Standardization of Training across Platoons***

There were several indicators in BOLC II suggesting that the platoons might be conducting/presenting material differently. To ensure that this does not negatively affect the training outcomes, steps must be established to ensure that all lieutenants are exposed to similar learning experiences.

One recommendation is for TRADOC to develop "hip pocket" training materials common to all sites. These materials could, for example, be used by the cadre following a specific block of instruction to reinforce key points during the training or discuss important decision points encountered by small unit leaders in mission scenarios similar to those presented in training.

Cadre members also need time to share and discuss the evaluation criteria for assessing lieutenant performance. This will ensure that they all have a common understanding of standards. For example, a combat arms cadre member may have different expectations of lieutenants in a field environment compared to a combat service support cadre member. If the training is not standardized between the platoons at a single site, then it will be difficult to provide standardized instruction across multiple sites.

### ***Specific Class Observations***

The key training issues and recommendations for specific classes are provided below.

***Small Group Instruction.*** The small group instruction class is a critical block of instruction for the cadre members to provide them with the necessary training techniques and methods for teaching lieutenants and creating competent leaders. The class for this ICP briefly described how to challenge lieutenants, ask leading questions, break down barriers in communication between the instructor and the lieutenants, and develop listening skills. More time is needed to ensure that all of the cadre members understand these methods and have an opportunity to practice them. Most of the cadre members have never served as small group instructors prior to BOLC II. Thus, this training will be invaluable to them as they serve in this capacity during BOLC II.

***Counseling.*** The counseling class is another important block of instruction for the cadre members. The cadre members need training on how to conduct evaluations of lieutenants, counsel officers, and interact with the lieutenants on a daily basis. The class for this ICP was completed in 30 minutes and was presented in a lecture format. In addition to providing the fundamentals of counseling (crawl phase using lecture format), ample time is required for the cadre members to observe examples of effective/ineffective counseling techniques and then actually practice counseling across different scenarios (walk/run phases) with feedback. Since most of the cadre members are junior NCOs, they have not been trained in counseling officers who outrank them. The cadre members need training and practice in this area, especially since it is one of the primary means for how the lieutenants will learn from their BOLC II experience.

**Conducting AARs.** AARs are a proven and valuable technique for improving decision-making and adaptive thinking skills. Effective AARs will serve as critical learning sessions for the lieutenants. To help prepare the BOLC II cadre to conduct AARs, the ICP could adopt the observer/controller (O/C) training approach used at the Combat Training Centers. This topic was not formerly taught during the ICP (a unit-level AAR class was not conducted during the ICP), but should be included in the ICP to ensure that the cadre know how to effectively conduct AARs.

**TCC.** The TCC is a valuable course because it establishes a common understanding and correct use of infantry doctrine and terminology among cadre. This is critical because the cadre members will be the "experts" in Infantry doctrine once they are at their assigned BOLC II sites. (According to Army training doctrine, all NCOs E6 and above are required to be able to read an operation overlay.) Thus, this class is essential for all cadre members (including 11B and combat arms MOSs), not just for those who will teach Infantry tactics.

The TCC should be considered as part of the centralized training curriculum as shown in Figure 1. The course could be modified (shortened) to include only the necessary information for the cadre to assist the lieutenants in their training (e. g., troop leading procedures, call for indirect fire, combat orders, and operational terms and graphics). It is imperative that instructors and leaders in the ICP use common doctrinal terms. The cadre members need to monitor each other throughout the ICP to reinforce this common terminology.

**Marksmanship Training.** The AMU training was viewed by many cadre members as very useful for building individual skills. Although the instruction may have increased the cadre members' confidence in their own marksmanship skills, it provided little information on the effective instructional or diagnostic techniques for training or assessing marksmanship skills in others, especially new firers. Subsequent iterations of the ICP should consider a revised approach to this block of instruction that focuses on training the cadre members to effectively coach lieutenants to increase their marksmanship skills to include instruction on assessing and diagnosing errors, instructing the cadre how to run a range, and providing specific details regarding the activities that will occur on the range (concurrent training and retraining, such as shadow boxes).

**Urban Operations.** The urban operations training was viewed, in general, in a very positive light by the cadre. However, some of the cadre members indicated that the training was confusing because of the conflicting perspectives presented by the various instructors. Specifically, the instructors, who were veteran cadre members/instructors, attempted to demonstrate both the doctrinally approved methodology as well as the tactics/techniques they employed successfully while assigned to their units in Iraq. This highlights a key training issue for the ICP. For each event, the ICP training should first introduce current doctrine focusing on the fundamentals. Then, the instructors could supplement the material with effective unit standard operating procedures. Further, the ICP should teach the cadre how to train lieutenants. The primary objective of the ICP urban operations training should be for the cadre to develop a strategy for improving the lieutenants' leadership skills, particularly decision-making/adaptive responding, in these (urban) environments. For example, the cadre could plan to have the lieutenants execute various urban operation missions that require them to react to unexpected events. This will give them opportunities to practice making decisions, adapting to new situations, and experiencing the outcomes of their decisions.

**Convoy Live Fire Exercise.** The strict safety procedures of the convoy live fire exercise limits the effectiveness of this training event in honing new lieutenants' decision-making,

planning, and execution skills at the platoon level. Consideration should be given to replacing this event with an alternative culminating event or series of events. One possible alternative to the convoy live fire exercise would be force-on-force training using a live OPFOR and non-lethal training ammunition. For example, a platoon-level exercise could be conducted where a platoon convoy is ambushed (both far and near ambushes) by the OPFOR as it negotiates a pre-determined route. Alternatively, events could be run out of the forward operating base (FOB) to include quick reaction force missions, FOB security, urban operations, etc. All missions would involve a live OPFOR and/or COB and would provide the lieutenants with realistic COE scenarios similar to what they will encounter as platoon leaders in the near future. One advantage of this approach is that the OPFOR/COB would be free to vary its tactics without the safety constraints of a live fire exercise. Thus, the lieutenants would have to react quickly in response to the rapidly changing situations. This would provide the cadre with an excellent opportunity to evaluate the lieutenants' adaptive thinking/decision-making skills across different mission scenarios.

**Land Navigation.** The cadre members executed the land navigation course (they were assessed on their land navigation skills) during this block of instruction. The prerequisite training for the land navigation test, the five-hour Applied Map Reading class, was not conducted. The results of the land navigation test and survey feedback indicated that many of the cadre members were not proficient in this skill. If cadre members are deficient in individual skills, such as land navigation, then they should receive the relevant training prior to the ICP. Since the cadre will be responsible for ensuring that the lieutenants can effectively navigate during BOLC II, the ICP should assess cadre members' individual proficiency in this area (as opposed to buddy teams).

### ***BOLC II End State Objectives***

One of the key BOLC II end state objectives is to produce adaptable leaders. Although adaptability was mentioned in the welcome briefings and discussed by certain instructors, the issue of integrating adaptability into the training was not always clear. For this ICP, the majority of the training was focused on basic knowledge and skill acquisition to ensure that all of the cadre members were familiarized on all BOLC II tasks and related skills.

To foster adaptability, the cadre must provide the lieutenants with the fundamentals for how to perform certain tasks. Thus, the cadre also must be proficient in these skills. However, once the lieutenants are familiarized on the tasks, the cadre should expose the lieutenants to multiple scenarios that allow them to apply the fundamentals in different ways. For example, if establishing 360-degree security is a critical concept that the cadre want to reinforce, then the cadre should present the lieutenants with multiple contexts in which a leader must establish 360 degree security such as reacting to contact during a convoy operation or moving down a street. Then, the cadre should evaluate the lieutenants on how well they apply this concept to different situations. By learning how to use the skill across a range of situations, the lieutenants will be more likely to adapt their behavior and use the skill effectively in novel situations.

Since, in reality, there are many tactically correct ways to do things, it is important to note that the emphasis of this training should be on the (tactical) soundness of the leaders' decisions. That is, the focus should be on whether the lieutenants make decisions that do not put their platoons/squads in danger. To maximize learning during this training, the cadre should directly question the lieutenants' rationale for their decisions, whether they considered alternative solutions, and whether they considered the consequences of their actions.



The ICP should provide the cadre with the appropriate tools (e. g., hip-pocket training materials, scenario-based training events/vignettes, training techniques) to accomplish these training objectives. To be effective in their roles as coaches and mentors, the cadre must be trained to provide the type of feedback that will positively affect the lieutenants' leadership development. Thus, future ICPs should place a greater emphasis on soft skill classes (e.g., small group instruction, counseling, AARs, cadre-officer interaction). Enhanced proficiency in these areas will enable the cadre to more effectively coach and mentor new lieutenants.

## SECTION II: BOLC II SINGLE-SITE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION (OBJECTIVES 2 - 3)

### Study Design Overview

The BOLC II single-site implementation was assessed to determine how well the course prepared the lieutenants to be leaders capable of operating in today's COE (Objective 3). In addition, lieutenants' knowledge of BOLC I tasks was assessed to determine how well BOLC I prepared them for BOLC II (Objective 2). Table 11 provides an overview of the study design. The study entailed a combination of paper-and-pencil instruments that were administered at selected times during the course, extensive training observations by the ARI research team, and informal interviews with lieutenants and cadre.

Table 11

#### *BOLC II Study Design*

<b>Pre- BOLC II (in-processing)</b>	<b>BOLC II Training</b>	<b>Post- BOLC II</b>
• Demographic Survey	• Leadership Assessment Report (cadre complete)	• End of Course Survey
• BOLC I Knowledge Test	• Training Observations (ARI)	• SJT II
• SJT I		• End of Course Leadership Assessment Report (cadre complete)
• Warrior Battle Drills & Tasks (in Demographic Survey)		• Adaptability Rating Scale (cadre complete)
		• Warrior Battle Drills & Tasks (in End of Course Survey)

## Instruments

### ***Pre-BOLC II Instruments (in-processing)***

***BOLC II Lieutenant Demographic Survey.*** This instrument (Appendix C) consisted of various demographic and training background data. In addition, the lieutenants were asked to report:

- How well prepared they were to lead a platoon in the execution of each of 9 Warrior battle drills (see page 21 for description).
- How confident they were in their ability to execute each of 39 Warrior tasks (see page 21 for summary description).

The lieutenants also were asked to rate themselves on these same drills and tasks after they completed BOLC II. Pre - Post BOLC II rating differences are discussed under Objective 3.

***BOLC I Knowledge Test.*** The test was developed to address Objective 2 (see above) and consisted of 53 scenario-based, multiple choice questions covering 42 selected BOLC I tasks (see Appendix D for the complete set of test items). The test was reviewed by SMEs from the three primary commissioning sources (OCS, ROTC, USMA) and a panel of experts from AAC. A sample item is provided below.

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*(130-xxx-0014). You are employing an M18A1 Claymore Mine at your position. You have completed your inventory. You are now going to conduct a circuit test. What visual cue do you use to determine that the Claymore firing circuit is active?*

- a. You visually observe each part to check for serviceability. No other cues are required.*
- b. You test fire the Claymore by attaching the M57 Firing Device directly to the firing wire connector and depress the M57 firing handle after placing the blasting cap under a sandbag.*
- c. You observe a spark arcing across the electrical terminals of the M57 Firing Device after depressing the M57 firing handle down. This confirms that an electrical charge is present.*
- d. The lamp in the window of the M40 Test Set flashes when the M57 Firing Device is properly attached and the M57 firing handle is depressed.*

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*The correct answer is "d. The lamp in the window of the M40 Test Set flashes when the M57 Firing Device is properly attached and the M57 firing handle is depressed." See STP 21-1-SMCT, Task 071-325-4425 Employ an M18A1 Claymore Mine, pg. 3-262 for additional details.*

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***SJT.*** The original intent of the SJT was to assess adaptability. However, the final version had a much broader focus and measured lieutenants' knowledge, cognitive capacities, problem-solving ability, and appraisal skills in response to simulated situations (see Appendix E). The lieutenants provided *best* and *worst* responses to 10 written scenarios relating to the COE. The scenarios were counterbalanced such that approximately 50% of the lieutenants received a different set of 10 scenarios pre and post BOLC II training. A sample item is presented below.

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***Example item:*** *While on patrol at 0200 you pass a set of government buildings for the third time. A call comes in from Higher telling you to report back to base right away. One of your*

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subordinates says, "Sir, there is a delivery van that wasn't there before." You haven't had any incidents in the last week, and the incident the week before was only a small group of rioters who were unhappy about the new curfew. What do you do?

- a. Comply with orders and head back.
- b. Radio Higher for permission to search or destroy the vehicle.
- c. Stop the unit and send an element to assess the vehicle.
- d. Note the location of the vehicle and report it to the S-2; ask if vehicles were used in neighboring villages to attack government buildings.
- e. Provide SITREP to Higher and request instructions.

**BEST ANSWER:** (e) You have been given a mission to return to base right away; you do not know the urgency or the reason, but Higher must have a purpose. However, Higher is not aware of the van that you just noticed. Therefore, provide this new information to Higher, let them weigh this along with other information they have, and provide you their instructions.

**WORST ANSWERS:** (a) This would be ignoring some potentially very useful information that might cause Higher to change its plans and potentially cause casualties. Higher does not know what is happening unless you tell them. This might become a higher priority than what they originally planned for your unit. **OR** (c) You have been given a directive to return to base right away. You should not deviate from this directive without discussing it with Higher. Make them aware of the new information and let them decide if your return can be delayed to investigate; you should not make that determination on your own.

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## **BOLC II Instruments during Training**

**Leadership Assessment Report.** The Leadership Assessment Report Book was developed to provide the cadre with a standardized tool to evaluate the lieutenants' performance. It was designed so that the cadre could rate the lieutenants' performance after each leadership opportunity in the course (i.e., physical training, garrison, classroom, field exercises, urban operations exercises, convoy live fire exercise). The assessment book contained a leadership measure that was developed from materials used by the U.S. Army Cadet Command in their leadership assessment program. The format was similar to an officer efficiency report and the academic efficiency reports used as evaluation tools in other U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) courses. The measure consisted of three parts.

- Part I was labeled "Character" and included items that reflected the lieutenants' adherence to the seven Army Values and seven Warrior Ethos Attributes, and performance on 16 leadership dimensions. The cadre rated the lieutenants on a four-point scale: 1) Needs much improvement; 2) Needs some improvement; 3) Satisfactory; 4) Excellent; with a not applicable option (Training situation, e.g., inadequate time, did not allow lieutenant to display this quality often enough to accurately rate.)
- Part II included one item that reflected an overall assessment of the lieutenants' performance.
- Part III included a record of observations and counseling statements where written comments were provided by the squad or platoon trainer.

Each book contained the assessment reports for one squad (10 lieutenants per squad) for the entire course. Thus, the book contained enough reports for each lieutenant: five leadership positions, six additional SPOT reports (additional pages for written comments reflecting positive or negative behavior), and a Warrior battle drills and tasks assessment per lieutenant.

**Training Observation Form.** Observation forms were used to capture the data in logical sections to facilitate reporting of the information. These sections included: training observed, training times, class structure, live fire training, sequence of events, and a space to write a narration of the training (see Appendix F).

### **Post-BOLC II Instruments**

**End of Course Survey: Lieutenants.** The lieutenants were administered an end of course survey that asked them to rate the following areas: POI and training, cadre, leadership training and counseling, platoon climate, how prepared and confident they were in performing the Warrior battle drills and tasks, time allocated for BOLC activities, and assessments of the overall BOLC II experience (see Appendix G).

**End of Course Leadership Assessment Report.** A survey was developed to assess the lieutenants' performance across the entire BOLC II course. This measure consisted of the same items as the Leadership Assessment Report Books, which were used throughout the course to collect leadership data. The cadre members rated each lieutenant in their squad at the end of the course on the seven Army values, seven Warrior Ethos attributes, and 16 leadership dimensions. The lieutenants were rated on a four-point scale (1 = Needs much improvement – rarely or never behaves this way; 2 = Needs some improvement – sometimes behaves this way; 3 = Satisfactory – usually behaves this way; 4 = Excellent – Always or almost always behaves this way) with a not applicable option (Training situation, e.g., inadequate time, did not allow lieutenant to display this quality often enough to rate (see Appendix H).

**Adaptability Rating Scale.** Adaptability was assessed with a measure that was based on the eight-factor model of Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon (2000) and the work of White et al. (2005) with Special Forces (SF) officers. The cadre members rated each lieutenant in their squad at the end of the course on the following four dimensions of adaptability:

- **Mental adaptability** - Handling emergencies/crisis situations, handling work stress, solving problems creatively, dealing effectively with unpredictable work situations.
- **Interpersonal adaptability** - Adjusting what one says and does to make interactions with other people run more smoothly and effectively.
- **Leading an adaptable unit** - Ability to develop adaptability in the unit by encouraging and rewarding adaptive behavior.
- **Physical adaptability** - Frequently pushes self physically to complete strenuous or demanding tasks.

The cadre members were provided behavioral examples of each dimension, which were based on critical incidents of adaptable behavior from White et al.'s work. The lieutenants were rated on a four-point scale (1 = Needs much improvement – rarely or never behaves this way; 2 = Needs some improvement – sometimes behaves this way; 3 = Satisfactory – usually behaves this way; 4 = Excellent – Always or almost always behaves this way) with a not applicable option (training situations did not allow lieutenant to display this quality often enough to rate (see Appendix I).

The Warrior Battle Drill and Task self-ratings (contained in the demographic and end of course surveys), the SJT, and leadership/adaptability scales described above were developed to provide a set of metrics to address, in part, Objective 3 (see Results section, Objective 3, for the rationale that guided the development of these instruments.)

***End of Course Survey: Cadre.*** The cadre completed an end of course survey to assess how well the ICP prepared them to be BOLC II trainers as well as provide feedback regarding the aspects of the BOLC II single-site initial implementation that were effective or not effective. The survey addressed the following areas: ICP training, leadership assessment, and counseling. Cadre also provided feedback for improving future ICPs and BOLC II implementation efforts (see Appendix J).

## Results

### *Lieutenant Demographics*

Of the 178 lieutenants who were on the assigned roster for this initial implementation, data were collected from 175 lieutenants. As shown in Table 12, the majority of the lieutenants (67%) received their pre-commissioning training from ROTC programs. The class was predominantly male (79%). Thirty-one percent of the lieutenants were prior enlisted. Approximately 5% of the lieutenants had some prior combat experience.

Table 12

### *Lieutenant Demographics*

Demographics	Frequency (%) (N = 175)
<b>Source of Commissioning</b>	
OCS	9 (5)
ROTC	118 (67)
USMA	30 (17)
Direct	8 (5)
Warrant Officers	5 (3)
PMA*	1 (1)
International Students	4 (2)
<b>Age</b>	<b>Mean = 23.77 (SD = 3.21)</b>
<b>Gender</b>	
Female	37 (21)
Male	138 (79)
<b>Status</b>	
Active Duty	131 (75)
National Guard on Active Duty	10 (6)
Army Reserve on Active Duty	32 (18)
Did not respond	1 (1)
<b>Prior Enlisted</b>	54 (31)
<b>Combat Experience</b>	8 (5)
<b>Civilian Education</b>	
High School/GED	1 (1)
Some College	6 (3)
Associates/2-year degree	3 (2)
Bachelor's/4-year degree	146 (83)
Advanced degree	16 (9)
Did not respond	1 (2)
<b>Army Training Courses</b>	
Basic Training	61 (35)
PLDC	17 (10)
BNCOC	8 (5)
Airborne	46 (26)
Ranger	1 (1)
Combat Life Saver	17 (10)
Other	32 (18)

Note. The full name for this commissioning source is unknown.

***Study Objective # 2: Review the linkages and appropriateness of BOLC I and II core tasks. Determine if the lieutenants are adequately prepared to attend BOLC II.***

To address this objective, a paper-and-pencil knowledge test was developed to assess lieutenants' knowledge on selected BOLC I prerequisite tasks and identify possible gaps in BOLC I training. Preliminary analyses indicated that one item reflected a task that the lieutenants were not taught in BOLC I and that another item was not written correctly. Thus, only 51 questions were scored. The majority of the lieutenants took the test (173 out of 178 lieutenants), and the average percent correct score was 54% (see Table 13 for the scores). The highest percent correct score was 76% while the lowest percent correct score was 20%. Warrant Officers received the highest scores with an average score of 63% while ROTC and Direct Commissions received the lowest average score of 53%. With the exception of the Warrant Officers, the average test scores and their dispersion were very similar across all the commissioning sources.

The low scores are not surprising if one takes into consideration that the lieutenants may have learned these BOLC I tasks several years ago. Clearly, the results indicated that the lieutenants may need refresher training on some BOLC I tasks during BOLC II. Moreover, although the lieutenants reported (on end of course surveys during preceding pilots and the current implementation) that previously learned BOLC I tasks should not be trained during BOLC II, it seems clear that maintaining acceptable levels of performance or knowledge in these areas requires repeated practice or exposure.

Table 13

*Mean Percent Correct Scores on BOLC I Knowledge Test by Commissioning Source*

Commissioning Source					
	Warrant Officers n=5	OCS n=9	USMA n=30	ROTC n=118	Direct N=8
<b>Mean</b>	63	56	56	53	53
<b>Range</b>	53 – 73	45 – 67	33 – 73	29 – 76	37 - 69



**Study Objective # 3: Review the BOLC II course and assess its overall ability to adequately prepare leaders to operate in today's COE.**

This objective was addressed, in part, by identifying the core skills and leader competencies that should be the primary focus of BOLC II. These skills were inferred from the BOLC II mission - ***To develop competent and confident adaptable lieutenants, grounded in Warrior tasks, able to lead Soldiers in the COE*** (Blocker, 2004). An analysis of the BOLC II mission and end state objective suggested the following core skills and leadership competencies.

An officer who is trained in the

- Warrior Battle Drills
- Warrior tasks

...who is

- Self-Aware
- Adaptable

...who demonstrates

- Characteristics of an Army leader
- Army values
- Embodies the Warrior Ethos

A set of paper-and-pencil instruments, described earlier, was developed (see Table 11) to assess these skills and competencies. The findings obtained from these instruments are described in the leadership assessment section. These findings were augmented by ARI's extensive training observations of the course which are described first.

### **Summary BOLC II Training Observations**

The BOLC II course was conducted from 10 July to 27 August 2005. The training schedule is summarized in Table 14. ARI researchers attended approximately 95% of all the classroom training and were present for all major field training events.

Table 14

*BOLC II Training Schedule*

<b>Week</b>	<b>Major Training Events</b>
<b>1</b>	Welcomes & Orientations In-processing CIF Equipment Issue Warrior Ethos/Soldiers Creed Army's Sexual Assault Prevention Employment Opportunity/Sexual Harassment Policies Army Substance Abuse Program APFT/PT Initial BOLC II Counseling Tactical Foot March (6.5km) Law of Land Warfare Adjust Indirect Fire Employ Close Air Support First Aid 9 BRM 1 & 2 AIMSS Modules 1 & 2 Confidence Course Heat Mitigation PE
<b>2</b>	PT AIMSS Modules 2 (Zero/Qualify with M68), 3, 4, and 5 IMT Buddy Shoot Tactical Foot March (9.7KM)
<b>3</b>	Basic Combatives Conduct Troop Leading Procedures Small Unit Operations and Tactics Participate in a Media Interview Land Navigation Classroom Training GPS Training Day/Night Land Navigation
<b>4</b>	PT Introduction to Warrior Battle Drills Introduction to U.S. Weapons (M2, M240B, M249, MK19, M203, M136, AT4) Extended Land Navigation STX
<b>5</b>	Mounted Battle Drills/IED EPW Handling/COB Operate Road Block/Checkpoint Tape Drills Urban Operations Night Infiltration Course Tactical Foot March (16KM)
<b>6</b>	PT Convoy Operations NBC Training First Aid Training Convoy Live Fire (Not Observed)
<b>7</b>	Final APFT Basic Combatives

The majority of the BOLC II training was conducted internally by the cadre (see Table 15). Training content followed the training support packages. Lieutenants were divided among five platoons. Each platoon contained six cadre members (1 Captain - platoon mentor, 1 SFC, and 4 SSGs). With few exceptions (ARM, Urban Operations) training was conducted at the company level.

Table 15

BOLC II Class by Instructor – Unit/Organizational Affiliation

Instructor	Training*
<b>BOLC II Cadre Members</b>	Warrior Ethos/Soldier Creed Army's Sexual Assault Prevention Equal Opportunity/Sexual Harassment Initial BOLC II Counseling Tactical Foot March (6.5KM) Law of Land Warfare Adjust Indirect Fire/Call for Fire First Aid 9 BRM 1 BRM 2 AIMSS Module 1 AIMSS Module 2A Heat mitigation PE AIMSS Module 2B (Zero and Qualify with M68) AIMSS Module 3 AIMSS Modules 4 and 5 ARM IMT Buddy Shoot Basic Combatives Tactical Foot March (9.7KM) Conduct TLP Small Unit Operations and Tactics Land Navigation Classroom Training GPS Training Day/Night Land Navigation Introduction to Warrior Battle Drills Extended Land Navigation STX Mounted Battle Drills/IED React To Contact Handle EPWs/COB PEs Operate Road Block/Checkpoint PEs Tape Drills Urban Operations Tactical Foot March (16 KM) Convoy Operations First Aid PT/APFT
<b>MEDDAC personnel</b>	In-processing
<b>Post Army Substance Abuse Program Office</b>	Army Substance Abuse Program
<b>CATD</b>	Employ Close Air Support
<b>Public Affairs Office</b>	Participate in a Media Interview
<b>29<sup>th</sup> IN REGT</b>	Introduction to U.S. Weapons Night Infiltration Course

## **Week 1**

### ***1SG Brief/Medical Records Screen***

The lieutenants received a handout (DA Form 4856 Developmental Counseling Form) consisting of company, battalion, and USAIS policies. The 1SG, A CO, 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN, went over the form and provided several additional clarifications regarding the lieutenants' behavior and unit standard operating procedures.

MEDDAC personnel went over specific forms that the lieutenants needed to complete (e.g., blood type, Privacy Act, health questionnaire, rank, grade, home information). The unit also reviewed additional BOLC II paperwork (e.g., vehicle registration for privately owned vehicle, officer/Warrior biosheet, next of kin, blood type, married/housing).

### ***Company Commander Orientation***

The company commander, A CO, 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN, provided information regarding the BOLC II class schedule, objectives, graduation requirements, expectations of the cadre, and behavior standards.

### ***Battalion Commander Orientation***

The Battalion Commander for the 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN presented a briefing on BOLC II. He addressed the following key issues:

- The BOLC II mission is to develop competent and confident leaders grounded in battle drills and tasks. The end state includes developing adaptable leaders.
- The major focus of BOLC II is to instill Warrior Ethos and the Army values.
- The overall BOLC model consists of the following three phases:
  - BOLC I - Task introduction
  - BOLC II - Task familiarity
  - BOLC III - Task proficiency.
- BOLC II includes all of the Warrior Battle Drills and Tasks, PT, and 3 field training exercises.
- The lieutenants will experience training at a FOB.
- The BOLC II graduation requirements consist of the following:
  - Pass APFT 60 percent.
  - Land Navigation (5/7 Day) (3/5 Night)/time limit 3 hours
  - Qualify with weapon
  - Satisfactory in 50 percent of the leadership evaluations
  - Complete all three field exercises.

### ***Regimental Commander Welcome***

The Regimental Commander for the 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN discussed what it means to be in the profession of arms, which is to protect the nation and win its wars.

### ***In-processing***

In-processing included the following areas: Standard Installation/Division Personnel System; finance; privately owned vehicle registration; privately owned weapon registration; and ID cards. Subject matter experts from Post Finance and the Adjutant General provided the in-processing instructions at the Soldier Readiness Center.

### ***S4/CIF Equipment Issue***

CIF is the consolidated post-wide warehouse where each Soldier receives the majority of the equipment and military-issued personal items needed to support field training for their particular class or unit on post. There is also some equipment necessary to support field training issued through the unit supply system (e.g., lensatic compasses, extra canteens, thermal underwear). This equipment is called the battalion S4-issued equipment. The unit drew 300 sets of equipment specific to BOLC II and issued the equipment from the unit supply room. The unit S4/CIF issue was well organized. The lieutenants picked up their equipment and received a hand receipt for the equipment. Then, the receipt of the equipment was checked item-by-item by both the individual receiving the equipment and the XO, A CO, 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN. Platoon initial counseling and room set-up were conducted concurrently. As one platoon completed their equipment check, another platoon was notified to move to the unit supply room to draw their equipment.

### ***Warrior Ethos/Soldier Creed***

The training reviewed the importance of the Soldier's Creed to all U.S. Soldiers. The Soldier's Creed helps define Soldiers, and at its heart are the four tenets of the Warrior Ethos. The training included several movie excerpts that highlighted the four tenets of Warrior Ethos. Then, in squads, the lieutenants identified the Warrior Ethos tenants for two scenarios (from the training support package) and presented these to the class. The training concluded with a group discussion of the vignette of SFC Shughart's sacrifice in Mogadishu.

### ***Army Sexual Assault Prevention***

The training reviewed the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention Program.

### ***Equal Opportunity/Sexual Harassment***

The training reviewed the Army's Equal Opportunity Program and the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Program.

### ***Army Substance Abuse Program***

The training was conducted in conjunction with other in-processing activities and reviewed the common illegal drugs often encountered by the unit chain of command and the perils of drunk driving. The lieutenants were advised that a drunken driving conviction while at Fort Benning would end their military career as an officer.

### ***Initial BOLC II Counseling***

Counseling sessions ran concurrently with the CIF issue during a three-day period. First, the lieutenants were counseled in platoons or squads and then individually by the platoon mentors. The lieutenants were given DA Form 4856 Developmental Counseling Form that had company, battalion, and USAIS policies printed on it. Two individual counseling sessions by two different platoon trainers were observed. The counseling sessions focused primarily on overall BOLC II standards of conduct. In subsequent conversations with three of the platoon trainers, all reported that the initial counseling should have included (lieutenant) academic performance expectations.

### ***Tactical Foot March (6.5KM)***

The training was a conditioning road march that was conducted by platoon with five minutes between platoons. The route was a total of four miles (two miles out, turn around, and return by the same route). The A CO commander, 1-11<sup>th</sup> IN, indicated that the pace would be a 19-minute mile with no breaks unless a platoon needed one. The uniform for the lieutenants was a camel back, a load carrying equipment (LCE), no head gear, and a rubber weapon. The platoons finished the march in approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. All personnel completed the road march.

### ***Law of Land Warfare***

The training reviewed the Code of Conduct, principals of the Law of Land Warfare, and the Rules of Engagement. The instructor provided an excellent review of the material because he included current events and examples from Afghanistan and Iraq into his presentation. He also asked the lieutenants numerous questions ("what ifs" and "what abouts"), and the lieutenants actively responded.

### ***Adjust Indirect Fire/Call for Fire***

The training reviewed the fundamentals of call for fire and adjust indirect fire. The instructor's knowledge of artillery and relaxed presentation style combined to provide a presentation that was easy to understand and actively involved the lieutenants. For example, the lieutenants participated in a simulated two-way radio traffic exercise in which they were the requesting units and the instructor acted as the artillery unit providing the fire. The instructor also used a very appropriate film clip from the movie *Platoon*, the scene where the observer accidentally called artillery fire on his own unit, to stress the importance of providing accurate information in the fire request message.

### ***Employ Close Air Support***

Training on aviation operations was substituted for the employ close air support class. The class covered the types of attack helicopter organizations, attack and reconnaissance capabilities and limitations, cargo and utility helicopter organizations and aircraft capabilities, and fundamentals of attack helicopter close combat attack.

## ***First Aid 9***

The training reviewed heat and cold injuries, field sanitation methods, and stress, nutrition, and tobacco issues. PEs (see below) were conducted as a separate class to reinforce the training.

### ***Heat mitigation PE.***

The training was a combination of lecture and group discussions with a question and answer period at the end of the training. The instructor used selected lieutenants as demonstrators for the various treatments of heat casualties. After identifying the three types of heat injuries, the lieutenants were asked to report the corresponding symptoms for each heat injury. Other lieutenants were then asked to specify treatments for each injury. The question and answer review consisted of the instructor asking selected lieutenants questions on symptom identification and treatments.

### ***BRM 1***

The training demonstrated a function check for an M4 or M4A1 carbine and the SPORTS (Slap, Pull, Observe, Release, Tap, and Shoot) procedure for correcting malfunctions of an M4 or M4A1 Carbine. After each demonstration, the lieutenants practiced performing the procedure with their weapons.

### ***BRM 2***

The training first demonstrated the disassembly and assembly of the M4. The lieutenants practiced disassembling and assembling their weapons in time with the demonstration. The training then demonstrated the prone unsupported firing position and reviewed the four fundamentals of marksmanship.

### ***AIMSS Module 1***

The training reviewed the characteristics, operation, and maintenance of the borelight. PEs were not conducted during the classroom instruction. However, the unit indicated that the platoons would perform hands-on training before the live fire zero.

### ***AIMSS Module 2A***

The training reviewed the characteristics, preventive maintenance checks and services, and operation of the CCO. The instructor was proficient with the training material and had a thorough knowledge of the CCO. Each lieutenant practiced turning on the CCO and mounting the CCO to the T8 rail position of their weapon. The class also reviewed how to tie the CCO to the weapon and how to zero the CCO after mounting it on a zeroed M-4 with backup iron sights. The training did not include a borelight or zero demonstration. However, the unit indicated that the platoons would perform hands-on training before the live fire zero.

### ***Confidence Course***

The confidence course was cancelled due to inclement weather.

## **Week 2**

### ***AIMSS Module 2B (Zero and Qualify with CCO)***

**Zero.** Each platoon used nine sequential firing points (25-meter) to zero. The lieutenants were given the choice to fire from the prone or foxhole position. Lieutenants who did not zero in 9 rounds were pulled from the firing line and received individual coaching from the cadre and further BRM 1 and 2 re-training that evening at the unit. Forty lieutenants (22%) zeroed the first day. All lieutenants successfully zeroed after three days.

**Qualify.** After the lieutenants zeroed, they walked to the qualifying range, which was run by a basic combat training (BCT) unit. The lieutenants were assigned to one of three firing points. Each lieutenant qualified using a total of 40 rounds (20 rounds from the prone supported position, 10 rounds from the prone unsupported position, and 10 from the kneeling firing position). The kneeling position was the standard for the BCT unit, thus the first BOLC II lieutenants to qualify had not practiced firing from this position. When the cadre members were informed that the lieutenants were qualifying from this position, they required the remaining lieutenants on the zero range to practice firing from this position and provided additional training that evening at the unit. Although only 30% of the lieutenants qualified within the USAIS standard of three attempts, all lieutenants qualified when given additional attempts.

### ***AIMSS Module 3***

The training reviewed the characteristics, operation, and maintenance of the AN/PVS-7(x)/14. Although this information was provided, the class did not have a hands-on portion of instruction for the lieutenants to familiarize themselves with this piece of equipment.

### ***AIMSS Modules 4 and 5***

The training reviewed the characteristics, preventive maintenance checks and services, and operation of the AN/PEQ-2A. Although this information was provided, the class did not have a hands-on portion of instruction for the lieutenants to familiarize themselves with this piece of equipment. The unit indicated that the boresight and zero procedures would be performed at the platoon-level at the company. The AN/PEQ-2A familiarization live fire (AIMSS 5) was cancelled due to inclement weather.

### ***ARM***

ARM uses reflexive firing techniques so that the firer can acquire a rapid sight picture to provide an accurate first kill capability in close combat situations. The platoons rotated through the following six stations: (1) Stance; (2) Aiming; (3) Magazine Change; (4) Barricades; (5) Blank/Live Fire; and, (6) concurrent training. Stations 1-5 were 30-minute classes and were conducted in sequence. For the sixth station, the cadre members could conduct any training that their platoons needed.

*Station 1* trained the fundamentals of stance, aiming, and magazine change. The lieutenants were taught the high and low ready positions, when and how to place the weapon on semi-automatic, and when to insert their finger on the trigger.



*Station 2* trained the fundamentals of aiming. Five E-type targets were used to demonstrate where to aim (face and neck area) to ensure fatal shots.

*Station 3* trained the proper method for conducting a magazine change.

*Station 4* trained the fundamentals of firing around cover (barricades) and moving from a standing position to a prone position and vice versa.

*Station 5* had 14 firing points/lanes with approximately a 3-meter lane separation for the blank/live fire. A range safety brief and a demonstration by a cadre member preceded the blank/live fire. Each lane had an E-type target with red, green, and yellow 6-inch squares across the chest region. The lieutenants fired following the commands from the OIC. For example, when the OIC called "up red" the lieutenants fired at the red square. The OIC identified friendly targets by designating a specific color, which changed after every third shot group (lieutenants fired two-round shot groups – a "double tap"). Firing at friendly targets resulted in friendly fire kills. The lieutenants fired from the standing position at the 25-, 10-, and 5-meter lines (in that order) with three magazines. Each lieutenant fired a total of 60 rounds (blanks first iteration, live ammunition second iteration). However, each magazine was loaded with an unknown number of rounds so that the lieutenants could practice unsuspected magazine changes. During the magazine changes, the range safeties tried to fluster the lieutenants by shouting at them. After each firing line was cleared, the lieutenants checked their targets.

### ***IMT - Buddy Shoot***

Three buddy team lanes (110-meters long) were used for this training. Each lane had six E-type targets (three per firer). Each platoon completed a walk through and blank fire prior to the live fire using all five lanes with three cadre members serving as range safeties. The average time per iteration was seven minutes. Each lieutenant was issued 60 blank rounds for the blank fire and 40 live rounds and a practice grenade for the live fire.

### ***Tactical Foot March (9.7KM)***

The training was a conditioning road march with no platoon separation. The planned route was to march out, turn around, and return by the same route. The company took one break at the turn around point. The assigned uniform was a LCE belt with suspenders, no head gear, rubber weapon, and rucksack (with a packing list). All personnel completed the march.

### Week 3

#### ***Basic Combatives***

Each platoon located their own combative training area, and each selected a grassy area large enough to allow 6 to 10 feet between pairs of lieutenants in a platoon circle formation. Some platoons provided more time for bouts while others used the time for practice. Both methods kept the lieutenants actively involved throughout the training periods. The cadre members observed the training and made any necessary corrections. The following table provides the training for each combative period conducted during this week.

<b>Periods 1 &amp; 2</b> Stand up in Base Establish the Fighter Stance Dominant Body Positions Back Mount Side Control Escape the Mount, Trap and Roll Pass the Guard Achieve the Mount from Side Control
<b>Period 3</b> Warm-up with Drill #1 Escape the Mount, Shrimp Escape Shrimp, PE Arm Push and Roll to the Rear Mount Escape the Rear Mount Conduct Drill #2
<b>Period 4</b> Warm-up/Review Pass the Guard, PE Employ Rear naked Choke (on knees) Employ the Cross Collar Choke from the Mount and Guard Bent Arm Bar. (mount and side control) Straight Arm Bar from the Mount 3-minute Bouts

### ***Conduct TLP***

The training reviewed the eight steps to Troop Leading Procedures. The instructor provided examples of the steps to TLP throughout the class. For example, the instructor provided an example of mission analysis by reading a lieutenant's mission statement and weather situation. The teaching point was that the moon would set two hours after the start of the mission, which meant that the movement would not have moonlight. The lieutenants received the following handouts: (1) guidelines for developing written orders; (2) an operation plan/order; (3) a warning order; (4) a fragmentary order; and (5) the mission analysis portion of the military decision-making process model.

### ***Small Unit Operations and Tactics***

The training was scheduled for a total of 23 hours over a three-day period (two days classroom/one day training in the garrison area). Only the first day, five hours of classroom training was observed. The classroom training covered 24 topics. Two platoon trainers indicated that the information would be reinforced during platoon training time and on the third day of this block of instruction.

### ***Participate in a Media Interview***

The training reviewed the following topics: media effects on public opinion, why talk to the media, why should the Army work with the media, finding a balance between our view of media and their view of us, 10 elements of news, verbal and non-verbal communication, how you sound and look, convey a message, and interview tactics, techniques, and procedures.

### ***Land Navigation Classroom Training***

The training reviewed the definition of map and contents, the military grid system, coordinate scales and using a protractor, measuring straight lines and distances, determining azimuth or direction, determining map declination, and performing map resection and modified resection. The lieutenants conducted practical exercises regarding the following topics: identify objects at specific grid locations, determine distance and direction, determine the curved line distance of a road segment, and conduct two iterations of resection and modified resection. The cadre members indicated that follow-on reinforcement classes would be conducted that evening prior to the land navigation examination.

### ***GPS Training***

The training reviewed the NAVSTAR GPS architecture, the components and general features of the AN/PSN-11 Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR), and familiarization of the AN/PSN-11 keyboard as well as a demonstration of fault isolation procedures, setup of the waypoint operation and navigation mode, and operation of the AN/PSN-11. The practical exercises required the lieutenants to confirm the grid locations and sequencing of the waypoints and to use the PLGR to identify objects located at waypoints in and around the classroom building. Since only 50 AN/PSN-11s were available, the training was conducted in 3- to 4-person teams.

## ***Day/Night Land Navigation***

***Day land navigation.*** The day land navigation test was conducted on a 3X4 km land navigation site consisting of standard Georgia terrain (hilly and swampy with over grown clear cuts). The unit provided the lieutenants with the following guidance: (1) locate 4 out of 6 points within 4 hours, (2) navigate the course in buddy teams, (3) talk to other buddy teams, (4) use their cell phones and call cadre SL to verify points before reporting to control point for grading, (5) finish at the point from which they started. The cadre members were instructed to inform the lieutenants if an incorrect point was located

Each lieutenant was required to verify the accuracy of their compass (at a compass check station [notched 2x4]) and conduct a 600m pace course before beginning the test. Individual platoon start times began after the entire platoon was issued grade sheets and before the lieutenants were allowed to plot their first grid coordinate. Buddy teams were allowed to depart the control/start point after plotting one or all points. The lieutenants were allowed to use roads to travel to their attack points for the final wooded movement to their point.

Eighty five percent of the lieutenants passed the day land navigation test on their first attempt (151/177). The remaining 15% (26/177) passed on their second attempt.

***Night land navigation.*** The night land navigation test was conducted in three hours on the day land navigation site. The unit guidance for this event was the same as described for the day land navigation training except for the following: (1) locate 2 out of 4 points within 4 hours, and (2) the grading point was the same as the start point.

Some platoons rotated lieutenants so that new buddy teams were formed while others did not. Individual platoon start times began after the entire platoon was issued grade sheets and before the lieutenants were allowed to plot their first grid coordinate. Buddy teams were allowed to depart the control/start point after plotting one or all points. The lieutenants were allowed to use roads to travel to their attack points for the final wooded movement to their point.

Sixty-seven percent (116/173) passed night land navigation test on their first attempt. Twenty seven percent passed on their second attempt. Six percent of the lieutenants did not pass on their second attempt.

## **Week 4**

### ***Introduction to Warrior Battle Drills***

During one session of the training, one platoon assigned leadership roles and executed a scenario. The platoon conducted a combat patrol and encountered an abandoned vehicle on the side of the trail. This vehicle contained an IED, which was visible on the passenger floorboards. Later in the exercise, the platoon encountered another IED that detonated and forced the platoon to conduct a react to contact drill. One cadre member provided instruction during the scenario and role-played with the platoon leader during a simulated radio report to higher. The cadre member also held AARs after each event (react to IED and react to contact drills).

During a second session of the training, one platoon performed convoy operations consisting of mounting and dismounting stationary High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). A second platoon performed a terrain walk and actions at halts training. Two other platoons performed patrolling exercises.

### ***Introduction to U.S. Weapons (M2, M240B, M249, MK19, M203, M136, AT4)***

The training was scheduled over a two-day period. However, only the first day was observed. On the first day, the unit trained with the M2 Cal .50 Machine Gun, the MK19 Mod3 40mm Grenade Machine Gun, and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). The training was conducted in three groups for the three weapon systems. On the second day, the unit was scheduled to train on the M136 AT-4, M240B Machinegun, and the M203 40MM Grenade Launcher.

The training for the M2 Cal .50 Machine Gun reviewed the M2 characteristics, functions and components, assembly/disassembly, and firing positions as well as how to load, perform safety checks, correct malfunctions (immediate action drill), and set the headspace and timing for the M2. A practical exercise required the lieutenants to set the headspace and timing. Six weapons were available for this exercise, which resulted in a 4-to-1 lieutenant-to-weapon ratio. The firing line consisted of three M2 guns, and the lieutenants fired three 5-round bursts with ball and then blank ammunition since there was not enough live ammunition for everyone. Depending on their firing order, many lieutenants fired only blank ammunition.

The M249 SAW training reviewed the SAW functions and components, operation, assembly/disassembly, and firing positions as well as how to load/unload and correct malfunctions (immediate action drill) of the SAW. The lieutenants conducted a practical exercise on assembly and disassembly. Twenty-five SAWs were available for the exercise, resulting in a 2-to-1 lieutenant-to-weapon ratio. The firing line consisted of 10 SAWs; however, only blank ammunition was available.

The MK19 training reviewed the MK19 characteristics, capabilities, and firing positions as well as how to load/unload and correct malfunctions (immediate action drill). A practical exercise on loading and unloading and immediate action drills was conducted prior to each group firing the MK19. Ammunition shortfalls curtailed firing to three lieutenants per platoon.

### ***Extended Land Navigation STX***

The extended land navigation STX training was scheduled as a 40-hour continuous operation field exercise over a two-day period. The purpose of the training was to maximize learning and evaluation opportunities, add stress to the lieutenant evaluations, and train for continuous operations. The training consisted of five STX lanes containing both intermediate and final objectives (see table below). After completing each subordinate task, the cadre members ENDEXED the lane, conducted an AAR, designated new leadership, allowed the lieutenants to plan and prepare, and initiated movement to the next objective. The pattern of the STX lanes was circular. Each platoon began the training at a different lane and rotated to the next lane after successfully negotiating both the intermediate and final objectives for the lane. On average, the platoons completed 1 lane the first day and 1 to 1½ lanes the second day.

<b>STX Lanes</b>	<b>Mission and Subtasks</b>
Lane 1 Mission Subtask A Subtask B	Rescue a recently downed A-10 pilot <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Locate Downed Pilot</li><li>• Establish an Ambush</li></ul>
Lane 2 Mission  Subtask A Subtask B	Conduct area reconnaissance of potential helicopter pick up/drop off zone to determine viability of helicopter operations from within sector <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Conduct an Area Reconnaissance</li><li>• Evacuate a Casualty</li></ul>
Lane 3 Mission Subtask A Subtask B	Locate and destroy enemy positions <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• React to Indirect Fire</li><li>• Adjust Indirect Fire</li></ul>
Lane 4 Mission  Subtask A Subtask B	Conduct movement to and reconnaissance of potential enemy IED manufacturing site to identify and record any signs of IED manufacturing activity <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• React to Indirect Fire</li><li>• Conduct Point Reconnaissance</li></ul>
Lane 5 Mission  Subtask A Subtask B	Conduct movement to and reconnaissance of enemy cache point to secure and destroy all enemy weapons and ammunition <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• React to Indirect Fire</li><li>• React to Unexploded Ordinance</li></ul>

## **Week 5**

### ***Mounted Battle Drills/IED React to Contact Practical Exercises***

The training was conducted as one of four stations that included practical exercises for mounted Battle Drills/IED react to contact, handle EPWs/COB, operate road blocks/checkpoints, and tape drills consisting of room clearing operations in an urban environment. Each station consisted of hands-on training in which the lieutenants performed the required tasks.

For the mounted Battle Drills/IED react to contact training, all the platoons practiced mounting and dismounting HMMWVs. One platoon also required the lieutenants to participate in a squad-level exercise. Two cadre members drove HMMWVs along the FOB perimeter. Another cadre member acted as the platoon leader and directed the lieutenant squad leaders (SLs) and their respective squads to react as appropriate. The squads reacted to an unblocked ambush and a blocked ambush.

### ***Handle EPWs/COB Practical Exercises***

The training reviewed the fundamentals for handling/searching EPWs. The instructor demonstrated and explained why certain takedowns are used. He also taught how to control a person with one hand by making them interlace their fingers and then grabbing them. He taught the correct method for using the plastic handcuffs (zip ties) and the importance of not letting an enemy soldier flex his hands while the cuff is being applied because he could then relax his hands and possibly free himself. He explained why sandbags are no longer used to cover an EPW or a detainee, and why a detainee's identification must be safeguarded. He also stressed that women should search women and men should search men. The instructor provided personal experiences as examples. This instructional technique generated many questions from the lieutenants. The lieutenants were then paired off and conducted takedowns and searches.

### ***Operate Road Block/Checkpoint Practical Exercises***

The training reviewed the fundamentals for operating road blocks/checkpoints. The instructor explained why certain distances are absolute while others are METT-TC dependent. The instructor provided a review of the material by relating his personal Iraq and Afghanistan checkpoint experiences to the lieutenants. These war stories generated many questions. The lieutenants manned the checkpoint while two cadre members drove their vehicles through the checkpoint. The lieutenants were told what to look for as they searched the vehicles and drivers.

### ***Tape Drills***

The training reviewed the fundamentals for breaching, entering, and clearing a room. The instructor reviewed the four-man stack and how to breach a door using the ram. The instructor explained that the number 4-man would be the breach man and enter the room last. The breach man would drop the ram outside the door and enter the room with both hands on his weapon. Then, after the room was cleared, the ram would be recovered. The instructor then reviewed room clearing procedures.

## **Urban Operations**

The urban operations training was conducted over three days including one night training event. The training was conducted at a MOUT site, which was designed specifically to conduct urban operations training. The lieutenants performed team and squad dismounted and mounted drills (see table below).

The training on the first day included the 4-man stack to clear a room, variations of room clearing operations (e.g., clearing a stairway, clearing a hallway, and limited visibility room clearing with the AN/PVS-7), clearing multiple rooms, and conducting presence patrolling - moving tactically down a street as a member of a squad and platoon (dismounted), and reacting to contact (dismounted). The training for the afternoon and evening included both dry-fire operations and the use of an internal OPFOR. The night training with the AN/PVS-7 included 40 rounds per lieutenant and a live OPFOR.

The training on the second day included a live OPFOR and consisted of further training on dismounted presence patrolling, convoy operations in an urban environment, react to IED, and react to contact (both mounted and dismounted) drills. Each lieutenant was issued 40 rounds each for the morning and afternoon training.

The training on the third day was unobserved, but the unit indicated that it was a continuation of training conducted on day two.

<b>Day 1</b> Team Training: One Room Entry Using 4-Man Stack Team Training: Multi-Room Clearing Squad Training: Multi-Room Clearing Squad Training: Clearing Hallways and Stairwells Squad-Level Entry and Breeching Operations Practice: One Room Entry Using 4-Man Stack; Multi-Room Clearing Multiple Room Clearing Operations With AN/PVS-7
<b>Day 2</b> Station 1: Mounted Convoy Operations React to IED/React to Contact Station 2: Mounted Convoy Operations React to IED/React to Contact Station 3: Dismounted Platoon-Level Presence Patrols With IED/OPFOR and React to Contact Station 4: OPFOR Duty to Support Station 1-3 and 5 Station 5: Breeching Operations
<b>Day 3</b> Not Observed



### ***Night Infiltration Course***

The night infiltration course is designed to reinforce IMT training under simulated combat conditions. IMT skills include the high crawl, low crawl, back crawl under wire obstacles, and react to flares. Actions also include freezing when the ground or aerial flare goes up and keeping a low profile to avoid detection by the enemy when moving through the woods. Machine gun rounds are carefully fired over the lieutenants' heads to replicate combat conditions. The lieutenant uniform was battle dress uniform, helmet, interceptor body armor, and rubber weapon.

### ***Tactical Foot March (16 KM)***

The training was conducted as a conditioning road march. The company departed the FOB in a mass formation with less than 3-feet between platoons. The route was 8km out, turn around, and return by the same route. There was one break at the turn around. The uniform was a LCE, real weapon, rucksack with packing list, and no head gear. The march was completed in 4 hours and 37 minutes. Three lieutenants did not complete the march.

## **Week 6**

### ***Convoy Operations***

The training was conducted as one of three stations. The other two stations were NBC and First Aid Training. Two platoons were observed. One platoon issued a mission brief to the designated lieutenant platoon leader the morning of the training while the other platoon developed a platoon OPOD and issued it to the entire platoon the night before and then required each squad to create a platoon order. Then, a single lieutenant was selected to issue the squad order to the platoon for the day's mission. Each platoon was given a circular route of approximately 7 km. The cadre plan called for a 30-minute separation between platoons.

There were four planned events, however only three were observed: unblocked ambush with OPFOR, react to an IED, and a second IED with a civilian. For the second event, if the lieutenants saw the IED they were supposed to stop short and secure the area around the IED site. If the lieutenants did not see the IED, then it would explode causing friendly casualties that would require the lieutenants to move back 200-meters, set up an LZ with the inverted "Y", and call for a MEDEVAC. Cadre members conducted AARs after each event.

### ***NBC***

The NBC training was not observed.

### ***First Aid***

The training reviewed the following tasks: First aid 1: Evaluate a casualty for life-threatening conditions, 2: Manage the airway, and 8: cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR). All practical exercises were conducted at the end of training in four-person groups. The first lieutenant evaluated the casualty, the second cleared the airway, the third treated a chest wound, and the fourth inserted a nasal airway. The process continued until all eight subtasks associated with the three primary first aid tasks (listed above) were performed by one lieutenant.

## **Week 7**

### ***Basic Combatives***

During the final combatives session, two platoons performed Period 4 combatives (see the description during Week 3), one platoon completed Period 5 combatives (see below), and one platoon was not observed.

#### **Period 5\***

Escape the Mount, Practical Exercise  
Straight Arm Bar from the Guard  
Sweep from the Attempted Straight Arm Bar  
Scissors Sweep from the Attempted Straight Arm Bar  
Front Takedown to the Mount  
Close the Gap and Achieve the Clinch  
3- minutes Bouts

### ***Final APFT***

Only the lieutenants who failed the initial APFT participated in the final APFT (20 lieutenants total).

## PT

The BOLC II PT was conducted at the platoon-level either at the company area or at the FOB. PT sessions included a warm-up period, the main PT activity, and a cool-down/stretching period. The main activity consisted of running or intervals lower/upper body exercises. One platoon performed battle-focused PT (e.g., carrying Skedcos and water bottles) during one of the PT sessions. The following PT sessions were conducted.

Scheduled	PT
11 JUL – Initial APFT	Cancelled due to weather
12 JUL – Initial APFT*	Conducted
14 JUL	Conducted
15 JUL	Conducted
18 JUL	Conducted
19 JUL	Not Conducted
20 JUL	Not Conducted
21 JUL	Not Conducted
22 JUL	Not Conducted
23 JUL	Not Observed
1 AUG	Not Conducted
2 AUG	Conducted
3 AUG	Conducted
15 AUG	Not Conducted
16 AUG	Conducted
17 AUG	Conducted
18 AUG	Conducted (2 Platoons)
19 AUG	Conducted
22 AUG – Final APFT*	Conducted

## **Leadership Assessment Measures**

### ***Proficiency in Warrior Battle Drills and Tasks***

One of the key objectives of the BOLC II mission is to develop Soldiers (new lieutenants) who are grounded in the Warrior battle drills and tasks. The lieutenants provided pre and post ratings for how well prepared they were to lead a platoon in the execution of the Warrior battle drills and how confident they were in their ability to execute each of the Warrior tasks.

The majority of the lieutenants reported that they were prepared to lead a platoon in the execution of the battle drills (prepared/very well prepared/extremely prepared - could teach the drill to others) and were confident in their ability to execute the tasks (confident/very confident/extremely confident could teach this task to others) following BOLC II. (See Appendix C and G for the frequencies of lieutenants in these categories, pre and post BOLC II, respectively.)

Further, a comparison of the pre-post means (t-test analyses) indicated that the lieutenants felt significantly (at least at the  $p < .05$  level) more prepared in leading a platoon in the execution of all of the Warrior battle drills following BOLC II (see Appendix K for the results of the t-test analyses). Additionally, the lieutenants were significantly more confident in their ability to execute the majority (87%) of the Warrior tasks following BOLC II. However, there was no change in their confidence for qualifying with their assigned weapon because the lieutenants provided very high confidence ratings prior to BOLC II. There also was no change in confidence for using the AN/PAS-13 (Thermal Weapon Sight), AN/TVS-5 (Crew Served Weapon Night Vision Sight), AN/PEQ-2A (Aiming Light), and the AN/PAQ-4 (Aiming Light) because these classes were cancelled during BOLC II. Finally, the lieutenants felt less confident in the task of "employing a M18 Claymore mine and hand grenades" after BOLC II. However, it is important to note that BOLC II did not include instruction on employing the M18 Claymore mine.

An attempt was made to obtain independent assessments of lieutenant proficiency on the Warrior battle drills and tasks from the cadre. However, the cadre were not able to reliably provide this information for several reasons. First, the cadre members were neither instructed on the standards for judging performance on these drills and tasks, nor were they provided with "cheat sheets" listing the standards. Second, the cadre were not instructed how to observe lieutenants (more than one) performing different tasks within the same mission or training event and accurately rate their performance. Finally, in some instances, the training events (schedule/limited time) did not allow the lieutenants to adequately perform some tasks for the cadre to provide accurate ratings of their proficiency. Thus, the high OPTEMPO and unclear guidance on how to conduct these assessments impacted the cadre's ability to provide ratings of the lieutenants' performance in this area. If these assessments are used in future BOLC II courses to help cadre counsel lieutenants in these areas, then the cadre will need more training in making these assessments.

### ***Leadership Assessment Report Book***

As noted earlier, the Leadership Assessment Report Book was developed to provide the cadre with a standardized tool to evaluate the lieutenants' performance. It was designed so that the cadre could rate the lieutenants' performance after each leadership opportunity in the course (i. e., physical training, garrison, classroom, field exercises, urban operations exercises, and convoy live fire exercise).

The data collected from the Leadership Assessment Report Book indicated that the cadre members did not use it correctly. Data entry inconsistencies precluded any type of formal analysis. Subsequent feedback from the cadre suggested that they did not receive adequate training on how to use the book and on the entire assessment process. The Leadership Assessment Book was the sole instrument used by the cadre to make standardized assessments of the lieutenants' performance on the leadership dimensions described above. The cadre members were instructed to use the data collected in the book to counsel lieutenants on their performance. Although the classroom training on the use of the book was informative, the cadre members clearly needed more time to familiarize themselves with the leadership dimensions and more practice using the book in assessment situations.

### ***End of Course Leadership Assessment***

The End of Course Leadership Assessment Report consisted of the same seven Army values, seven Warrior Ethos attributes, and 16 leadership dimensions (three attributes, four skills, and nine actions) contained in the Leadership Assessment Report that the cadre used during the course. The cadre based their ratings on the lieutenants' performance across the entire course. The lieutenants' average scores for each cluster of leadership categories described above were computed. Next, the percentage of lieutenants with ratings of 3 (satisfactory) or excellent (4) was computed. The majority (75%) of the lieutenants received satisfactory or excellent scores in these areas: Warrior Ethos (84%), Army values (95%), Leader attributes (83%), skills (76%) and actions (80%). See Appendix H for the scores.

### ***Adaptability***

The cadre members rated each lieutenant in their squad at the end of the course on four dimensions of adaptability described earlier (mental, interpersonal, leading an adaptable unit and physical). Ratings were based on observations of lieutenant behavior throughout the course. An average adaptability rating was computed for each lieutenant. Next, the percentage of lieutenants receiving a rating of 3 (satisfactory) or 4 (excellent) was computed. The majority (82%) of the lieutenants received satisfactory or excellent scores in these areas (see Appendix I for the scores).

Adaptability was positively (significantly) related to many of the FM 22-100 leadership dimensions ( $r = .16 - .74$ , at least at the  $p < .05$  level). Furthermore, the results of confirmatory factor analyses using structural equation modeling suggested that adaptive performance may overlap with leader actions reflecting building, assessing, and motivating behaviors. Finally, the results from a hierarchical regression analysis indicated that adaptability contributed uniquely to the assessment of overall leadership performance ( $\Delta R^2 = .10$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

The results demonstrated that adaptability is an important aspect of leadership effectiveness and should be trained in addition to the leadership dimensions described in FM 22-100. However, it is important to note that ARI observed very limited specific instruction focused on enhancing the lieutenants' adaptive performance during this BOLC II initial implementation. Thus, these ratings may not provide an accurate representation of how the lieutenants would actually perform in situations requiring a high level of adaptability (i.e., effectively responding to changing situations). If adaptability is viewed as a key skill to be fostered in BOLC II, then specific training events must be integrated into the BOLC II program of instruction that challenge the lieutenants' decision-making and adaptive thinking skills.

## **SJT**

The initial analyses showed that the two versions of the SJT (different sets of scenarios) were not equivalent, which precluded a valid assessment of change in problem-solving ability pre-post BOLC II. Thus, only the post BOLC II SJT results are reported. These indicated that 27% and 29% of the lieutenants provided the correct *best* answer for five or more of the items for SJT A and SJT B, respectively (see Appendix E for the scores). Sixteen percent and 22% of the lieutenants provided the correct *worst* answer for five or more of the items for SJT A and SJT B, respectively. The average correct *best* responses was 4.76 ( $SD = 1.61$ ) for SJT A and 5.27 ( $SD = 1.85$ ) for SJT B while the average correct *worst* responses was 4.16 ( $SD = 1.33$ ) for SJT A and 4.76 ( $SD = 1.74$ ) for SJT B. The SJT scenarios proved to be very challenging for the new lieutenants, and two platoon mentors requested the SJT items to use as hip pocket training materials. The platoon mentors felt that the scenarios addressed many of the dilemmas typically faced by lieutenants in the COE and could serve as excellent discussion points during BOLC II.

## ***BOLC II Leadership Assessment: Conclusion***

The leadership/adaptability assessments from two of the instruments (*End of Course Leadership Assessment Report* and the *Adaptability Survey*) provided by the cadre showed that the majority of lieutenants received either satisfactory or excellent scores. However, it is difficult to determine what impact BOLC II had in improving lieutenants' leadership skills during the course. As already noted, very little formal training on improving adaptive performance/decision-making was provided during the course. The high OPTEMPO of the course precluded the administration of these (leadership/adaptability) measures earlier to assess any pre - post differences. For some leadership qualities, e. g., leadership values, the five week BOLC II experience may be too short to produce reliable changes in behavior.

A reliable, valid set of leadership measures is needed for this course since they provide the foundation for leadership development counseling provided by the cadre. The instruments developed for this initial implementation (if formally adopted for use in BOLC II) will require further refinement to better fit the objectives of the course. One possible refinement could entail streamlining the Leader Assessment Report (e.g., revising the rating format, reducing the number of qualities rated).

## End of Course Survey

The lieutenants were administered an end of course survey that covered the following areas: POI and training, cadre, leadership training and counseling, platoon climate, time allocated for BOLC activities, and assessments of the overall BOLC II experience (see Appendix G for a complete summary of responses by item). Surveys were completed by 166 lieutenants. The key findings from the survey are presented below.

*The following three sections reflect lieutenants' written responses to open-ended questions.*

**Things that are good/going well in BOLC II.** Key areas mentioned by at least 10% of the lieutenants included urban operations training (55%), convoy operations training (31%), new equipment/weapons familiarization training (25%), the BOLC concept (23%), and combatives (10%).

**Most important skills learned (open-ended responses).** When the lieutenants were asked to list the most important skills they acquired during BOLC II, the most frequently mentioned skills were COE oriented and included urban operations (69%) and convoy operations (58%). Not surprisingly, after BOLC II lieutenants felt confident or very confident in performing such COE related tasks as entering a building (93%), engaging targets in an urban environment (89%), executing movement techniques in an urban environment (86%), reacting to IED (66%), and preparing a vehicle in a convoy (58%).

**Training improvements.** Five overarching areas were identified by the lieutenants as needing improvement. These areas were professional treatment of lieutenants by cadre (52%), time management (51%), more predictable training schedules (44%), better course planning/preparation/organization (15%), and living conditions/barracks maintenance details/lack of foot lockers (10%).

In addition, the lieutenants identified several BOLC II training content areas that needed improvement or required further review for course relevance. The areas mentioned were more physical training (58%); (less) redundancy of training tasks between BOLC I and BOLC II (43%); more realistic FOB training events (i.e., FOB should not be used primarily for conducting administrative activities); more time for urban operations training (20%); a review of the extended land navigation as a COE-relevant training event (17%); more time for convoy operations training (16%); and a review of the night infiltration course as a relevant training event (15%).

**Time allotted for training activities.** The lieutenants felt the time devoted to performing the following activities was not nearly and/or not quite enough:

- Physical training (87%)
- Combatives (66%)
- Plan for and adjust indirect fire (60%)
- Set-up operate checkpoint/roadblock (58%)
- Countering terrorist attacks (49%)
- Identify IED (49%)
- Employ close air support (49%)
- Handling EPWs/COBs (47%)
- Participate in media interview (46%)



As a result of inefficient time management and the dynamic training schedule (mentioned above) certain areas of training were identified as needing improvement. One of these was PT. Often PT was eliminated or curtailed due to scheduling issues. As a result, virtually all lieutenants (96%) felt that the normal PT (unit runs and exercises) conducted during BOLC II did not adequately sustain them for the APFT. Similarly, a large percentage of the lieutenants (74%) felt that the BOLC II fitness training (combatives, road marches) did not sustain them for their APFT.

**Training standards.** The lieutenants also reported that inconsistent application and enforcement of standards affected the training. When asked, for example, whether the BOLC II training was conducted to standard rather than to available time, 83% felt that the training was conducted to available time. With regard to whether the platoons were following the same standards, the majority of the lieutenants (62%) felt that their platoon did not use the same standards as the other platoons.

**Cadre.** Overall, the lieutenants' perceptions of the cadre were mixed. Although 64% of the lieutenants rated the cadre members as good mentors, 55% agreed or strongly agreed that the cadre's leadership perspective and philosophy were good examples to follow, that the cadre helped them to understand what it means to be a leader (52%), and that they would recommend the cadre members as role models (50%).

**Leadership training improvements.** The lieutenants were asked to rate specific leadership training areas, and the results indicated some training deficiencies. The lieutenants felt that BOLC II did not help them learn how to prepare an operation order (93%) or prepare them for their role as a platoon leader (83%). The classroom instruction on doctrinal leadership (FM 22-100) was not perceived as useful (72%). The lieutenants also felt that BOLC II did little to further their understanding of troop leading procedures (68%). Forty-nine percent of the lieutenants felt that BOLC II made them a better leader.

When asked to specify the areas of BOLC II that needed the most improvement, some lieutenants identified general leadership training issues. The lieutenants (31%) felt that they needed more decision-making opportunities and a greater role in the planning and execution of events as opposed to having the cadre doing the majority of the work in these areas. Additionally, they felt that the execution of training events should be at the platoon versus squad level (20%), and that they needed more leadership positions/training opportunities (11%). (*Note. This question was open ended and not all lieutenants provided responses. Thus, the percentages are lower than questions requiring a scaled response, e.g., strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, in which all lieutenants responded.*)

**Counseling.** The lieutenants provided ratings for several counseling items. The findings indicated that counseling, as a whole, was not taken seriously (78%). The lieutenants did not feel that the counseling they received during BOLC II made them better leaders (69%). Forty-five percent of the lieutenants felt that not nearly/not quite enough time was spent on counseling individual performance. Another 36% indicated that counseling (lieutenant performance) was not conducted. The lieutenants also felt that the cadre were not prepared to teach counseling (59%).

**Overall reactions to the BOLC II training.** The lieutenants' reactions to this BOLC II initial implementation indicated that significant improvements to the training are needed. Table 16 summarizes the lieutenants' overall ratings of the course. The majority of the lieutenants felt that their commitment to the Army had not risen as a result of BOLC II and that BOLC II did little

to increase their excitement about starting their careers as Army officers. They also felt they learned very little during BOLC II and indicated that BOLC II was worse/much worse than what they had expected. Finally, the lieutenants were asked to rate how well the course addressed the BOLC II mission, (i.e., *How would you rate BOLC II in developing you as a competent and confident officer who is grounded in the Warrior tasks and able to lead Soldiers in the contemporary operational environment?*) On a scale ranging from 1 (the worst training you ever received) to 10 (the best training you ever received), 61% of the lieutenants rated the course a four or below.

Table 16

Overall Reactions to BOLC II Training

End of Course Survey Item	Lieutenants' Responses
As a result of this course, I am excited about starting my career as an Army officer.	63% disagreed/strongly disagreed
My commitment to the Army has risen as a result of the BOLC II experience.	81% disagreed/strongly disagreed
I learned a lot during BOLC II.	55 % disagreed/strongly disagreed
BOLC II expectations.	72% rated BOLC II as worse/much worse than expected
How would you rate BOLC II in developing you as a competent and confident officer who is grounded in warrior tasks and able to lead Soldiers in the COE?	61% rated BOLC II a "4" or below on a 10 point scale. (1 = worst training ever received; 10 = best training ever received)

## Recurring Issues

ARI conducted four previous pilot studies (see page 1 for references) and reported six key lessons which continue, in varying degrees, to be issues for this implementation.

- Select and prepare motivated cadre
- Set/enforce course and graduation requirements
- Develop a relevant Program of Instruction focused on lieutenant skills
- Improve counseling training
- Treat lieutenants as commissioned officers
- Ensure cadre members and lieutenants understand the BOLC II purpose

**Select and prepare motivated cadre.** The cadre members are the centerpiece of BOLC II. While strict selection standards (Drill Sergeant) were imposed for this ICP, as noted earlier, the focus of the ICP was on familiarizing and improving cadre proficiency on the Warrior tasks. Very little time was used to train cadre members for their critical roles as teachers, coaches, and mentors in BOLC II. Although the ICP (conducted 25 September - 28 October 2005) addressed some of these issues, specifically the coach/mentor concept, there are still some concerns on the effectiveness of the training received to prepare the cadre for these roles.

One of the key problems is that the cadre members have not universally understood, nor have some completely accepted, their roles as coaches/mentors for the lieutenants. If the BOLC II mission is to be fully successful, then the cadre members must have a clear understanding of what is expected of them and actively embrace their roles as coaches and mentors. Moreover, without an ICP that contains clear standards that are consistently enforced, the cadre members cannot be expected to teach to standard or effectively fulfill their roles.

**Set/enforce course and graduation requirements.** For all of the pilots, ARI has noted that the training was not always conducted to Army standards or that the standards were not consistently enforced. For this initial implementation, land navigation and physical training were two clear examples where the training was not conducted to standard. In both instances the standards were not strictly enforced, and the lieutenants indicated that this affected their morale. Responses from the end of course survey indicated that the lieutenants wanted to be held to the higher (Army) standard and challenged accordingly.

ARI noted that unit briefings were not sufficient for articulating and enforcing the standards for the course. In addition, the initial lieutenant counseling by the platoon trainers did not address academic performance, graduation requirements, performance during leadership positions, and the evaluation process and standards. The cadre should develop a standardized counseling form that addresses initial counseling session requirements, including graduation requirements. Cadre members frequently commented during this initial implementation and the preceding pilots that they were unable to enforce the course standards. While there was no recycle policy during these pilot/implementation efforts (everyone moved on to BOLC III regardless of how they performed during BOLC II) other means could have been used to formally capture the lieutenants' standing in the course (e. g., issuing certificates of attendance versus certificates of completion, issuing letters of concern). This would provide some means of linking lieutenant performance to course status. No matter what option is employed, it is critical to clearly articulate and enforce established graduation requirements and standards to sustain the lieutenants' morale and ensure a high level of motivation throughout the course.

**Develop a Program of Instruction focused on lieutenant skills.** One of the challenges of the BOLC II pilots has been striking a balance between task- and leader-focused training. The focus of this single-site implementation mirrored that of the ICP. Much of BOLC II training revolved around the Warrior tasks. ARI's training observations indicated that one critical area of improvement for BOLC II is that the course needs to provide the lieutenants with both refresher training on basic Warrior skills *and* leadership training to improve their decision-making and adaptability skills. Since BOLC II has been identified as the leadership arm of BOLC, the balance between basic skills training for tasks and opportunities for learning/demonstrating leadership skills should be re-examined. It is important to note that given the extended timelines for BOLC I instruction, BOLC II must include some basic instruction on the tasks as a foundation for the leadership and decision-making/adaptability training.

**Improve counseling training.** As noted earlier, counseling is a key component of the leadership development process. Since the ICP did not provide the cadre with adequate training on counseling and other "soft skills," the cadre members were not always prepared to deal with the unique counseling challenges presented in BOLC II. Specifically, much of the "soft skill" training during the ICP was either abbreviated, in briefing or lecture format (no opportunities for the cadre to actively practice these skills and receive feedback), or not delivered because of expectations that the cadre had experience in these areas. A CO, 1-11<sup>th</sup> felt that the NCO cadre's experience with counseling enlisted Soldiers would easily transfer to counseling lieutenants. Thus, the unit did not devote much time to training the cadre in these areas. In summary, some of the lieutenants' negative perceptions of the counseling process may have been alleviated if the ICP would have placed a greater emphasis on training these soft skills.

Finally, the cadre members' feedback on the end of course survey indicated that they were not completely comfortable using the Leadership Assessment Report books. Since this book is the primary tool that the cadre will use to conduct the leadership assessments during the two-site initial implementation, it is critical that the cadre members have the opportunity to practice using it with feedback.

**Treat the lieutenants like commissioned officers.** When asked to report areas of BOLC II that needed improvement, 52% of the lieutenants expressed concern for the way that they were treated by the cadre. The issues reported by the lieutenants included: the cadre treating the lieutenants like privates, the mandatory requirement of living in the barracks, lieutenant curfews, barracks inspections, the cadre coddling the lieutenants in the name of safety, the cadre marching the lieutenants to and from class, and incidents of the cadre yelling and cursing at the lieutenants.

Written comments indicated that approximately one third of the cadre members (32%) felt there was a need for officer and NCO cadre training on how to interact with "lieutenant" students. The training should emphasize that the lieutenants are officers not basic trainees; they must be treated as such and held accountable for their actions. This could be part of an expanded soft skill block of instruction during the ICP.

**Ensure cadre and lieutenants understand the BOLC II purpose.** This issue was introduced in the first section that addressed the importance of selecting motivated cadre members and adequately preparing them to be BOLC II instructors. The cadre members must have a clear understanding of the BOLC II mission and how they will contribute to the success of the course. The roles of the cadre members as coaches/mentors are similar to that of the drill sergeant (rather than an observer/controller). Selected BOLC II instructors (depending on the class and work schedule for the cadre) should be present for all of the day training events to

advise and correct the lieutenants and at night to reinforce that day's training and to prepare the lieutenants for the following day's instruction. This requires the cadre members to be the resident experts in BOLC II subjects.

The BOLC II cadre also should establish the appropriate BOLC II mindset in the lieutenants. Most of the new lieutenants did not have a feel for the "BOLC II big picture" or their role in it. They need to know the many challenges of being a small-unit leader such as the demands/expectations they will face in leading Soldiers in the COE. They also need to know the role of BOLC II in addressing these areas. The end of course survey responses from the lieutenants suggested that their expectations of BOLC II clearly were not met. One possible explanation for these responses is that the lieutenants perceived a disconnect between what they read before attending BOLC II from official sources, their own ideas of what it means to be a small unit leader, and the actual training they received which was primarily cadre-driven and focused on learning Warrior tasks. To better meet the lieutenants' expectations and ensure that the training events adhere to the leadership focus of BOLC II, the linkages between the BOLC II mission objectives and course content and execution will require careful assessment.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The key findings from the assessment of this initial implementation are highlighted below. The BOLC II mission states that the goal of the course is to “develop competent and confident adaptable lieutenants.” Thus, BOLC II should provide some refresher training for certain collective tasks. However, the primary focus needs to be on leadership training for lieutenants. The Program of Instruction should be reviewed to determine how to incorporate more leader and adaptability training opportunities. More emphasis is needed on how to teach/mentor/coach lieutenants in the ICP so that the cadre can effectively facilitate the leadership development process.

### ***Address Recurring Issues***

As already noted, for BOLC II to fully meet the training objectives envisioned by course developers, the recurring issues that have affected all of the earlier pilots (to include this initial implementation) should be carefully examined and addressed prior to final implementation of the course in June 2006. Key points are summarized in Table 17 and detailed below.

Table 17

#### *Summary of Recurring Issues*

Issue	Recommendation
<b>Cadre:</b> The key for the overall success of the course.	Preparation as coaches, mentors and teachers requires continued monitoring and adjustments where appropriate.
<b>Course Standards &amp; Graduation Requirements:</b> Requirements were not enforced (in part because these were pilots/initial implementation).	Once BOLC II enters final implementation in June 2006, lieutenant performance must be tied to course status to sustain morale and keep motivation high.
<b>Content:</b> The course focused on training tasks not leadership skills.	To achieve BOLC II training objectives, a balance is needed between basic skills training for tasks and opportunities for both learning and demonstrating leadership skills.
<b>Soft Skills:</b> Cadre members were not always prepared to counsel new lieutenants.	For the cadre to fulfill the roles envisioned for them in BOLC II, an increased emphasis on counseling and other “soft skills” training is required during the ICP.
<b>Treatment of Lieutenants:</b> Lieutenants reported incidents of unprofessional treatment by the cadre.	This may be due in part to many of the NCO cadre having never worked in a setting that required them to interact with lieutenant students. Establishing the appropriate rules of conduct between cadre and lieutenants should be considered as a block of instruction during the ICP.

<p><b>Understanding the BOLC II Mission:</b> Cadre and lieutenants must have a clear understanding of the BOLC II mission.</p>	<p>Cadre members must understand how they contribute to the success of the course as coaches, mentors, and teachers. They are the key to establishing the appropriate mindset and ensuring that the objectives are met.</p> <p>Lieutenants must understand the various leadership challenges they will face as new platoon leaders and how BOLC II will prepare them to effectively lead Soldiers in the COE.</p>
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### ***Leadership Training***

The lieutenants identified a number of specific areas where the leadership training could be improved (e.g., how to prepare an operation order, classroom instruction on leadership doctrine, troop leading procedures). They also felt that more time should be devoted to preparing for their role as platoon leaders and learning how to take charge of a platoon.

Additionally, ARI's observations indicated that more opportunities for lieutenants to be assessed in leadership roles need to be incorporated into the POI. Further, key leadership assessment events were not adequately structured to fully assess leadership positions. First, the events did not, in many instances, allow the lieutenants to display many of the leader characteristics listed in FM 22-100. Second, the events were structured such that only the lieutenant assigned as the platoon leader for the specific event benefited from the experience. BOLC II training time must be better utilized to insure that the lieutenants are provided with more opportunities to demonstrate/refine their leadership skills.

***Counseling.*** Counseling is a key soft skill for the cadre to effectively communicate to the lieutenants their strengths and weaknesses as leaders as well as provide developmental strategies for improvement. However, counseling did not receive adequate emphasis during the ICP. Additionally, training on the use of the Leadership Assessment Report for the cadre to become familiar with the leader dimensions and make accurate assessments in realistic training situations also was not sufficiently emphasized during the ICP. The many changes to the training schedule and the high OPTEMPO of the course caused some cadre members to fall behind in counseling the lieutenants on their performance. The cadre members must continue to improve their counseling skills. Although finding the time to do the counseling is a continuing problem, it must, nevertheless, be accomplished.

***Professional treatment.*** The professional treatment of the lieutenants continues to be an issue for BOLC II. Most of the NCO cadre members have not trained and counseled officers prior to becoming BOLC instructors. The challenges of this unique relationship should receive more emphasis in the ICP. Moreover, the cadre should establish a training environment that is commensurate with lieutenants undergoing training. One that allows them the freedom to fail and holds them accountable for their actions. It may be useful to have a similar block of instruction for the lieutenants regarding the rules of interaction with their cadre mentors.

## ***Training Execution***

BOLC II is a short course, thus the training opportunities must be maximized wherever possible. There were several areas in the course where the execution of the training could be improved. These areas are briefly discussed in the following sections.

***Mission planning.*** Most platoons only briefed the mission to the lieutenant designated as the platoon leader. The platoon leader then developed a platoon OPORD, which was issued to the other leaders or the entire platoon. This procedure greatly reduced the number of learning opportunities for the lieutenants who were not in leadership roles. This process could easily be changed to maximize training, for example, by issuing the mission brief to the entire platoon and requiring each squad to create a platoon order. Then, a lieutenant would be selected as the platoon leader and he/she would issue the squad-developed order to the platoon. This would allow the entire platoon to participate in the planning process and not just the assigned platoon leader and his/her chain of command.

***Concurrent training.*** There were many opportunities throughout the course where “hip pocket” training opportunities could have been employed to reinforce newly learned skills, serve as refresher training, or maximize the current learning situation. Standardized “hip pocket” training materials should be developed for use during down periods to reinforce specific training areas. For instance, “What now, Lieutenant?” vignettes could be developed to enhance leader skills related to decision making and adaptive thinking.

***Platoon-level training.*** The end of course survey feedback from the lieutenants indicated that they felt that their platoon was not using the same standards or not doing the same training as the other platoons. Further, during this initial implementation, the platoons did not receive specific commander guidance regarding the focus of some of the training, resulting in material being presented differently (e.g., use of different counseling forms) and variations in PT events and concurrent training classes. More command guidance may be required to effectively structure platoon-level training. Steps must be established (if not already done so) to ensure that this training is standardized. Standardized platoon-level training will be especially critical when BOLC II training is conducted at multiple sites. The lieutenants must receive similar experiences regardless of the location of the course.

***Train to Army standards.*** In some instances, the training standards were not the same as those used in the Infantry school (e. g., land navigation, physical training). Although this was an initial implementation, the training should be conducted to Army standards. The standards must be clearly articulated and enforced. The lieutenants should be held accountable for poor performance or ineffective leadership during BOLC II.

***COE training.*** The COE training events that included urban operations, convoy operations, advanced rifle marksmanship, and IED classes were a well-accepted part of BOLC II. The classes were directly applicable to the COE and were up to date. The cadre felt that the COE events were useful, and the lieutenants felt that the COE events trained important skills, particularly those relevant to urban and convoy operations. Moreover, if the appropriate emphasis is applied and additional materials are made available (e. g., standardized hip pocket training booklets), then these events could provide excellent leadership training opportunities. Instruction in these areas should be retained, and the class content revised as the situation within the COE evolves.



### ***Can BOLC II Produce Better Small Unit Leaders?***

In a study conducted by Boccardi (2003), this question was addressed by first analyzing the POIs from the precommissioning sources (BOLC I), selected OBCs (BOLC III), and BOLC (II). He compared the existing OES structure which included the precommissioning (BOLC I) and OBC (BOLC III) with the newly proposed OES structure which included BOLC II with regard to the number hours devoted (by phase) to values, technical, tactical, and leader-action task training. Boccardi's analyses showed that the addition of BOLC II to the OES structure produces better small unit leaders. His conclusion was based on the premise that BOLC II fills three essential gaps in preparing small unit leaders. First, its emphasis on experiential values and attributes training combined with intensive feedback and assessment provided by cadre and peers is superior to other POIs. Second, the technical training opportunities provided in BOLC II helps sustain combat proficiency, allowing the OBC's to focus on branch-specific training. Third, the merging of BOLC task training with experiential leader-actions training provides small unit leaders with the tactical skills not trained in the OBCs. While Boccardi provided a very persuasive argument in support of the BOLC II concept, it should be noted that there is currently no objective data available supporting this conclusion. This was not the focus of the present study and would require the longer-term assessment effort as detailed earlier in this report (p. 2).

For the current study, deficiencies in the proposed strengths of BOLC II identified by Boccardi were observed, particularly in the leadership areas (leadership assessment /counseling and leader decision-making/adaptability). For BOLC II to be fully successful in meeting its objectives, the recommendations provided in this report concerning leadership should be addressed prior to the initial two-site implementation. Changes made to the ICP and BOLC II courses based on these recommendations would help to ensure that small-unit leaders report to their first unit of assignment with the character and competence to lead their units in the COE.



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# Appendix A

ARI PT No. 60-81

## Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) Cadre Demographic Survey

**Directions:** Please fill in the blank [print] or mark the appropriate response for each question.

**Name:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Last 4 SSN (for internal tracking):** \_\_\_\_\_

**Army Knowledge Online (AKO) e-mail address:** \_\_\_\_\_

1. Gender: ☐ **Female** ☐ **Male**

2. Rank: \_\_\_\_\_

If you are an officer, what is your source of commissioning?

☐ **OCS** ☐ **USMA** ☐ **ROTC** ☐ **Other**(specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Are you branch qualified ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes** ☐ **Not Sure**

Are you Prior Enlisted? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

If you are Prior Enlisted, what was your MOS? \_\_\_\_\_ Your highest enlisted rank? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Number of continuous *years* of active, military service: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Time in Grade (*years*): \_\_\_\_\_

5. Branch or MOS: (IN, SC, MI, QM, or 11M, 19D, 95B, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

6. Do you have additional skill identifiers (be specific – J3, A8, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

7. Do you have combat experience? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

If Yes, where/when and what was your duty position? \_\_\_\_\_

8. Do you have National Guard or Reserve time? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

If Yes, please specify and give details \_\_\_\_\_

9. What Army training courses have you completed? (Please be specific – **MIOBC, BNCOC, FAOBC, ANCOC, BMO, Ranger, Drill Sergeant, Pathfinder, Combat Life Saver, CAS3, etc.**, and include as many as you can remember.)

10. **If you were/are an NCO**, which of the following positions have you held? (Circle all that apply)

### Unit

Squad Leader

Platoon Sergeant

First Sergeant

### Staff

Battalion Staff

Brigade Staff

### Special Assignment

Drill Sergeant

Recruiter

11. **If you were/are a Platoon SGT**, were you in a TO&E unit? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

12. **If you are an Officer**, which of the following positions have you held? (Circle all that apply)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Staff</u>
Platoon Leader	Battalion Staff
Company XO	Brigade Staff
Company CDR	
Battalion XO	

13. Do you have prior experience as an instructor in a training environment?  
(e.g., Master Gunner instructor, AOAC instructor, tactics instructor, etc.) ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

If Yes, please specify and give details (e.g., school/course, location, when) \_\_\_\_\_

Did any of your instructor time involve training officers? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

If Yes, Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

14. Please circle the highest level of civilian education you have completed:

**High School** or **Some College** or **Associate's Degree/2-year degree** or  
**Bachelor's Degree/4-year degree** or **Advanced Degree** (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

15. What is your GT score? \_\_\_\_\_ (**For enlisted or prior enlisted**)

16. What is your current physical profile (PULHES)? \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have any temporary conditions/waivers? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

If Yes, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

17. Do you plan to remain in service until retirement? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

If Yes, how many more *years* until you plan to retire? \_\_\_\_\_

If No, how many *months* before you plan to ETS? \_\_\_\_\_

18. Have you qualified with a M16A2 or M4 within the last six months? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**.

If Yes, circle the weapon you qualified on: **M16A2** or **M4**

Did you fire: ☐ **Marksman** ☐ **Sharpshooter** ☐ **Expert**

19. Do you have any speech-related difficulties that affect your ability as an instructor to communicate clearly? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

20. Have you had any major counseling actions/statements in the past 5 years? ☐ **No** ☐ **Yes**

## Appendix B

ARI PT No. 60-81

### End of Course (ICP) Survey Responses: Cadre (30 Cadre Members)

#### **Section I: Additional Background Information**

1. Do you have experience in a combat theater of operation? Please check all that apply and tell us your duty position in each.

Operation	√	Duty Position
Iraqi Freedom (May 03-present)		
Enduring Freedom (Oct 01 – present)		
Joint Forge (98-04)		
Joint Guard (96-98)		
Joint Endeavor (95-96)		
Restore Democracy (Sept 94 – Mar 96)		
Support Hope (Jul – Sept 94)		
Able Sentry (Jul 94 – Feb 99)		
Provide Promise (Jul 92 – Mar 96)		
Restore Hope (Dec 92 – May 93)		
Southern Watch (Aug 92 – May 03)		
Northern Watch (Dec 96 – Mar 03)		
Provide Comfort (Apr 91 – Dec 96)		
Desert Storm (Jan 91 – Feb 92)		
Desert Shield (Aug 90 – Jan 91)		
Promote Liberty (Jan 90 – Jan 91)		
Just Cause (Dec 89 – Jan 90)		
Other: _____		

2. Please check all of the classes or courses you have attended prior to coming to Ft. Benning, will attend during BOLC at Ft. Benning, or are scheduled to attend at the site where you will train BOLC:

- ☐ Total Army Instructor Training Course (TAITC)
- ☐ Small Group Instructor Training Course (SGITC)
- ☐ Tactics Certification Course (TCC)
- ☐ Combat Life Saver (CLS)
- ☐ Range Officer in Charge (OIC) Safety Certification Class (at the site where you will train BOLC)
- ☐ Range Safety Officer (RSO) Certification Class (at the site where you will train BOLC)
- ☐ Ammunition Handling Class (at the site where you will train BOLC)
- ☐ Mail Handler's Class (at the site where you will train BOLC)
- ☐ Defensive Driver Course (DDC)
- ☐ Combatives (Skill Level I)
- ☐ Suicide Prevention Class

3. Do you have a current permanent physical profile other than 111111?      No      Yes  
If Yes, please provide your correct PULHES

4. Do you have at least 24 months remaining in service? \_\_\_No \_\_\_Yes

**Section II: Time Allocated for POI Training Time - Frequencies (Percent Cadre)**

Item	Not Nearly Enough Little	Not Quite Enough	About Right	A Little Too Much	Entirely Too Much
1. Welcomes and Introductions			28 (93)	1 (3)	1 (3)
2. In-processing	1 (3)	2 (7)	24 (80)	2 (7)	
3. Command directed classes (EO, SH, etc.)		1 (3)	22 (73)	2 (7)	
4. Benning-specific classes (MEDEVAC, RSO, DDC, etc.)	1 (3)	7 (23)	17 (57)		
5. Tactics Certification Course	2 (7)	9 (30)	7 (23)	9 (30)	2 (7)
6. Squad level Battle Drills	2 (7)	4 (13)	24 (80)		
7. Individual Movement Techniques	1 (3)	6 (20)	23 (77)		
8. Safety classes (Risk Management, Climate, etc.)	1 (3)	8 (27)	18 (60)	1 (3)	
9. Counseling	2 (7)	9 (30)	15 (50)	2 (7)	
10. Night Infiltration Course		3 (10)	22 (73)	2 (7)	2 (7)
11. BRM, ARM, AIMSS (marksmanship)		6 (20)	20 (67)	3 (10)	
12. Land Navigation	1 (3)	9 (30)	11 (37)	8 (27)	1 (3)
13. Extended Land Navigation	2 (7)	6 (20)	17 (57)	5 (17)	
14. Squad STX Lanes	3 (10)	2 (7)	22 (73)	1 (3)	
15. Battle Drills	2 (7)	5 (17)	23 (77)		
16. Convoy Operations/ Convoy LFX	1 (3)	3 (10)	15 (50)	7 (23)	2 (7)
17. Urban Operations	1 (3)	2 (7)	24 (80)	3 (10)	
18. Preparing for the courses you will teach during BOLC (e.g., selecting and planning job aids)	7 (23)	9 (30)	11 (37)	2 (7)	
19. Reviewing vault files and notes	10 (33)	8 (27)	9 (30)		1 (3)
20. Rehearsing instruction	10 (33)	9 (30)	8 (27)	1 (3)	
21. Performing Range recons	7 (23)	6 (20)	15 (50)		
22. Preparing for field exercises	2 (7)	3 (10)	22 (73)		1 (3)
23. Preparing for counseling sessions (reading FM 22-100)	5 (17)	7 (23)	16 (53)		
24. Reading other related materials (drill books, FMs, etc.)	5 (17)	5 (17)	18 (60)		
25. The entire BOLC II Instructor Certification Program	1 (3)	10 (33)	13 (43)	3 (10)	1 (3)



**Section III: Overall Training –Frequencies (Percent Cadre)**

Item	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. The entire BOLC II Instructor Certification Program provided standardized instruction on the courses that I will teach during BOLC.	2 (7)	15 (50)	10 (33)	3 (10)
2. The training I received during the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program clearly addressed how to train lieutenants on the subject material.	2 (7)	12 (40)	16 (53)	
3. I feel confident in teaching the content of the courses that I am tasked to instruct to BOLC students.		3 (10)	22 (73)	4 (13)
4. The pace and tempo of the cadre train-up kept me fully involved.		4 (13)	19 (63)	7 (23)
5. The overall BOLC II Instructor Certification Program was conducted to standard, not to available time.	3 (10)	8 (27)	16 (53)	3 (10)
6. Team building exercises were successfully incorporated into the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program.	1 (3)	8 (27)	17 (57)	1 (3)
7. The quality of the instruction was appropriately high.	1 (3)	6 (20)	22 (73)	1 (3)
8. The emphasis on physical training did not detract from training in other areas.	2 (7)	2 (7)	17 (57)	8 (27)
9. Questions about BOLC were answered to my satisfaction.	1 (3)	8 (27)	18 (60)	3 (10)
10. My experience and expertise were utilized during the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program.	3 (10)	7 (23)	16 (53)	4 (13)
11. I feel comfortable with the training events that will occur during BOLC.		5 (17)	23 (77)	2 (7)
12. The Tactics Certification Course (TCC) was an essential part of the cadre train-up.	5 (17)	10 (33)	11 (37)	4 (13)
13. The TCC prepared me to provide standardized instruction on approved infantry doctrine.	3 (10)	4 (13)	18 (60)	5 (17)
14. I feel confident in teaching the TCC content to BOLC II students.	2 (7)	2 (7)	21 (70)	5 (17)
15. I am fully confident that my knowledge of conducting risk assessments will lead to safe training.			21 (70)	9 (30)
16. I see no further need for additional risk assessment training.	3 (10)	7 (23)	14 (47)	5 (17)

#### **Section IV: Additional Courses – Frequencies (Percent Cadre)**

Item	YES	I DON'T KNOW
1. Combatives	25 (83)	
2. Grenade Assault Course	5 (17)	2 (7)
3. Patrolling	25 (83)	2 (7)
4. Confidence Course	14 (47)	2 (7)
5. Obstacle Course	16 (53)	1 (3)

#### **Section V: Please share your thoughts about the BOLC Cadre Train-up. There are no right or wrong answers; all we are looking for is your opinion.**

1. What portions of the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program should be changed – deleted, reduced, or expanded – in view of TIME available? Please be as specific as possible.
2. What portions of the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program should be changed – deleted, reduced, or expanded – in view of cadre expertise and competence?
3. If the Tactics Certification Course is included in future BOLC II Instructor Certification Programs, what, if any, aspects of the course should be modified?
4. What would be the best training methods to ensure the cadre are prepared to teach their BOLC courses?
5. Did you have enough time to get to know the other cadre? If you did not, what got in the way? What was most helpful in this process?
6. Do you think everyone, regardless of branch/gender, felt welcome and part of the team? Why or why not?
7. What was the best part of the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program?
8. What was the worst part of the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program? How could it be made better?
9. If you were the Commander – or otherwise in charge of the BOLC II Instructor Certification Program – what would you have done differently?
10. What did we forget to ask that you'd like to comment on?

# Appendix C

ARI PT No. 60-81

## Basic Officer Leader Course II (BOLC) Lieutenant Demographic Survey

### Section I: Background Information

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

AKO e-mail address: \_\_\_\_\_

LAST 4 SSN (for internal tracking)	YOUR AGE	Gender	Date of Commissioning		
			Month	Day	Year

Source of Commissioning	Are you Prior Enlisted?	Your Status		
OCS <input type="radio"/> ROTC <input type="radio"/> USMA <input type="radio"/> OTHER <input type="radio"/> (specify): _____  Branch: (IN, SC, MI, QM, etc.) _____  For ROTC, specify the college or university you attended: _____	No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/>  If Yes, Specify your MOS: _____  Your highest enlisted rank? _____  Time in service? (years) _____	Active Duty <input type="radio"/> National Guard on Active Duty <input type="radio"/> Army Reserve on Active Duty <input type="radio"/>  Do You Have Combat Experience? No <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> If Yes, <div> <div>Where were you deployed?</div> <div>When were you in combat?</div> <div>What was your duty position?</div> </div>		

Indicate the highest level of civilian education obtained:	Indicate the Army training courses you have already completed: Indicate all that apply and write in the names of any others.
High school / GED <input type="radio"/> Some College <input type="radio"/> Associate's degree/2-year degree <input type="radio"/> Bachelor's degree/4-year degree <input type="radio"/> Advanced degree (specify): <input type="radio"/> _____	Basic Training <input type="radio"/> PLDC <input type="radio"/> BNCOC <input type="radio"/> Airborne <input type="radio"/> Ranger <input type="radio"/> Combat Life Saver <input type="radio"/> Others: <input type="radio"/> _____

**What do you expect your job to be (your best guess)?**

For example, Platoon Leader, Battalion/Brigade Staff (specify position), or other (specify).

**Section II: Preparation for BOLC II Warrior Battle Drills** (Does not include international students. Shading =  $\geq 50\%$  )

Using the scale below, please indicate how well prepared you are to lead a platoon in the execution of each of the following Warrior Battle Drills.

BATTLE DRILLS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Prepared/ Very Well Prepared	Extremely Prepared – Could Teach This to Others
	Frequencies (Percentages)				
<b>1. React to contact (visual, IED, direct fire [includes RPG])</b>					
Prior Service ( $n = 53$ )	5 (9)	4 (8)	19 (36)	22 (42)	3 (6)
No Prior Service ( $n = 118$ )	5 (4)	4 (3)	54 (46)	49 (42)	6 (5)
OCS ( $n = 9$ )	1		1 (11)	6 (67)	1 (11)
ROTC ( $n = 118$ )	(11)	3 (3)	47 (40)	57 (48)	7 (6)
USMA ( $n = 30$ )	4 (3)		19 (63)	8 (27)	
Direct ( $n = 8$ )	3 (10)	3 (38)	4 (50)		
Warrant Officers ( $n = 5$ )	1 (13)	1 (20)	2 (40)		1 (20)
State OCS ( $n = 1$ )	1 (20)	1			
Male ( $n = 134$ )	9 (7)	7 (5)	48 (36)	62 (46)	8 (6)
Female ( $n = 37$ )	1 (3)	1 (3)	25 (68)	9 (24)	1 (3)
<b>2. React to ambush (blocked)</b>					
Prior Service	7 (13)	6 (11)	18 (34)	20 (38)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	15 (13)	16 (14)	46 (39)	37 (31)	3 (3)
OCS		1 (11)	4 (44)	4 (44)	
ROTC	15 (13)	11 (9)	38 (32)	49 (42)	
USMA	3 (10)	6 (20)	17 (57)	4 (13)	
Direct	2 (25)	4 (50)	2 (25)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		2 (40)		1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	19 (14)	17 (12)	45 (34)	48 (36)	4 (3)
Female	3 (8)	5 (14)	19 (51)	9 (24)	1 (3)
<b>3. React to ambush (unblocked)</b>					
Prior Service	5 (9)	5 (9)	19 (36)	22 (42)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	10 (9)	15 (13)	46 (39)	41 (35)	5 (4)
OCS	1 (11)		3 (33)	5 (56)	
ROTC	7 (7)	11 (9)	37 (31)	55 (47)	6 (5)
USMA	2 (7)	6 (20)	19 (63)	3 (10)	
Direct	3 (38)	2 (25)	3 (38)		
Warrant Officers	1 (20)	1 (20)	2 (40)		1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	13 (10)	16 (12)	43 (32)	55 (41)	6 (5)
Female	2 (5)	4 (11)	22 (60)	8 (22)	1 (3)

BATTLE DRILLS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Prepared/ Very Well Prepared	Extremely Prepared – Could Teach This to Others
	Frequencies (Percentages)				
<b>4. React to indirect fire</b>					
Prior Service	4 (8)	2 (4)	15 (28)	27 (51)	5 (9)
No Prior Service	1 (1)	6 (5)	36 (31)	65 (55)	10 (9)
OCS	1 (11)		2 (22)	6 (67)	
ROTC	1 (1)	4 (3)	33 (28)	66 (56)	14 (12)
USMA	1 (3)	2 (7)	9 (30)	18 (60)	
Direct	1 (13)	2 (25)	4 (50)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers	1 (20)		2 (40)	1 (20)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	4 (3)	5 (4)	34 (25)	77 (58)	14 (10)
Female	1 (3)	3 (8)	17 (46)	15 (41)	1 (3)
<b>5. React to a chemical attack</b>					
Prior Service	2 (4)	3 (6)	22 (42)	25 (48)	1 (2)
No Prior Service	6 (5)	12 (10)	65 (55)	34 (29)	1 (1)
OCS		2 (22)	2 (22)	5 (56)	
ROTC	6 (5)	7 (6)	66 (56)	38 (32)	1 (1)
USMA	1 (3)	4 (13)	12 (40)	13 (43)	
Direct	1 (13)	1 (13)	5 (63)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers			2 (40)	2 (40)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	7 (5)	9 (7)	66 (49)	50 (37)	2 (2)
Female	1 (3)	6 (16)	21 (57)	9 (24)	
<b>6. Break contact</b>					
Prior Service	4 (8)		21 (40)	24 (45)	3 (6)
No Prior Service		6 (5)	33 (28)	68 (58)	10 (8.5)
OCS	1 (11)	1 (11)	2 (22)	5 (56)	
ROTC	1 (1)	1 (1)	27 (23)	76 (64)	12 (10)
USMA		2 (7)	17 (57)	11 (37)	
Direct	1 (13)	1 (13)	5 (63)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers	1 (20)		2 (40)		1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	3 (2)	5 (4)	40 (30)	73 (55)	12 (9)
Female	1 (3)	1 (3)	14 (38)	19 (51)	1 (3)

BATTLE DRILLS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Prepared/ Very Well Prepared	Extremely Prepared – Could Teach This to Others
	Frequencies (Percentages)				
<b>7. Dismount a vehicle</b>					
Prior Service	8 (15)	15 (28)	17 (32)	10 (19)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	48 (41)	33 (28)	24 (20)	12 (10)	
OCS		2 (22)	1 (11)	5 (56)	1 (1)
ROTC	49 (42)	36 (31)	19 (16)	12 (10)	
USMA	4 (13)	6 (20)	16 (53)	4 (13)	
Direct	3 (38)	4 (50)		1 (13)	
Warrant Officers			4 (80)		1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	37 (28)	35 (26)	36 (27)	22 (16)	2 (2)
Female	19 (51)	13 (35)	5 (14)		
<b>8. Evacuate injured personnel from a vehicle</b>					
Prior Service	11 (21)	16 (30)	12 (23)	11 (21)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	55 (47)	27 (23)	25 (21)	10 (8)	1 (1)
OCS	1 (11)	1 (11)	3 (33)	4 (44)	2 (2)
ROTC	54 (46)	27 (23)	19 (16)	16 (14)	
USMA	7 (23)	11 (37)	12 (40)		
Direct	4 (50)	3 (38)	1 (13)		
Warrant Officers			2 (40)	1 (20)	2 (40)
State OCS		1			
Male	46 (34)	34 (25)	31 (23)	19 (14)	4 (3)
Female	20 (54)	9 (24)	6 (16)	2 (5)	
<b>9. Secure at a halt</b>					
Prior Service	8 (15)	6 (11)	16 (30)	20 (38)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	16 (14)	27 (23)	25 (21)	10 (8)	1 (1)
OCS			2 (22)	7 (78)	
ROTC	18 (15)	13 (11)	35 (30)	45 (58)	7 (6)
USMA	2 (7)	2 (7)	11 (37)	15 (50)	
Direct	4 (50)	2 (25)	2 (25)		
Warrant Officers			3 (60)	1 (20)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	18 (13)	11 (8)	39 (29)	58 (43)	8 (6)
Female	6 (16)	6 (16)	15 (41)	10 (27)	

**Note.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

**Section III: Execution of BOLC II Warrior Tasks** (Does not include international students)

Using the scale below, please rate how confident you are in your ability to execute the following tasks.

BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b><u>Shooting Tasks</u></b>					
<b>1. Qualify with assigned weapon: M16/M4 (CIRCLE the type used)</b> Prior Service (n = 53) No Prior Service (n = 118)  OCS (n = 9) ROTC (n = 118) USMA (n = 30) Direct (n = 8) Warrant Officers (n = 5) State OCS (n = 1)  Male (n = 134) Female (n = 37)			3 (6) 16 (14)  2 (22) 11 (9) 5 (17) 1 (13)	29 (55) 71 (60)  7 (78) 69 (59) 16 (53) 5 (63) 2 (40) 1	21 (40) 29 (25)  37 (31) 9 (30) 1 (13) 3 (60)
<b>2. Correct malfunctions of assigned weapon: M16/M4 (CIRCLE the type used)</b> Prior Service No Prior Service  OCS ROTC USMA Direct Warrant Officers State OCS  Male Female		1 (2) 3 (3)  1 (11) 3 (3)	5 (9) 28 (24)  1 (11) 22 (19) 4 (13) 6 (75)	29 (55) 63 (53)  5 (56) 64 (54) 18 (60) 1 (13) 3 (60) 1	18 (34) 24 (20)  2 (22) 29 (25) 8 (27) 1 (13) 2 (40)
		2 (1) 2 (5)	19 (14) 14 (38)	74 (55) 18 (49)	39 (29) 3 (8)

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>3. Employ M18 Claymore mine and hand grenades</b>					
Prior Service		6 (11)	15 (28)	28 (53)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	10 (9)	6 (5)	49 (42)	48 (41)	4 (3)
OCS		2 (22)	2 (22)	5 (56)	
ROTC	7 (6)	7 (6)	42 (36)	56 (48)	5 (4)
USMA		1 (3)	15 (50)	13 (43)	1 (3)
Direct	3 (38)	1 (13)	3 (38)		1 (13)
Warrant Officers			2 (40)	2 (40)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	5 (5)	10 (8)	47 (35)	62 (46)	8 (6)
Female	4 (11)	2 (5)	17 (46)	14 (38)	
<b>Engage targets with the following weapons:</b>					
<b>4. M240B (Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	10 (19)	7 (13)	14 (26)	19 (36)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	28 (24)	14 (12)	32 (27)	41 (47)	4 (3)
OCS	3 (33)			4 (44)	1 (11)
ROTC	28 (24)	18 (15)	32 (27)	39 (33)	1 (1)
USMA		1 (3)	11 (37)	15 (50)	3 (10)
Direct	5 (63)	1 (13)	2 (25)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		1 (20)	2 (40)	
State OCS		1			
Male	26 (19)	13 (10)	33 (25)	56 (41)	5 (4)
Female	12 (32)	8 (22)	13 (35)	4 (8)	
<b>5. M249 (Machine Gun-SAW)</b>					
Prior Service	5 (9)	6 (11)	14 (26)	23 (43)	5 (9)
No Prior Service	14 (12)	12 (10)	37 (31)	51 (43)	4 (3)
OCS	1 (11)		2 (22)	5 (56)	1 (11)
ROTC	12 (10)	14 (12)	38 (32)	50 (42)	4 (3)
USMA		1 (3)	8 (27)	18 (60)	3 (10)
Direct	5 (63)	1 (13)	2 (25)		
Warrant Officers	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	9 (7)	11 (8)	35 (26)	70 (52)	9 (7)
Female	10 (27)	7 (19)	16 (43)	4 (11)	



<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>6. M2 (Cal. 50 Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	13 (25)	10 (19)	11 (21)	17 (32)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	46 (39)	15 (13)	30 (25)	27 (23)	
OCS	5 (56)	1 (11)	2 (22)	1 (11)	
ROTC	45 (38)	19 (16)	24 (20)	28 (24)	2 (2)
USMA	1 (3)	2 (7)	13 (43)	14 (47)	
Direct	5 (63)	1 (13)	2 (25)		
Warrant Officers	3 (60)	1 (20)		1 (20)	
State OCS		1			
Male	43 (32)	19 (14)	31 (23)	39 (29)	2 (2)
Female	16 (43)	6 (16)	10 (27)	5 (14)	
<b>7. MK19 (40 mm Grenade Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	12 (23)	14 (26)	12 (23)	15 (28)	
No Prior Service	58 (49)	19 (16)	24 (20)	17 (14)	
OCS	5 (56)	1 (11)	1 (11)	2 (22)	
ROTC	51 (43)	23 (20)	24 (20)	20 (17)	
USMA	7 (23)	5 (17)	10 (33)	8 (27)	
Direct	5 (63)	2 (25)	1 (13)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)	1 (20)		2 (40)	
State OCS		1			
Male	53 (40)	25 (19)	28 (21)	28 (21)	
Female	17 (46)	8 (22)	8 (22)	4 (11)	
<b>Correct malfunctions of the following weapons:</b>					
<b>8. M240B (Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	19 (36)	11 (21)	7 (13)	14 (27)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	43 (36)	24 (20)	33 (28)	17 (14)	
OCS	4 (44)		1 (11)	3 (33)	1 (11)
ROTC	47 (40)	26 (22)	25 (21)	19 (16)	1 (1)
USMA		7 (23)	14 (47)	8 (27)	1 (3)
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	3 (60)	1 (20)		1 (20)	
State OCS	1				
Male	42 (31)	23 (17)	37 (28)	29 (22)	3 (2)
Female	20 (54)	12 (32)	3 (8)	2 (5)	

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>9. M249 (Machine Gun-SAW)</b>					
Prior Service	12 (23)	11 (21)	9 (17)	15 (28)	6 (11)
No Prior Service	34 (29)	20 (17)	37 (31)	26 (22)	1 (1)
OCS	2 (22)		1 (11)	4 (44)	2 (22)
ROTC	34 (29)	23 (20)	33 (28)	25 (21)	3 (3)
USMA		6 (20)	11 (37)	12 (40)	1 (3)
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	2 (40)	1 (20)	1 (20)		1 (20)
State OCS	1				
Male	28 (21)	19 (14)	41 (31)	39 (29)	7 (5)
Female	18 (49)	12 (32)	5 (14)	2 (5)	
<b>10. M2 (Cal. 50 Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	22 (42)	12 (23)	8 (15)	10 (19)	1 (2)
No Prior Service	68 (58)	26 (22)	19 (16)	5 (5)	
OCS	6 (67)	1 (11)	1 (11)	1 (11)	
ROTC	64 (54)	25 (21)	18 (15)	10 (9)	1 (1)
USMA	9 (30)	10 (33)	8 (27)	3 (10)	
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	3 (60)	1 (20)		1 (20)	
State OCS	1				
Male	71 (53)	24 (18)	24 (18)	14 (10)	1 (1)
Female	19 (51)	14 (38)	3 (8)	1 (3)	
<b>11. MK19 (40 mm Grenade Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	21 (40)	14 (26)	10 (19)	8 (15)	
No Prior Service	80 (68)	24 (20)	11 (9)	3 (3)	
OCS	6 (67)	1 (11)	1 (11)	1 (11)	
ROTC	72 (61)	25 (21)	12 (10)	9 (8)	
USMA	13 (43)	10 (33)	7 (23)		
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	2 (40)	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)	
State OCS	1				
Male	80 (60)	24 (18)	21 (16)	9 (7)	
Female	21 (57)	14 (38)		2 (5)	
<b>Engage targets with a weapon using the following night vision sights:</b>					

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>12. AN/PVS-4 (Individual WPN Night Sight)</b>					
Prior Service	28 (53)	4 (8)	12 (23)	9 (17)	
No Prior Service	74 (63)	11 (9)	17 (14)	15 (13)	1 (1)
OCS	5 (56)			4 (44)	
ROTC	80 (68)	7 (6)	19 (16)	12 (10)	
USMA	6 (20)	6 (20)	9 (30)	8 (27)	1 (3)
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	4 (80)		1 (20)		
State OCS	1				
Male	75 (56)	13 (10)	23 (17)	22 (16)	1 (1)
Female	27 (73)	2 (5)	6 (16)	2 (5)	
<b>13. AN/PAS-13 (Thermal WPN Sight)</b>					
Prior Service	34 (64)	7 (13)	6 (11)	6 (11)	
No Prior Service	91 (77)	8 (7)	12 (10)	7 (6)	
OCS	6 (67)			3 (33)	
ROTC	91 (77)	8 (7)	11 (9)	8 (7)	
USMA	16 (53)	5 (17)	7 (23)	2 (7)	
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	4 (80)	1 (20)			
State OCS	1				
Male	93 (69)	13 (10)	16 (12)	12 (9)	
Female	32 (86)	2 (5)	2 (5)	1 (3)	
<b>14. AN/TVS-5 (Crew Served WPN Night Vision Sight)</b>					
Prior Service	35 (66)	6 (11)	5 (9)	7 (13)	
No Prior Service	92 (78)	8 (7)	10 (9)	8 (7)	
OCS	7 (78)			2 (22)	
ROTC	91 (77)	8 (7)	9 (8)	10 (9)	
USMA	17 (57)	4 (13)	6 (20)	3 (10)	
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	4 (80)	1 (20)			
State OCS	1				
Male	93 (69)	12 (9)	15 (11)	14 (10)	
Female	34 (92)	2 (5)		1 (3)	
<b>Engage targets using the following aiming lights:</b>					

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>15. AN/PEQ-2A (Aiming Light)</b>					
Prior Service	33 (63)	5 (9)	5 (9)	9 (17)	1 (2)
No Prior Service	86 (73)	6 (5)	14 (12)	12 (10)	
OCS	6 (67)			3 (33)	
ROTC	90 (76)	5 (4)	11 (9)	11 (9)	1 (1)
USMA	11 (37)	4 (13)	7 (27)	7 (23)	
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	4 (80)	1 (20)			
State OCS	1				
Male	86 (64)	10 (8)	17 (13)	20 (15)	1 (1)
Female	33 (89)	1 (3)	2 (5)	1 (3)	
<b>16. AN/PAQ-4 (Aiming Light)</b>					
Prior Service	31 (59)	6 (11)	4 (8)	10 (19)	1 (2)
No Prior Service	84 (71)	6 (5)	16 (14)	12 (10)	
OCS	6 (67)			3 (33)	
ROTC	88 (75)	6 (5)	10 (9)	12 (10)	1 (1)
USMA	9 (30)	4 (13)	10 (33)	7 (23)	
Direct	7 (88)	1 (13)			
Warrant Officers	4 (80)	1 (20)			
State OCS	1				
Male	82 (62)	11 (8)	18 (13)	21 (16)	1 (1)
Female	33 (89)	1 (3)	2 (5)	1 (3)	
<b>Communicate</b>					
<b>17. Perform voice communications: SITREP/SPOTREP</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	5 (9)	13 (25)	30 (57)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	5 (4)	5 (4)	46 (39)	58 (49)	4 (3)
OCS			3 (33)	6 (67)	
ROTC	3 (3)	6 (5)	41 (35)	61 (52)	7 (6)
USMA	1 (3)	2 (7)	11 (37)	16 (53)	
Direct	2 (25)	1 (13)	4 (50)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers				4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	5 (4)	5 (5)	42 (31)	73 (55)	8 (6)
Female	1 (3)	4 (11)	17 (46)	15 (41)	

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>18. Perform voice communications: Call for Fire</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	17 (32)	16 (30)	14 (26)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	4 (3)	21 (18)	63 (53)	29 (25)	1 (1)
OCS	1 (11)	1 (11)	4 (44)	3 (33)	
ROTC		29 (25)	56 (48)	30 (25)	3 (3)
USMA	1 (3)	3 (10)	16 (53)	10 (33)	
Direct	4 (50)	2 (25)	2 (25)		
Warrant Officers	1 (20)	2 (40)	1 (20)		1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	7 (5)	27 (20)	58 (43)	38 (28)	4 (3)
Female		11 (30)	21 (57)	5 (14)	
<b>19. Perform voice communications: MEDEVAC</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	7 (13)	17 (32)	24 (45)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	6 (5)	15 (13)	57 (48)	38 (32)	2 (2)
OCS	1 (11)		3 (33)	5 (56)	
ROTC	3 (3)	15 (13)	53 (45)	45 (38)	2 (2)
USMA	1 (3)	6 (20)	14 (47)	9 (30)	
Direct	4 (50)	1 (13)	2 (25)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	2 (40)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male	8 (6)	19 (14)	50 (37)	53 (40)	4 (3)
Female	1 (3)	3 (8)	24 (65)	9 (24)	
<b>20. Use visual signaling techniques</b>					
Prior Service	4 (8)	5 (9)	15 (28)	25 (47)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	12 (10)	12 (10)	39 (33)	46 (39)	8 (7)
OCS		1 (11)	2 (22)	5 (56)	1 (11)
ROTC	13 (11)	10 (9)	28 (24)	58 (49)	7 (6)
USMA	1 (3)	4 (13)	17 (57)	6 (20)	2 (7)
Direct	2 (25)	1 (13)	5 (63)		
Warrant Officers			2 (40)	2 (40)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	14 (10)	13 (10)	42 (31)	53 (40)	10 (8)
Female	2 (5)	4 (11)	12 (32)	18 (49)	
<b>Joint Urban Operations</b>					

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>21. Perform movement techniques during urban operations</b>					
Prior Service	21 (40)	8 (15)	15 (28)	8 (15)	1 (2)
No Prior Service	54 (46)	18 (15)	29 (25)	17 (14)	
OCS	4 (44)			5 (56)	
ROTC	56 (48)	18 (15)	26 (22)	17 (14)	1 (1)
USMA	7 (23)	5 (17)	16 (53)	2 (7)	
Direct	6 (75)	2 (25)			
Warrant Officers	2 (40)	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)	
State OCS			1		
Male	52 (39)	20 (15)	39 (29)	22 (16)	1 (1)
Female	23 (62)	6 (16)	5 (14)	3 (8)	
<b>22. Engage targets during urban operations</b>					
Prior Service	22 (42)	5 (9)	16 (30)	9 (17)	1 (2)
No Prior Service	60 (51)	14 (12)	24 (20)	19 (16)	1 (1)
OCS	4 (44)			5 (56)	
ROTC	63 (53)	10 (9)	25 (21)	18 (15)	2 (2)
USMA	7 (23)	6 (20)	13 (43)	4 (13)	
Direct	6 (75)	2 (25)			
Warrant Officers	2 (40)	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)	
State OCS			1		
Male	58 (43)	14 (10)	34 (25)	26 (19)	2 (2)
Female	24 (65)	5 (14)	6 (16)	2 (5)	
<b>23. Enter a building during urban operations</b>					
Prior Service	20 (38)	7 (13)	16 (30)	8 (15)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	59 (50)	9 (8)	22 (19)	28 (24)	
OCS	3 (33)	1 (11)		5 (56)	
ROTC	62 (53)	7 (6)	24 (20)	23 (20)	2 (2)
USMA	6 (20)	5 (17)	12 (40)	7 (23)	
Direct	6 (75)	2 (25)			
Warrant Officers	2 (40)	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)	
State OCS			1		
Male	55 (41)	13 (10)	31 (23)	33 (25)	2 (1)
Female	24 (65)	3 (8)	7 (19)	3 (8)	
<b>Move</b>					

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>24. Determine location on ground (terrain association, map &amp; GPS)</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	2 (4)	8 (15)	34 (64)	8 (15)
No Prior Service	2 (2)	5 (4)	19 (16)	70 (59)	22 (19)
OCS	1 (11)	1 (11)		5 (56)	2 (22)
ROTC	2 (2.5)	1 (1)	17 (14)	77 (66)	21 (48)
USMA		4 (13)	3 (10)	18 (60)	5 (17)
Direct		1 (13)	6 (75)		1 (13)
Warrant Officers				4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	3 (2)	4 (3)	18 (13)	80 (60)	29 (22)
Female		3 (8)	9 (24)	24 (65)	1 (3)
<b>25. Navigate from one point to another (dismounted)</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)		10 (19)	30 (57)	12 (23)
No Prior Service		4 (3)	15 (13)	69 (59)	30 (25)
OCS			1 (11)	6 (67)	2 (22)
ROTC		1 (1)	14 (12)	73 (62)	30 (25)
USMA		3 (10)	5 (17)	15 (50)	7 (23)
Direct	1 (13)		4 (50)	2 (25)	1 (13)
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male	1 (1)	3 (2)	16 (12)	77 (58)	37 (28)
Female		1 (3)	9 (24)	22 (59)	5 (14)
<b>26. Move over, through, or around obstacles (except minefields)</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	1 (2)	16 (30)	31 (59)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	6 (5)	4 (3)	33 (28)	59 (50)	15 (13)
OCS	2 (22)		3 (33)	4 (44)	
ROTC	3 (3)	4 (3)	32 (27)	65 (55)	13 (11)
USMA	3 (10)	1 (3)	8 (27)	15 (50)	3 (10)
Direct	1 (13)		4 (50)	3 (38)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	5 (4)	4 (3)	34 (25)	74 (55)	16 (12)
Female	4 (11)	1 (3)	15 (41)	16 (43)	1 (3)

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>27. Prepare a vehicle in a convoy</b>					
Prior Service	20 (38)	13 (25)	7 (13)	11 (21)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	78 (66)	13 (11)	17 (14)	9 (8)	1 (1)
OCS	3 (33)	1 (11)	4 (44)	1 (11)	
ROTC	77 (65)	17 (14)	10 (9)	14 (12)	
USMA	13 (43)	7 (23)	7 (23)	2 (7)	1 (3)
Direct	5 (63)	1 (13)	1 (13)		1 (13)
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	71 (53)	22 (16)	21 (16)	17 (13)	3 (2)
Female	27 (73)	4 (11)	3 (8)	3 (8)	
<b>Fight</b>					
<b>28. Move under direct fire</b>					
Prior Service	6 (11)	2 (4)	15 (28)	25 (49)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	14 (12)	7 (6)	40 (34)	50 (42)	6 (5)
OCS	2 (22)			7 (78)	
ROTC	15 (13)	6 (5)	36 (31)	51 (43)	9 (8)
USMA	1 (3)	1 (3)	11 (37)	17 (57)	
Direct		2 (25)	6 (75)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	15 (11)	4 (3)	33 (25)	71 (53)	10 (8)
Female	5 (14)	5 (14)	22 (60)	5 (14)	
<b>29. React to indirect fire (dismounted &amp; mounted)</b>					
Prior Service	7 (13)	4 (8)	15 (28)	23 (43)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	12 (10)	13 (11)	45 (38)	42 (36)	6 (5)
OCS		1 (11)	2 (22)	6 (67)	
ROTC	15 (13)	10 (9)	40 (34)	45 (38)	8 (7)
USMA	1 (3)	4 (13)	10 (33)	14 (47)	1 (3)
Direct	1 (13)	2 (25)	5 (63)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		2 (40)		1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	14 (10)	9 (7)	46 (34)	55 (41)	10 (8)
Female	5 (14)	8 (22)	14 (38)	10 (27)	



<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>30. React to direct fire (dismounted &amp; mounted)</b>					
Prior Service	7 (13)	3 (6)	14 (26)	25 (47)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	13 (11)	13 (11)	40 (34)	48 (41)	3 (3)
OCS	1 (11)		2 (22)	6 (67)	
ROTC	15 (13)	9 (8)	38 (32)	49 (42)	6 (5)
USMA	1 (3)	4 (13)	8 (27)	17 (56)	
Direct	1 (13)	3 (38)	4 (50)		
Warrant Officer	2 (40)		1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	15 (11)	8 (6)	38 (28)	65 (49)	7 (5)
Female	5 (14)	8 (22)	16 (43)	8 (22)	
<b>31. React to unexploded ordnance hazard</b>					
Prior Service	16 (30)	8 (15)	12 (23)	15 (28)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	61 (52)	19 (16)	19 (16)	17 (14)	1 (1)
OCS	4 (44)		3 (33)	2 (22)	
ROTC	52 (44)	18 (15)	19 (16)	26 (22)	2 (2)
USMA	15 (50)	6 (20)	6 (20)	3 (10)	
Direct	4 (50)	2 (25)	1 (13)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		2 (40)		1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	57 (43)	22 (16)	23 (17)	28 (21)	3 (2)
Female	20 (54)	5 (14)	8 (22)	4 (11)	
<b>32. React to man-to-man contact (Combatives)</b>					
Prior Service	7 (13)	8 (15)	15 (28)	21 (40)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	48 (41)	10 (9)	21 (18)	31 (26)	8 (7)
OCS	2 (22)	1 (11)	1 (11)	5 (56)	
ROTC	46 (39)	13 (11)	25 (21)	27 (23)	7 (6)
USMA		2 (7)	7 (23)	18 (60)	3 (10)
Direct	4 (50)	2 (25)		2 (25)	
Warrant Officers	3 (60)		2 (40)		
State OCS			1		
Male	36 (27)	16 (12)	28 (21)	47 (35)	7 (5)
Female	19 (51)	2 (5)	8 (22)	5 (14)	3 (8)

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>33. React to chemical or biological attack/hazard</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	3 (6)	17 (32)	30 (57)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	8 (7)	33 (28)	51 (43)	25 (21)	
OCS	1 (11)		5 (56)	3 (33)	
ROTC	7 (6)	26 (22)	49 (42)	34 (29)	1 (1)
USMA		7 (23)	10 (33)	13 (43)	
Direct	1 (13)	2 (25)	3 (38)	2 (25)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	9 (7)	27 (20)	47 (35)	48 (36)	2 (2)
Female		9 (24)	21 (57)	7 (19)	
<b>34. Decontaminate yourself &amp; individual equipment using chemical decontaminating kits</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	4 (8)	20 (38)	26 (49)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	19 (16)	36 (31)	41 (35)	22 (19)	
OCS	1 (11)		6 (67)	2 (22)	
ROTC	7 (6)	29 (25)	47 (40)	34 (29)	1 (1)
USMA	8 (27)	8 (27)	5 (17)	9 (30)	
Direct	3 (38)	3 (38)	2 (25)		
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS	1				
Male	19 (14)	32 (24)	42 (31)	39 (28)	2 (2)
Female	1 (3)	8 (22)	19 (51)	9 (24)	
<b>35. Maintain equipment (individual and crew served weapons)</b>					
Prior Service	5 (9)	2 (4)	9 (17)	32 (60)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	11 (9)	20 (17)	37 (31)	49 (42)	
OCS	1 (11)	1 (11)	1 (11)	6 (67)	
ROTC	11 (9)	14 (12)	33 (28)	56 (48)	
USMA	1 (3)	5 (17)	7 (23)	16 (53)	1 (3)
Direct	3 (38)	1 (13)	4 (50)		
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	8 (6)	18 (13)	35 (26)	68 (51)	5 (4)
Female	8 (22)	4 (11)	11 (30)	13 (35)	

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>36. Evaluate a casualty</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	13 (25)	31 (58)	7 (13)
No Prior Service	5 (4)	14 (12)	28 (24)	65 (55)	6 (5)
OCS		1 (11)	2 (22)	6 (67)	
ROTC	4 (4)	9 (8)	32 (27)	65 (55)	7 (6)
USMA		3 (10)	4 (13)	19 (63)	4 (13)
Direct	1 (13)	1 (13)	3 (38)	3 (38)	
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS		1			
Male	4 (3)	11 (8)	26 (19)	81 (61)	11 (8)
Female	1 (3)	4 (11)	15 (41)	15 (41)	
<b>37. Perform first aid for open wound (abdominal, chest, &amp; head)</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	5 (9)	15 (28)	25 (47)	5 (9)
No Prior Service	11 (9)	16 (14)	41 (35)	45 (38)	5 (4)
OCS		1 (11)	5 (56)	3 (33)	
ROTC	11 (9)	17 (14)	36 (31)	47 (40)	7 (6)
USMA		2 (7)	10 (33)	17 (57)	1 (3)
Direct	2 (25)	1 (13)	4 (50)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers	1 (20)			2 (40)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male	11 (8)	14 (10)	44 (33)	57 (43)	8 (6)
Female	3 (8)	7 (19)	12 (32)	13 (35)	2 (5)
<b>38. Perform first aid for bleeding of extremity</b>					
Prior Service	2 (4)	2 (4)	15 (28)	26 (49)	8 (15)
No Prior Service	11 (9)	11 (9)	34 (29)	53 (45)	8 (7)
OCS		1 (11)	1 (11)	6 (67)	1 (11)
ROTC	11 (9)	10 (9)	32 (27)	53 (45)	11 (9)
USMA		1 (3)	10 (33)	17 (57)	2 (7)
Direct	2 (25)		5 (63)	1 (13)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	2 (40)	2 (40)
State OCS		1			
Male	10 (8)	8 (6)	35 (26)	67 (50)	13 (10)
Female	3 (8)	5 (14)	14 (38)	12 (32)	3 (8)

<b>BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS</b>	<b>Never Done This Before</b>	<b>Not at All Confident</b>	<b>Somewhat Confident</b>	<b>Confident/ Very Confident</b>	<b>Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others</b>
<b>39. Select temporary fighting position</b>					
Prior Service	2 (4)	1 (2)	12 (23)	34 (64)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	6 (5)	3 (3)	33 (28)	72 (61)	4 (3)
OCS		1 (11)	2 (22)	6 (67)	
ROTC	7 (6)	1 (1)	28 (24)	76 (64)	6 (5)
USMA		2 (7)	9 (30)	18 (60)	1 (3)
Direct	1 (13)		4 (50)	3 (38)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	7 (5)	4 (3)	30 (22)	85 (63)	8 (6)
Female		1 (3)	15 (41)	21 (57)	

**Notes.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

## Appendix D

### BOLC II Entry Level Assessment Survey

**1 (130-xxx-0014).** You are employing an M18A1 Claymore Mine at your position. You have completed your inventory. You are now going to conduct a circuit test. What visual cue do you use to determine that the Claymore firing circuit is active?

- ☐ a. You visually observe each part to check for serviceability. No other cues are required.
- ☐ b. You test fire the Claymore by attaching the M57 Firing Device directly to the firing wire connector and depress the M57 firing handle after placing the blasting cap under a sandbag.
- ☐ c. You observe a spark arcing across the electrical terminals of the M57 Firing Device after depressing the M57 firing handle down. This confirms that an electrical charge is present.
- ☐ d. The lamp in the window of the M40 Test Set flashes when the M57 Firing Device is properly attached and the M57 firing handle is depressed.

The correct answer is "d. The lamp in the window of the M40 Test Set flashes when the M57 Firing Device is properly attached and the M57 firing handle is depressed." See STP 21-1-SMCT, Task 071-325-4425 Employ an M18A1 Claymore Mine, pg. 3-262 for additional details.

**2 (130-xxx-0080).** Your platoon is on patrol. The lead squad reports observing significant enemy activity. You must now send your company commander a SPOT report. What format should you use for the SPOT report?

- ☐ a. SALUTE format
- ☐ b. An incident report format
- ☐ c. 5 "S's" format
- ☐ d. SALT format

The correct answer is "a. SALUTE format." SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) is the Army-approved standard for reporting information. See STP 21-1-SMCT, Task 301-371-1000 Report Intelligence Information, pg. 3-593 for additional details.

**3 (130-xxx-0065).** Which of the following is an example of a risk assessment control measure?

- ☐ a. Intelligence reports indicate that the enemy has bridging equipment capable of bridging the river on your right flank.
- ☐ b. There is not enough vaccine present to treat both your Soldiers and the civilian population against a recent outbreak of cholera.
- ☐ c. After hearing reports of enemy armor units to your west, you establish an engagement area in that area to be used by attack helicopters.
- ☐ d. Because of their religious beliefs, protestors are planning a demonstration against the presence of unveiled female Soldiers in your unit.

The correct answer is "c. After hearing reports of enemy armor units to your west, you establish an engagement area in that area to be used by attack helicopters." A control is an action that either eliminates a threat or reduces the risk (probability or severity) of a threat. See FM 3-100.12 *Risk Management*, pg. II-3 for additional details.

4 (130-xxx-0073). The commander has asked you to review a draft operations security (OPSEC) plan. You note that the plan defines all three types of indicators: profile, deviation, and tip-off. However, the plan only addresses one type of profile indicators - signature indicators. Another type of indicators deals with established routines such as garbage collection at 0700 each day and shift changes at 0800, 1600, and 0100hrs. What is this other type of profile indicators?

- ☐ a. Friendly force profile indicators
- ☐ b. SIGINT indicators
- ☐ c. HUMINT indicators
- ☐ d. Pattern indicators

The correct answer is "d. Pattern indicators." According to the Individual Task Analysis Report for Task 130-XXX-0073 Implement Operational Security Measures, indicators are data derived from open sources or from detectable actions that the threat can piece together or interpret to reach conclusions concerning friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. Profile indicators show how activities are normally conducted. Profile indicators include patterns and signatures. Signatures result from the presence of a unit or activity on the battlefield. Signatures are detected because different units have different types of equipment, are of different sizes, emit different electronic signals, and have different noises associated with them. Patterns are stereotyped actions that occur so habitually that they can cue an observer to either the type of military unit or activity, its identity, capabilities, or intent. The Army tends to do things in the same way (by unit SOP). This causes patterns that the threat looks for so he can predict intentions.

5 (130-xxx-0003). Your platoon is preparing to depart the objective after a successful raid. You tell SSG Jones, your 3d Squad Leader, to destroy a captured enemy vehicle with a thermate grenade. You observe him telling everyone not to look at the flame, cautioning everyone away, pulling the pin on a cylindrical grenade with a light red body with black markings, place the grenade on the vehicle engine block, and immediately withdrawing from the vicinity of the burning vehicle. He chose the correct grenade for destroying the equipment. What grenade did he use?

- ☐ a. AN-M14 TH3 Incendiary Hand Grenade
- ☐ b. M-67 Fragmentation Hand Grenade
- ☐ c. AN-M83 White Smoke Hand Grenade
- ☐ d. MK3A2 Offensive Hand Grenade

The correct answer is "a. AN-M14 TH3 Incendiary Hand Grenade." The AN-M14 TH3 incendiary hand grenade is used to destroy equipment or start fires, damaging, immobilizing, or destroying vehicles, weapons systems, shelters, or munitions. Thermate is an improved version of thermite. A portion of thermate mixture is converted to molten iron, which burns at 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. The mixture fuzes together the metallic parts of any object that it contacts. The thermate filler can burn through a 1/2-inch homogenous steel plate. It produces its own oxygen and burns under water. The cylindrical grenade is gray in color with purple markings and a single purple band (current grenades). Under the standard color-coding system, incendiary grenades are light red with black markings. See FM 3-23.30 *Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals*, paragraph 1-8 for additional details.

6 (130-xxx-0074/130-xxx-0075). Your platoon was engaged in a firefight with local insurgents. You killed six and captured three insurgents, and captured 10 individual weapons, two crew-served weapons, two pieces of equipment, and documents that your interpreter says are important political documents. You treated the wounded enemy prisoners of war (EPW). You tagged everything and everybody. How are the EPWs and captured enemy material (CEM) processed?

- ☐ a. EPWs and all equipment, including documents, are sent to the battalion S2.
- ☐ b. EPWs and all equipment, including documents, are sent to the EPW collection point.
- ☐ c. EPWs are sent to the EPW collection point, all equipment is sent to the battalion S2, and documents are sent to the brigade military intelligence (MI) unit.
- ☐ d. EPWs are sent to the EPW collection point and all equipment, including documents, is sent to the battalion S2.

The correct answer is "d. EPWs are sent to the EPW collection point and all equipment, including documents, are sent to the battalion S2. However, "c. EPWs are sent to the EPW collection point, all equipment is sent to the battalion S2, and documents are sent to the brigade military intelligence (MI) unit" will also be accepted as a correct answer. According to the Individual Task Analysis Reports for Task 130-XXX-0074 Process Captives and Task 130-XXX-0075 Process Captured Materials, evacuate all captives quickly to a Military Police (MP) Collecting Point and/or Holding Area. All enemy documents captured on the battlefield are sent immediately to the first intelligence staff officer in the chain. The S2/G2 then routes all enemy documents to the nearest interrogation element for tactical exploitation. See STP 21-24 SMCT, Task 301-371-1200 Process Captured Material, pg. 3-131 for additional details. However, since most documents are written in a foreign, even third party language, many units automatically send documents to their MI battalion for analysis.

7 (130-xxx-0041). Two types of military authority exist, \_\_\_\_\_ and general military such as rank.

- ☐ a. command
- ☐ b. delegation of authority
- ☐ c. supplemental by law or regulation
- ☐ d. rank structure, traditions, and regulations

The correct answer is "a. command." In accordance with (IAW) Appendix A of FM 22-100 *Army Leadership* (pg.

A-3), "Two types of military authority exist: command and general military."

8 (130-xxx-0065). You are doing a risk assessment of your next mission. Your platoon is to attack an enemy combat outpost. You outnumber the enemy and have weapons superiority. However, there is an enemy battalion base camp 3 miles up a road that connects the two positions. To

Risk Assessment Matrix						
Severity		Probability				
		Frequent A	Likely B	Occasional C	Seldom D	Unlikely E
Catastrophic	I	Extremely High	Extremely High	High	High	Moderate
Critical	II	Extremely High	High	High	Moderate	Low
Marginal	III	High	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low
Negligible	IV	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Low

reduce the risk, your commander placed an adequate blocking force on the road between your objective and the base camp. As a result, you assess the severity of the enemy obtaining reinforcements as marginal (III) and the probability as seldom (D). What is the risk level?


- ☐ a. Extremely      ☐ b. High      ☐ c. Moderate      ☐ d. Low

The correct answer is "d. Low." To determine the risk level, use the risk assessment matrix. Follow the severity of the enemy obtaining reinforcements (marginal III) across until it intersects with the probability of occurrence (seldom D). They intersect at a low level of risk. See Annex D of FM 3-100.12 *Risk Management*, pg. D-1 for additional details.

9 (130-xxx-0047). Using this map of Cedar Grove, what are the correct six-digit grid coordinates for the school building?


- ☐ a. NF847394  
☐ b. NF395841  
☐ c. NF841395  
☐ d. NF394847

The correct answer is "c. NF841395." This question tested both your ability to read map coordinates and map symbols. Map coordinates are read "right and up." The school building, marked by a rectangle with a pennant on top of the building, is located at NF841395. A church, a rectangle with a cross on top, is located at NF847394 (answer a.). See Chapter 3, notably the information on a map legend, of FM 3-25.26 *Map Reading and Land Navigation* for additional details.



10 (130-xxx-0047). You are disoriented and your GPS is inoperable. You perform a modified resection to find your location. You know you are on a trail overlooking a pond bordered by a dam and a road. You use your laser rangefinder to determine the azimuth to the pond (168°) and that you are about 1500 meters away. Where are you?

- ☐ a. KF323059  
☐ b. KF334069  
☐ c. KF330046  
☐ d. KF331049



The correct answer is "c. KF330046." To conduct the modified resection, measure the length of the 168° azimuth arrow from the pond northward for 1500 meters. Mark that location along the azimuth arrow as your location and read the coordinates. Remember that a six-digit grid coordinate indicates a location within 100 meters so any grid coordinate within 100 meters of your plotted location (for example, KF331045) would be acceptable. See Chapter 6 of FM 3-25.26 *Map Reading and Land Navigation* for additional details.




11 (130-xxx-0069). If "A" designates high-speed mounted avenues of approach, "B" is an obstacle to mounted traffic, and "C" overlooks "A" and offers good observation and fields of fire, what is "C"?

- ☐ a. Key terrain
- ☐ b. Engagement area
- ☐ c. Area of operations
- ☐ d. Attack position

The correct answer is "a. Key terrain." According to FM 3-90 *Tactics*, key terrain is any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant (pg. 2-17).

Examples of key terrain include terrain that permits the defending force to cover a major obstacle system by fire, and important road junctions and choke points that impact troop movements (pg. 8-14).



12 (130-xxx-0063). Regardless of circumstances, which one of the following is **not** an action you should take when being interrogated by captors? (STP 21-1-SMCT Task 331-202-1049, pg 3-41)

- ☐ a. Keep your temper under control and maintain a polite bearing.
- ☐ b. Take a simple, tenable position and stick with it.
- ☐ c. Give short answers to the questions.
- ☐ d. Regardless of duress, provide only your name, rank, service number, and date of birth.

The correct answer is "d. Regardless of duress, provide only your name, rank, service number, and date of birth." Article V of the Code of Conduct reads, "When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause." The underlined portion of the article was added to the Code of Conduct after the Vietnam War to acknowledge that it was unrealistic to expect a PW to remain confined for years reciting only name, rank, service number and date of birth, especially under duress of psychological and physical suffering. The other three answers (Keep your temper under control and maintain a polite bearing; take a simple, tenable position and stick with it; and give short answers to the questions) are acceptable survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) practices to help friendly prisoners of war resist enemy interrogators. See STP 21-1-SMCT Task 331-202-1049 Comply with the Requirements

of the Code of Conduct, pg. 3-39, for additional information.

13 (130-xxx-0071). Your patrol is moving when you hear the sound of an overhead flare being fired. What is your immediate response? (STP 21-1-SMCT Task 071-326-0511)

- ☐ a. Freeze.
- ☐ b. Wait for the illumination burst, then move out of the illuminated area.
- ☐ c. Assume the prone position prior to the flare burst.
- ☐ d. Sound the alarm "Flare" and assume the prone position prior to the flare burst.

The correct answer is "c. Assume the prone position prior to the flare burst. To respond to an overhead flare with warning (for example, the sound of a rising flare): assume the prone position (behind concealment when available) before the flare bursts; protect your night vision

by closing one eye and observing with the other; use your night vision eye to reorient yourself or rejoin your group when the flare burns out; and then continue the mission. See STP 21-1-SMCT, Task 071-326-0511 React to Flares, pg. 3-180, for additional information

**14** (130-xxx-0048). SSG Jones lost a set of AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Goggles after it fell out of a helicopter and could not be recovered. He admits his negligence (culpability), is willing to settle liability, and especially wants to maintain a low profile about the incident. The supply sergeant says that the AN/PVS-7D is a sensitive item. What is the best instrument to settle liability and recover accountability under these circumstances?

- ☐ a. Only a report of survey can be used in this instance since the NVG is a sensitive item.
- ☐ b. Statement of charges (DD Form 362)
- ☐ c. Cash Collection Voucher (DD Form 1131)
- ☐ d. Either b or c

The correct answer is "a. Only a report of survey can be used in this instance since the NVG is a sensitive item." Normally, a statement of charges (DD Form 362) or a cash collection voucher (DD Form 1131) are the most expeditious means of resolving culpability provided the hand receipt holder is in agreement, however, IAW FM 10-14 *Unit Supply Operations* because the AN/PVS-7D is a sensitive item, only a report of survey can be used (pg. 3-10).

**15** (130-xxx-0046). \_\_\_\_\_ is the employment of units in combat (including the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy) and the realm of close combat where friendly forces are in immediate contact and use direct and indirect fires to defeat and destroy the enemy; a(an) \_\_\_\_\_ is a small tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below. (FM 3-0, paragraph 2-12)

- ☐ a. Tactics and battle
- ☐ b. Battle and engagement
- ☐ c. Engagement and battle
- ☐ d. Tactics and engagement

The correct answer is "d. tactics and engagement." IAW paragraph 2-12 of FM 3-0 *Operations*, *tactics* is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. A *battle* consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation. An *engagement* is a small tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below. Engagements are usually short measured in minutes, hours, or a day (see FM 3-90).

**16** (130-xxx-0022). Troop-leading procedures is a series of eight inter-related, overlapping steps that are used by leaders to ensure that nothing is left out of planning and preparation and that Soldiers understand the mission and are adequately prepared. The eight troop-leading procedures steps are: receive the mission, issue the warning order, \_\_\_\_\_, start necessary movement, reconnoiter, complete the plan, issue the order, and supervise.

- ☐ a. make a tentative plan
- ☐ b. conduct rehearsals
- ☐ c. inspect troops

- ☐ d. identify requirements

The correct answer is "a. make a tentative plan." IAW Chapter 4 of FM 5-0 *Army Planning and Orders Production*, the eight troop-leading procedures steps are: receive the mission, issue the warning order, make a tentative plan, start necessary movement, reconnoiter, complete the plan, issue the order, and supervise.

**17** (130-xxx-0083). You have found a 152mm artillery round that failed to detonate. You treat it as an unexploded ordnance (UXO). You mark the location, approximate its explosive and fragmentation radii and evacuate the immediate area. You then block off the danger area to keep unauthorized personnel out. You also reroute traffic to avoid traffic vibrations disturbing the UXO. What other action should you perform as part of the evacuation process?

- ☐ a. Open doors/windows within the danger area to reduce glass breakage and blast effects.
- ☐ b. Mark the explosive and fragmentation radii with stakes for easy reference.
- ☐ c. Remove the fuse.
- ☐ d. Check for booby traps by moving the round with a wooden prod.

The correct answer is "a. Open doors/windows within the danger area to reduce glass breakage and blast effects." According to Individual Task Analysis Report 130-XXX-0083 React to Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Hazards, you evacuate the area around the suspected UXO item immediately upon its discovery by: blocking off danger areas to keep unauthorized and unneeded personnel out of the area; stop and reroute traffic to avoid the danger zone and to be sure that traffic vibrations do not disturb the UXO; open doors and windows within the danger area to reduce glass breakage and other effects of blast and suction; and evacuate important supplies, machinery, and records if their loss will hurt the war or defense effort.

**18** (130-xxx-0042). A mission statement is a combination of what is to be accomplished and why. The "what" of a mission statement is the \_\_\_\_\_. It is the activity performed by a unit expressed by friendly actions (e.g. control, breach, seize, secure) or effects on enemy force (e.g. isolate, fix, destroy). (FM 5-0, paragraph 3-89 and 3-93)

- ☐ a. operational situation.
- ☐ b. strategy.
- ☐ c. tactics to employ.
- ☐ d. mission task.

The correct answer is "d. mission task." IAW FM 5-0 *Army Planning and Orders Production*, A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph describing the unit's essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, and the reasons thereof, but seldom specifies how (paragraph 3-89). The "what" is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs (for example, contain, destroy, isolate) (paragraph 3-93). It is the tactical mission task to be accomplished. FM 3-90, *Tactics*, defines *tactical mission tasks* as, "The specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force (paragraph 3-94)."

**19** (130-xxx-0042). The battlefield organization is the allocation of forces in the area of operations by purpose. It consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations. Of the three, \_\_\_\_\_ operations are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher

headquarters. They determine the conclusive outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements. (FM 3-0, paragraph 4-84)

- ☐ a. sustaining
- ☐ b. decisive
- ☐ c. shaping
- ☐ d. coordinating

The correct answer is "b. decisive." See paragraph 4-84 of FM 3-0 *Operations* for more details.

**20** (130-xxx-0045). Listed below are several force protection Level I awareness training measures for reducing vulnerabilities to unit personnel. One is a physical security measure used to reduce vulnerabilities to equipment. Which one is the physical security measure?

- ☐ a. Ensuring clear zone areas inside and outside perimeter fences are kept free of obstacles, topographic features, and vegetation exceeding 4 inches in height.
- ☐ b. Reducing the threat by practicing individual protective measures.
- ☐ c. Acquiring knowledge of hostage survival techniques to lessen the potential impact of captivity.
- ☐ d. Detecting terrorist surveillance, which allows an intended victim to take precautions.

The correct answer is "a. Ensuring clear zone areas inside and outside perimeter fences are kept free of obstacles, topographic features, and vegetation exceeding 4 inches in height." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report Task 130-xxx-0045 *Employ Basic Measures to Reduce Vulnerability to Terrorist Acts/Activities*, you can determine physical security measures to reduce vulnerabilities to unit equipment by hardening the target through the layering of security to include determining physical security barriers required for the unit's protection including vehicle barriers, fences, and ensuring clear zone areas inside and outside perimeter fences are kept free of all obstacles, topographic features, and vegetation exceeding 4 inches in height. High vegetation reduces the effectiveness of the physical barrier, impedes observation and provides cover and concealment for an intruder.

**21** (130-xxx-0037). Your platoon has just completed an important training session. You want to record the individual training results. You identify the records to be updated. The results will be used to identify a strategy to improve or sustain training proficiency. Three entries are normally recorded. If the task was fully trained, a "T" is entered. If the task was untrained, a "U" is annotated. By doctrine, what is used for the third possible entry? (FM 7-1, paragraph 4-13)

- ☐ a. "C" for completed training, but not fully trained
- ☐ b. "F" for task failure
- ☐ c. "P" for needs practice
- ☐ d. "NO GO" for not completing training, or not fully trained

The correct answer is "c. "P" for needs practice." IAW paragraph 4-13 of FM 7-1 *Battle Focused Training*, individual training results use three entries, "T" for trained, "U" for untrained, and "P" for needs practice.

**22** (130-xxx-0037). The after-action review (AAR) is a professional discussion of an event that enables Soldiers and units to discover for themselves what happened and why. The purpose of an AAR is to \_\_\_\_\_. (FM 7-1, paragraph C-4)

- ☐ a. provide an assessment tool.
- ☐ b. provide a final passing or failure score.

- ☐ c. document how a task was performed in past training exercises.
- ☐ d. provide feedback essential to correcting training deficiencies.

The correct answer is "d. provide feedback essential to correcting training deficiencies." IAW paragraph C-4 of FM 7-1 *Battle Focused Training*, the after action review, "The purpose of the AAR is to provide the feedback essential to correcting training deficiencies. Feedback should be direct and on-the-spot. Each time incorrect performance is observed, it should be noted, and—if it will not interfere with training—corrected."

**23** (130-xxx-0030). A person's character is shaped by **values** (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage) and **attributes** (mental, physical, and emotional). These enable the individual to "BE" a leader. A leader's competence includes the **skills** he must "KNOW" (interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical) and how he applies this knowledge through **actions** of excellence, or "DO" (influencing, operating, and improving). This hierarchy of BE, KNOW, DO is known as the \_\_\_\_\_. (FM 22-100, paragraph 1-2)

- ☐ a. Core Leadership Dimensions.
- ☐ b. Army leadership framework.
- ☐ c. Warrior Ethos.
- ☐ d. Action-Observation-Reflection (AOR) Model.

The correct answer is "b. Army leadership framework." IAW paragraph 1-2 of FM 22-100 *Army Leadership*, The hierarchy of BE, KNOW, DO is known as the Army leadership framework.

**24** (130-xxx-0027). You observe SSG Jones counseling PVT Smith. From what you learned about the interpersonal skill of communicating, you know that SSG Jones has established two-way communication with PVT Smith and also is sending the active listening signals. He also applied good visual cues of nonverbal communication. Of the items listed below, what is an example of active listening? (FM 22-100, paragraph 4-8).

- ☐ a. SSG Jones maintaining eye contact and avoiding interrupting PVT Smith.
- ☐ b. SSG Jones writing on a pad while listening to PVT Smith.
- ☐ c. SSG Jones periodically says "yes" or "uh-huh" when agreeing with PVT Smith.
- ☐ d. SSG Jones is cognizant of his body language, voice tone, and facial expressions.

The correct answer is "c. SSG Jones periodically says "yes" or "uh-huh" when agreeing with PVT Smith." However, "a. SSG Jones maintaining eye contact and avoiding interrupting PVT Smith" will be accepted since maintaining eye contact is also a characteristic of active listening. This example of active listening can be found in paragraph 4-8 of FM 22-100 *Army Leadership*.

**25** (130-xxx-0017). You are engaging targets on an M16 live-fire range. Your rifle malfunctions. What action should you immediately perform?

- ☐ a. Move selector to SAFE, check magazine, reinsert, pull charging handle, and continue.
- ☐ b. Execute S-P-O-R-T-S (Slap, Pull, Observe, Release, Tap, Shoot).
- ☐ c. Keep the weapon down range in the event of a "cookoff" and signal for assistance.
- ☐ d. Replace magazine, pull the charging handle, continue firing.

The correct answer is "b. Execute S-P-O-R-T-S (Slap, Pull, Observe, Release, Tap, Shoot)." Individual Task Analysis Report 130-XXX-0017 Engage the Enemy with an M16A2 Rifle states that, "should your rifle malfunction, remember S-P-O-R-T-S. This key word will help you remember these actions in sequence: Slap, Pull, Observe, Release, Tap, Shoot."

**26** (130-xxx-0060). Specialist Santos is in the window for promotion. You conducted a developmental counseling session during which you said, "Next week you'll attend the map reading class with 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon. After the class, SGT Dixon will coach you through the land navigation course. He will help you develop your compass skills. I will observe your training and then talk to you again to determine where additional training is needed." This discussion is an example of \_\_\_\_\_. (FM 22-100, paragraph C-71)

- ☐ a. a nondirective counseling approach.
- ☐ b. event counseling.
- ☐ c. establishing the right atmosphere.
- ☐ d. developing a plan of action.

The correct answer is "d. developing a plan of action." IAW paragraph C-71 of FM 22-100 *Army Leadership*, a plan of action identifies the method for achieving the desired results. This example is located in that paragraph.

**27** (130-xxx-0031). You're a newly arrived platoon leader. You decide that you want to hold two inspections. You want to inspect your vehicles to insure that they have all the equipment issued to them and that the equipment is serviceable. You also want to inspect your Soldiers in their Class A uniforms. What type(s) of inspections should you use? (FM 7-22.7, paragraph 2-34)

- ☐ a. An in-ranks inspection and a full field inspection.
- ☐ b. A pre-combat inspection and in-ranks inspection.
- ☐ c. A technical inspection and an on-the-spot inspection.
- ☐ d. Both inspections are types of in-ranks inspections.

This item was not scored since you were not taught this task. However, the correct answer is "d. Both inspections are types of in-ranks inspections." Paragraph 2-34 of FM 7-22.7 *The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide* states that, "There are two categories of inspections for determining the status of individual soldiers and their equipment: in-ranks and in-quarters. An *in-ranks inspection* is of personnel and equipment in a unit formation. The leader examines each soldier individually, noticing their general appearance and the condition of their clothing and equipment. When inspecting crew-served weapons and vehicles, the personnel are normally positioned to the rear of the formation with the operators standing by their vehicle or weapon. Leaders may conduct an *in-quarters (barracks) inspection* to include personal appearance, individual weapons, field equipment, displays, maintenance and sanitary conditions.

**28** (130-xxx-0029). You received a movement order directing your unit to move to the port of embarkation. You have used your unit SOP and all unit movement directives to prepare your unit. Vehicles and containers are already prepared for movement. You must now build 463L Pallets for your supplies. Plastic and nets are available. You know that you must place hazardous materials, approved for palletizing by the unit movement officer (UMO), on the pallet with the label clearly visible and right side up with "special handling" labels facing out. What other consideration(s) must be applied to building the pallets? (STP 21-24-SMCT Task 551-88N-0002)

- ☐ a. Large, heavy objects are loaded first, distributed from the center of the pallet outward.
- ☐ b. Lighter or smaller items are placed on top of or beside heavier objects.
- ☐ c. The load is constructed in a square or pyramid shape to make load more stable.
- ☐ d. All of the above.

The correct answer is "d. All of the above." IAW Task 551-88N-0002 Prepare for Unit Move on pg. 3-127 of STP 21-24-SMCT, the three listed answers (large, heavy objects are loaded first, distributed from the center of the pallet outward, lighter or smaller items are placed on top of or beside heavier objects, and the load is constructed in a square or pyramid shape to make load more stable.) are all considerations for preparing a 463L Pallet for movement.

**29** (130-xxx-0021). By harnessing the experience of its people and organizations to improve the way it does business, adopting new techniques and procedures that get the job done more efficiently, and discarding outmoded techniques and procedures yet remaining flexible, the Army proves that it is a(an) \_\_\_\_\_ organization. (FM 22-100, paragraph 5-124)

- ☐ a. flexible
- ☐ b. evolutionary
- ☐ c. learning
- ☐ d. dynamic

The correct answer is "c. learning." Paragraph 5-124 of FM 22-100 Army Leadership states that, "The Army is a learning organization, one that harnesses the experience of its people and organizations to improve the way it does business. Based on their experiences, learning organizations adopt new techniques and procedures that get the job done more efficiently or effectively. Likewise, they discard techniques and procedures that have outlived their purpose."

**30** (130-xxx-0028). You must enter a secure net over a tactical radio. Your call sign is E13. The net control station (NCS) is E3E. You initiate the transmission by saying, "E3E, this is E13, over." The other two stations on the net (E39, and E46) respond in the correct sequence. You then hear the following, "Net, this is E3E, out." What did the last message from E3E mean? (STP 21-1-SMCT Task 113-571-1022)

- ☐ a. The NCS is advising all stations there is a problem on the secure net.
- ☐ b. The NCS wants all stations to stand by for further traffic.
- ☐ c. The NCS is letting every station know that the net is already open.
- ☐ d. The NCS is acknowledging opening the net, but has no traffic.

The correct answer is "d. The NCS is acknowledging opening the net, but has no traffic." For further information see STP 21-1-SMCT, pg. 3-241, Task 113-571-1022 Perform Voice Communications.

**31** (071-D-2322). One of your Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) has been hit. The vehicle is in danger of catching fire. The gunner is unconscious and lying on the turret floor. He has received first aid for his wounds. The troop compartment access door is blocked. He must be removed via either the commander's or gunner's hatch, whichever provides the most direct access. Three men are prepared to assist with the evacuation. What piece of equipment do you tell the Soldiers conducting the evacuation to use to help remove the injured gunner?

- ☐ a. A pistol belt
- ☐ b. A field litter
- ☐ c. An improvised litter
- ☐ d. A field pack harness

The correct answer is "a. A pistol belt." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2322 Transport a Casualty, one of the methods for lifting an unconscious casualty upward out of a combat vehicle is to "place a pistol belt or similar material around the casualty's chest to help pull him out of the vehicle."

**32 (071-D-2317).** A civilian male is escorted to your command post location. He is carrying an unconscious woman who is experiencing severe breathing difficulty and appears to be choking. The woman also is clearly in the advanced stages of pregnancy. The male lays the woman across a desk, makes a fist, holds it up to his throat, and points with the other hand to indicate his companion cannot breathe because of a blockage in her throat. The woman becomes unconscious. A wheezing sound coming from her throat is audible. The guard says the platoon sergeant went to get the medic. What's your next step?

- ☐ a. Wait for the medic to arrive.
- ☐ b. Slap the choking patient on the back to attempt to dislodge the object.
- ☐ c. Perform abdominal thrusts on the choking patient to clear the airway.
- ☐ d. Perform chest thrusts on the choking patient to clear the airway.

The correct answer is "d. Perform chest thrusts on the choking patient to clear the airway." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2317 First Aid 2 (Manage the Airway), you would perform chest thrusts on the patient to clear the airway. You would not use abdominal thrusts on anyone who is in the advanced stages of pregnancy, is obese, or who has a significant abdominal wound.

**33 (130-xxx-0062).** Your platoon has been attacked with a chemical agent. Your commander instructs you to move to a prepared decontamination site. What duty is normally performed at both the link-up point and the decontamination site by the contaminated unit?

- ☐ a. Security at both sites.
- ☐ b. Clean and mark the decontamination site.
- ☐ c. Set up and run the vehicle wash-down site.
- ☐ d. Reporting the area of contamination (decontamination site).

The correct answer is "a. Security at both sites." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 130-xxx-0062 Direct Decontamination Procedures, the contaminated unit provides security at both link up point and decon site.

**34 (130-xxx-0025).** In basic combatives one of the best techniques to counter a leg takedown is the \_\_\_\_\_ (FM 3-25.150, pg 3-29).

- ☐ a. scissors sweep.
- ☐ b. paper cutter choke.
- ☐ c. cross collar choke.
- ☐ d. front guillotine choke.

The correct answer is "d. front guillotine choke." According to pg. 3-29 of FM 3-25.150 *Combatives*, one of the best techniques to counter a leg takedown is the front guillotine choke.

**35 (130-xxx-0020).** What is wrong with the following call for fire request: "H24, this is N59, adjust fire, over (*observer identification and warning order*). Grid NF506394 (*target location*). Tank in the open (*target description*), VT in effect, 3 rounds, over (*method of engagement and method of fire and control*). I authenticate Papa, out (*authentication, if used*)."

- ☐ a. The method of engagement is wrong (using variable time fuze for tanks).
- ☐ b. The warning order should always be stated as, "request fire, over."
- ☐ c. Method of fire and control should always be stated as, "one round" until confirmed.
- ☐ d. Target location should always be given as a shift from a known point.



The correct answer is "a. The method of engagement is wrong (using variable time fuze for tanks)." IAW FM 6-30 *Observed Fire Procedures* (pg. 4-11 and Appendix E) and FM 6-20-20 *Fire Support at Battalion Task Force and Below*, high explosive/variable time (HE/VT) round/fuze combinations are used for targets that require either an aerial burst or penetration, e.g. into heavy woodlines, earthworks, trenches, buildings, and light bunkers. It would be ineffective against tanks. The optimum solution would be a Copperhead missile to destroy the tank, should an observer be able to place a ground/vehicular laser locator designator (G/VLLD) on the targeted tank. If not, HE can be used to damage, but most likely not destroy, the tank.

**36 (071-D-2323).** Your platoon has been operating in a cold environment for an extended period. One of your Soldiers complains of a cold injury to his feet. You look at his feet and determine that the skin is red with ulcerated and/or bleeding lesions at the joints of his toes. What cold injury is he suffering from?

- ☐ a. Frostbite
- ☐ b. Immersion foot
- ☐ c. Hypothermia
- ☐ d. Chilblain

The correct answer is "d. Chilblain." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2323 First Aid 8 (Perform Field Sanitation and Preventive Medicine Fieldcraft), the symptoms for chilblain include that the skin is red with ulcerated and/or bleeding lesions at the joints of his toes.

**37 (071-D-2319).** One of your Soldiers has suffered a broken right arm. The arm position is unnatural. The break is not a compound or open fracture (bone extruding). You reassure the casualty, check for circulation below the fracture for skin color, feel for temperature variance, and ask the casualty if he can move his fingers. What is the next step?

- ☐ a. Treat for shock.
- ☐ b. Apply a sling.
- ☐ c. Question the casualty about numbness, tightness, or cold sensation.
- ☐ d. Splint or immobilize the suspected fracture.

The correct answer is "c. Question the casualty about numbness, tightness, or cold sensation." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2319 First Aid 4 (Splint a Suspected Fracture), once you have reassured the casualty, checked circulation below the fracture for skin color, felt for temperature variance, and asked the casualty if he can move his fingers, you would question the casualty about numbness, tightness, or cold sensation.

**38 (071-D-2316).** A Soldier in your platoon was found unconscious and has symptoms of an injury. You must evaluate the Soldier as a casualty. The Soldier is non-responsive, but is breathing steady. What is the next step? (STP 21-1-SMCT Task 081-831-1000)

- ☐ a. Treat for shock.
- ☐ b. Check for fractures.
- ☐ c. Check for bleeding.
- ☐ d. Check for burns.

The correct answer is "c. Check for bleeding." IAW STP 21-1-SMCT Task 081-831-1000 Evaluate a Casualty, pg. 3-53, once you have checked the casualty for responsiveness, and breathing, you would check the casualty for bleeding.

**39 (071-D-2318).** A Soldier in your platoon was knocked unconscious by a mortar round burst. The Soldier is responsive, is breathing steady, and there appears to be no uncontrolled bleeding. You tell one of your Soldiers to treat the injured man for shock just in case. The caregiver looks confused so you start going through the steps for treating shock. You tell the caregiver to position the casualty on his back and elevate the casualty's feet higher than his heart. You then tell the caregiver to loosen the casualty's clothing. What is the next step?

- ☐ a. Prevent the casualty from chilling or overheating.
- ☐ b. Check for fractures.
- ☐ c. Check for bleeding.
- ☐ d. Calm and reassure the casualty.

The correct answer is "a. Prevent the casualty from chilling or overheating." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2318 First Aid 3 (Control Bleeding and Treat Burns), you would treat the casualty for shock by positioning the casualty on his back, stop any uncontrolled bleeding, elevate the casualty's feet higher than his heart, loosen the casualty's clothing, then prevent the casualty from chilling or overheating.

**40 (071-D-2318).** A Soldier in your platoon has received phosphorus burns from an improvised explosive device (IED). You have cut off the Soldier's smoldering clothing and uncovered the burn. What is the next step?

- ☐ a. Apply first aid cream or ointments to the burn.
- ☐ b. Moisten and apply a wet field dressing or mud over the phosphorus to exclude air.
- ☐ c. Apply a clean field dressing.
- ☐ d. Break blisters to prevent swelling.

The correct answer is "b. Moisten and apply a wet field dressing or mud over the phosphorus to exclude air." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2318 First Aid 3 (Control Bleeding and Treat Burns), phosphorus will continue to burn if it can receive oxygen. You must moisten and apply a wet field dressing or mud over the phosphorus to exclude air. You would never break the blisters or apply an ointment or grease over burns.

**41 (071-D-2316).** One of your Soldiers is a casualty to a mine blast. He is conscious, but is breathing hard. The Soldier is able to speak, cough forcefully, and has a good air exchange, but is wheezing in between coughs. What action should you perform next?

- ☐ a. Perform abdominal thrusts.
- ☐ b. Request urgent CASEVAC.
- ☐ c. Perform chest thrusts.
- ☐ d. Do not interfere except to encourage the casualty while awaiting CASEVAC.

The correct answer is "d. Do not interfere except to encourage the casualty while awaiting CASEVAC." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2316 First Aid 1 (Evaluate a Casualty for Life-Threatening Conditions, if the casualty is conscious, and has a good air exchange, no further treatment is required except to reassure and encourage the patient.

**42 (071-D-2323).** One of your Soldiers has become a heat casualty. He is sweating profusely with pale, moist, cool skin. He complains of a headache, weakness, dizziness and a loss of appetite. He also complains of chills (goose flesh) and tingling of the hands and/or feet. What type of heat injury is your Soldier suffering from?

- ☐ a. Heat exhaustion

- ☐ b. Heat stroke
- ☐ c. Heat casualty
- ☐ d. Heat cramps

The correct answer is "a. Heat exhaustion." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2323 First Aid 8 (Perform Field Sanitation and Preventive Medicine Fieldcraft), the symptoms for heat exhaustion include the casualty sweating profusely with pale, moist, cool skin, possible headache, weakness, dizziness and a loss of appetite, and complaints of chills (goose flesh) and tingling of the hands and/or feet.

**43 (071-D-2321).** A Soldier was struck by a mortar blast concussion and was knocked unconscious. There is no sign of injury. The Soldier isn't breathing, but has a pulse. The caregiver begins cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). After two initial breaths, the caregiver administers chest compressions. How many compressions and at what rate should the caregiver administer CPR?

- ☐ a. 1 compression followed by 2 breaths, repeated every 5 seconds.
- ☐ b. 4 compressions in 12 seconds followed by 1 breath.
- ☐ c. 15 compressions in 9 to 11 seconds followed by 2 breaths.
- ☐ d. 2 compressions in 10 seconds followed by 4 breaths.

This item was not scored. The question should have read: "A Soldier was struck by a mortar blast concussion and was knocked unconscious. There is no sign of injury. The Soldier isn't breathing, but has a pulse. The caregiver begins cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Just then, the casualty convulses and both breathing and heartbeat cease. After two initial breaths, the caregiver administers chest compressions. How many compressions and at what rate should the caregiver administer CPR?" IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2321 First Aid 6 (Perform Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation - CPR), the correct answer would have been "c. 15 compressions in 9 to 11 seconds followed by 2 breaths."

**44 (071-D-2324)** Your platoon has come under a chemical attack. One extremely slender Soldier is an apparent nerve agent casualty, experiencing some mild symptoms (runny nose, headache, drooling, blurred vision). He starts to complain of tightness of the chest, muscular twitching, and stomach cramps. You administer a nerve agent antidote. Where do you apply treatment?

- ☐ a. In the meaty portion of the upper arm.
- ☐ b. Directly into the Pulmonary Artery about three inches above the collarbone.
- ☐ c. Always apply the antidote to a part of the lateral thigh muscle from about a hand's width above the knee to a hand's width below the hip joint.
- ☐ d. Since he's extremely slender, in the buttocks, being careful to inject only into the upper, outer quarter of the buttocks to avoid hitting the major nerve that crosses the buttocks.

The correct answer is "d. Since he's extremely slender, in the buttocks, being careful to inject only into the upper, outer quarter of the buttocks to avoid hitting the major nerve that crosses the buttocks." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2324 First Aid 9 (Administer Nerve Agent Antidote), administering the antidote in the thigh of an extremely slender Soldier may incapacitate movement. The antidote should be administered in the buttocks.

**45 (071-D-2318).** One of your Soldiers was hit by small arms fire and is suffering from an open wound to the forehead. Another Soldier removed the casualty's helmet. He is conscious and is answering questions freely and correctly, but brain matter is dangling from the wound. What treatment must be performed next?

- ☐ a. Use a sterile object to push exposed brain matter back into the skull.
- ☐ b. Clean the area in and around the wound.
- ☐ c. Gently apply the Soldier's field and pressure dressing to the wound.
- ☐ d. Position the Soldier, elevating his feet.

The correct answer is "c. Gently apply the Soldier's field and pressure dressing to the wound." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2318 First Aid 3 (Control Bleeding and Treat Burns), you would securely apply the Soldier's (not your) field and pressure dressing to the wound. You would never attempt to clean the wound, push exposed brain matter back into the skull, or remove a protruding object.

**46 (071-D-2318).** One of your Soldiers was hit by mortar fire and received an open abdominal wound. He is conscious and answering questions, but is in pain. Six feet of intestines are protruding from the wound, much larger than a field dressing can cover. Another Soldier placed the casualty on his back, flexed his knees, and removed the clothing surrounding the wound, but is asking for help in offering further treatment. What actions must be performed next?

- ☐ a. Use the field dressing wrapper, poncho, or other material to cover the intestines.
- ☐ b. Cut away exposed intestines from the wound.
- ☐ c. Scoop the intestines back into the abdominal cavity, then apply a field dressing.
- ☐ d. Firmly apply the Soldier's field and pressure dressing to the wound.

The correct answer is "a. Use the field dressing wrapper, poncho, or other material to cover the intestines." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2318 First Aid 3 (Control Bleeding and Treat Burns), you would use the field dressing wrapper, poncho, or other material to cover and secure the intestines. You would never attempt to clean the wound, cut away exposed intestines from the wound, remove any foreign object, or scoop the intestines back into the abdominal cavity.

**47 (071-D-2320).** A Soldier is hit by small arms fire. Enemy fire is intense and you cannot get to him. Smoke is not available. You tell him to return fire, move to cover, and administer self-aid to stop the bleeding. He says he can't move. What do you do next?

- ☐ a. Have the casualty play dead.
- ☐ b. Yell for the medic to get to him and render first aid.
- ☐ c. You move to the casualty and render life-saving hemorrhage control.
- ☐ d. Tell him he has got to come to you regardless of enemy fire.

The correct answer is "a. Have the casualty play dead." IAW Individual Task Analysis Report 071-D-2320 First Aid 5 (Perform Tactical Combat Casualty Care), if the casualty cannot return fire, move to cover, or administer self-aid to stop the bleeding, the care provider should tell the casualty to play dead to avoid being shot at further.

**48 (081-831-1037).** You are in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level 2 while operating in a chemical environment. You are operating with M9 Detector Paper. You tell your Soldiers to attach M9 Detector Papers on their opposite upper arm, wrist, and ankle, depending on if they are right or left handed, and to monitor color changes detecting the presence of chemical agents. Where is the M9 Detector Paper put on equipment? (STP 21-1-SMCT Task 081-831-1037)

- ☐ a. On the side of the equipment to avoid distraction to the operator.
- ☐ b. Where it may come into contact with contaminated objects and is visible to the

operator.

- ☐ c. On top since chemical agents are most likely airborne.
- ☐ d. You should use M8 Detector Paper for this mission instead.

The correct answer is "Where it may come into contact with contaminated objects and is visible to the operator." IAW STP 21-1-SMCT Task 031-503-1037 Detect Chemical Agents Using M8 or M9 Detector Paper, the M9 Detector Paper should be placed on the equipment where it may come into contact with contaminated objects and is visible to the operator.

**49 (081-503-1015).** Your platoon is preparing for a patrol. Since the enemy has previously used chemical agents, you instruct your platoon to carry their MOPP gear. You receive a radio alarm to go to MOPP level 1. Which of the following is MOPP 1? (STP 21-1-SMCT Task 031-503-1015)

- ☐ a. Don MOPP trousers, jacket, overboots, and protective mask and hood.
- ☐ b. Don MOPP trousers, jacket, and overboots.
- ☐ c. Don MOPP trousers and jacket.
- ☐ d. Don only protective mask and hood.

The correct answer is "c. Don MOPP trousers and jacket." IAW STP 21-1-SMCT Task 031-503-1015 Protect Yourself from NBC Injury/Contamination with Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), MOPP level 1 is Don MOPP trousers and jacket.

**50 (130-xxx-0050).** Your division is attacking a fortified town. The defending enemy commander expelled all noncombatants in order to lessen his logistical burden. Division has ordered that under no circumstances are noncombatants to be allowed to leave the town and pass through your lines. They are to be fired at to discourage their movement or to be sent back into town. Several of your Soldiers question the validity of the command. How do you respond?

- ☐ a. Subject to local agreements, there is no rule of law that compels the attacking force commander to permit noncombatants to leave a besieged locality.
- ☐ b. The order is in violation of international law.
- ☐ c. Only wounded, sick, infirmed, aged persons, children under 15, maternity cases, religious ministers and supplies, and medical personnel and equipment are exempt.
- ☐ d. You are going to request additional guidance from division.

The correct answer is "a. Subject to local agreements, there is no rule of law that compels the attacking force commander to permit noncombatants to leave a besieged locality." Paragraph 44 of FM 27-10 *The Law of Land Warfare*, reads as follows: "Subject to the foregoing exceptions (removal from besieged or encircled areas of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel, stores, and equipment) there is no rule of law which compels the commander of an investing (surrounding) force to permit noncombatants to leave a besieged locality. It is within the discretion of the besieging commander whether he will permit noncombatants to leave and under what conditions. Thus, if a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants in order to lessen the logistical burden he has to bear, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten the surrender. Persons who attempt to leave or enter a besieged place without obtaining the necessary permission are liable to be fired upon, sent back, or detained."

**51** (130-xxx-0011). Who is the ethical standard bearer for a platoon? (FM 22-1100, paragraph 5-120)

- ☐ a. The company commander because he's responsible for all actions within his company.
- ☐ b. All leaders within the platoon.
- ☐ c. NCOs since they set and maintain the standard.
- ☐ d. The platoon leader since he is an officer.

The correct answer is "b. All leaders within the platoon." IAW paragraph 5-120 of FM 22-100 *Army Leadership*, "all leaders are the ethical standard bearer for their organization."

**52** (130-xxx-0033). Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) are published for each type of unit in the Army that has a field mission. They prescribe the organizational structure of the unit and the personnel and equipment allowances needed for the unit to do its job. What is a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) used for? (FM 10-14, pg. 1-3 and 1-10)

- ☐ a. To identify a unit's wartime mission requirements.
- ☐ b. To identify requirements between types of units such as airborne or air assault infantry.
- ☐ c. To identify requirements for support units.
- ☐ d. To authorize additional personnel and equipment or to authorize personnel with specific MOS or special equipment.

The correct answer is "d. To authorize additional personnel and equipment or to authorize personnel with specific MOS or special equipment." IAW pg. 1-10 of FM 10-14 *Unit Supply Operations*, a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is used to authorize additional personnel and equipment or to authorize personnel with specific MOS or special equipment. Although the changes are often inclusive, the changes do not necessary reflect the unit's wartime mission requirements.

**53** (130-XXX-0062). Your platoon was exposed to a chemical blister agent and is at the unit decontamination site. Your Soldiers have actively pitched in to assist in the decontamination. You warned your Soldiers about using correct decontamination procedures and not getting sloppy. You have also provided instructions on the dangers of blister agents and how to neutralize them. Also, several decontaminants are present that offer some unique problems. Large quantities of Decontamination Solution No. 2 (DS2), a corrosive agent that neutralizes the blistering agent and is highly flammable, and Super Tropical Bleach (STB), an oxidizer, which means it yields oxygen in a fire, are present. The company NBC NCO has already warned your Soldiers about keeping DS2 away from POL products because it will react violently. What other concern should you have?

- ☐ a. When STB comes in contact with DS2 it can ignite and explode.
- ☐ b. DS2 and STB are both corrosive agents and must be completely washed off vehicles.
- ☐ c. DS2 and STB are known cancer-causing agents (carcinogens).
- ☐ d. STB also must be kept away from POL products.

The correct answer is "a. When STB comes in contact with DS2 it can ignite and explode." IAW pg. 2-3 of FM 3-5 *NBC Decontamination* (July, 2000), Super Tropical Bleach (STB) can spontaneously ignite if mixed with Decontaminating Solution 2 (Ds2) or Blister Agent.

## Appendix E

### Platoon Leader Situations – Version A

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Last 4 of Social: \_\_\_\_\_

**Instructions:** You will read a series of combat situations. Choose the **best and worst** response to the given situation. In each situation you are the platoon leader confronted with a problem. You should consider each of the situations as independent from one another.

Each situation is a matter of life and death; that is, you must respond within seconds or friendly Soldiers will likely die. You DO NOT have time to take multiple actions; you can only choose one of the available options. Please select the action you would take immediately, knowing that lives could depend on your decision.

**For each question, you will provide 2 responses. Fill in the bubble completely in the “best” column to indicate the best response to the problem and fill in the bubble completely in the “worst” column to indicate the worst response to the problem.**

1. While on a mission to clear several buildings your lead squad enters a house and walks into a trap. The enemy has opened fire inside the house and you are forced to leave the building. You try to call for a Bradley Fighting Vehicle to provide support, but radio communications have failed. What do you do now?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Withdraw from the area until radio communications can be reestablished.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Immediately ask your SLs how much ammo they have left to determine resources you have available.                    |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Look for a different way into the house that would take the enemy by surprise.                                      |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Send a runner to link-up with an adjacent unit for support.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Task a portion of your element to suppress the house while you lead the assault element to accomplish your mission. |

“e” is the best answer, “a” is the worst answer

2. Your men have been fighting on foot for the past 10 days with no more than 2 hours of sleep per night. During a brief period of rest PFC Smith becomes delirious and begins asking where his dog from home is. Several of the guys assist in calming him down. You then receive orders to move out immediately. What do you say to your men who have just witnessed this situation?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. “We have orders to move out, follow me.”  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. “I know this is rough, but we’ve got a job to do. Let’s get it done.”   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. “I know you’re tired, but I’m counting on you. I know you’ll do your best as always. We can pull through if we do this together.” |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. “SGT Jones, have somebody give PFC Smith a hand. We’ve got to move.”  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. “We must pull it together men. We can rest when we get to a more secure location. Right now I need you to give me 100%.”          |

“d” is the best answer, “a” is the worst answer

3. Your mission is to secure a three-story building and provide overwatch on a key intersection in order to provide cover for follow-on troops. Time is of the essence because the other unit should be moving through the intersection in approximately 10 minutes. The battalion intelligence officer just reported possible enemy activity in the building across the street. How do you respond?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Radio Higher and request another unit be sent to secure the building across the street.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Prepare to clear the building across the street.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Secure the target building first in order to set up the overwatch team and then send an element to clear the second building.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Organize your unit into two sections in order to execute a simultaneous assault on both buildings.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Position an element to suppress the building across the street with small arms if necessary, and then secure the target building. Then tell your men to overwatch both the intersection and the second building. |

"e" is the best answer, "d" is the worst answer

4. As you are moving to link up with another platoon you pass a church. A small group of women and children come running out toward you. You are aware that many civilians have deserted the area and it seems odd that they are here in the open. What do you do?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Find available cover and concealment and prepare to defend yourselves.                                  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Remind your Soldiers of the Rules of Engagement.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Order the civilians to "STOP" and put their hands in the air.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Fire a warning shot in the air to get the group's attention.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Tell Soldiers to aim their weapons at the group, but not to fire unless the group proves to be hostile. |

"a, c" is the best answer, "d" is the worst answer

5. While engaged in fighting with insurgents in a small town you hear machine gun fire increasing several blocks away. You are currently positioned in a one-story concrete building in the middle of the block. You are one of the 3 platoons in the immediate vicinity. What action do you take?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Radio Higher HQs to provide a SITREP.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Check the ammo and equipment status of your men.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Contact each of the other platoons and let them know what you're hearing; ask if they have any further information. |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Continue to pull security and await further instructions.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Do a map recon and tentatively plan a safe and efficient route that could move your unit to where the action is.    |

"a" is the best answer, "c" is the worst answer



6. You are the 1<sup>st</sup> platoon leader and are moving toward your link-up point when you look down an alley and see 2nd platoon moving in the opposite direction from the target area. You received no radio communications about any changes to the original plan. What action should you take?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Radio your fellow platoon leaders in the vicinity to find out what's going on.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Radio Higher HQs and request an update on the link-up point.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Set up a security halt and send two men down the alley to find out what is going on.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Drive on with your original mission to the link-up point.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Change your unit's direction of movement in order to intercept the adjacent platoon and find out what's going on face-to-face. |

"b" is the best answer, "c, e" is the worst answer

7. While moving toward an intersection that you are to secure, your unit receives small arms fire from the second story window of a 2-story building you are approaching. Movement is also detected on the lower level. It was thought that the buildings were deserted, but Higher now orders you to destroy enemy insurgents in any of the 6 buildings along your way to the intersection. What instructions do you provide to your SLs?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Remind them of the Rules of Engagement.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Stop and secure the area.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Talk to the locals as we pass and ask for information about suspicious activity.          |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Assault the building quickly before the enemy disperses.                                  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Keep personnel together and keep others informed of where you are and what you encounter. |

"d" is the best answer, "a" is the worst answer

8. You are on patrol in BFVs. You are in the lead BFV, while your PSG is in another BFV, 600 meters behind you. Midway through the patrol, his vehicle is attacked by RPG and small arms fire. He reports his situation to you. What is your response?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Reply, "Roger, continue to develop the situation." |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Go back and assist to fight off the attack.        |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Call for reinforcements.                           |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Find some cover and radio your commander.          |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Search and find the insurgents.                    |

"b" is the best answer, "d" is the worst answer

9. You just cleared a road leading into a city that may be filled with enemy insurgents. You are approaching a key area where concealment is difficult. You are using smoke to mask your movements, but have inhibited your ability to monitor enemy actions and responses. You receive enemy fire. What would you do?

**best    worst**

- ☐ ☐ a. Radio your company for any new information about enemy activity in the town.
- ☐ ☐ b. Direct an overwatch/sniper team into a position in a nearby building to see over/past your smokescreen to engage any observed enemy.
- ☐ ☐ c. Use aerial command and control elements to scout out enemy activities.
- ☐ ☐ d. Wait until dark and recon the site.
- ☐ ☐ e. Request armored vehicles.

"b" is the best answer, "d" is the worst answer

10. Your three vehicle convoy has been conducting a presence patrol on the outskirts of your unit sector. Approximately 200 meters to your immediate front, you hear and see what seems to be a hasty ambush being executed on coalition flatbed and cargo trucks. What actions do you take?

**best    worst**

- ☐ ☐ a. Radio in a quick SALUTE report to higher headquarters and monitor the situation from a distance. You might cause more confusion if you rush to the convoy's aid.
- ☐ ☐ b. Issue a quick FRAGO to your patrol on how you might deploy in support of the operation if needed.
- ☐ ☐ c. Place your vehicles in a flank position in order to coordinate indirect fire on the insurgents.
- ☐ ☐ d. Immediately pull 360 degree security. It's possible that the commotion up ahead is a distraction or baited-ambush. The real ambush may be designed for you when you move in to support.
- ☐ ☐ e. Immediately deploy to support the unit under attack while reporting your actions to higher headquarters enroute.

"e" is the best answer, "d" is the worst answer

### **Platoon Leader Situations – Version B**

1. While getting ready to enter a two-story house that you know has wounded enemy inside you note that there is a front door, a front window with bars, and a side window. Two squads are running low on ammo. Your unit has just received fire from inside the building. What action do you take?

**best    worst**

- ☐ ☐ f. Send an element to recon additional information about the house.
- ☐ ☐ g. Assemble PSG and SLs to assess the situation and discuss options.
- ☐ ☐ h. Instruct your SLs to position themselves at the possible exits and wait for the enemy to move.
- ☐ ☐ i. Take a quick assessment of the platoon equipment to see if you have anything capable of making an explosive breach.
- ☐ ☐ j. Isolate the house and have your interpreter order the inhabitants to lay down their weapons or you will be forced to demolish the house.

"e" is the best answer, "b" is the worst answer

2. The platoon's mission is to clear and secure four buildings and await further orders. You have secured your objective and then you hear that another unit down the street has stumbled into a hostile situation and has sustained several casualties. What do you do?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Radio Higher HQs for permission to leave your building and provide support to the other unit.        |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Send half of your unit down the street and leave half at your objective.                             |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Radio the other unit and tell them you're on the way.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Maintain your unit in a security posture. If you're needed down the street, someone will inform you. |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Start task organizing your unit in order to send an element to assist down the street, if needed.    |

"e" is the best answer, "b" is the worst answer

3. After several hours of defending your position within a two-story building from snipers and rebel insurgents, a lull in the fighting occurs. Radio communications indicate that a small group of five or six insurgents are in the vicinity (4-5 blocks away) and are moving in your direction. What do you do?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Radio Higher HQs for more information and guidance.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Inform your SLs of the possible new threat in order to keep them aware.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Check the ammo/water/equipment status of your unit.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Double check that your crew served weapons are positioned in the best locations to cover the ingress routes to your location. |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Position men in observation posts outside of the building in order to provide early warning.                                  |

"b, d" is the best answer, "e" is the worst answer

4. Your unit's task is to breach and secure a foothold in Building #1. Your support element, tasked with suppressing the building, throws smoke in order to obscure the assault team's entry. As the assault team leader enters through a window he encounters a booby-trap and is KIA. Another member of the assault team appears disoriented from the blast, stalling your breach into the building. What do you do?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Call for a medic, throw more smoke, and pull the casualties to a safe location away from the building.      |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Order one man to tend to the disoriented man and then lead the rest of the assault element into the breach. |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Look for an alternate entrance into the building.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Bypass the casualties and send another assault team into the breach.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Report the casualties to Higher HQs and request another unit to help support your breach mission.           |

"b, d" is the best answer, "e" is the worst answer

5. During an ambush, your platoon has been separated from the company. You start to receive small arms fire and move to a damaged concrete building for cover. Your M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner begins to lay down suppressive fire but this only causes the enemy fire toward your location to intensify. You believe that the rest of your company is moving to the east, but radio communications are unreliable. What action do you take?

**best    worst**

- ☐    ☐    a. Order your SAW gunner to shoot only if he has an exact location on the enemy.
- ☐    ☐    b. Attempt to establish radio communications to find out where the rest of your unit is located.
- ☐    ☐    c. Send two men to determine if they can locate the rest of your company.
- ☐    ☐    d. Move the entire platoon to the east, toward where you believe the rest of the company is located before the enemy pins you down.
- ☐    ☐    e. Check your security perimeter and remain where you are. The company is probably looking for you and attempting to regain contact.

“d” is the best answer, “c” is the worst answer

6. While on patrol at 0200 you pass a set of government buildings for the third time. A call comes in from Higher telling you to report back to base right away. One of your subordinates says, “Sir, there is a delivery van that wasn’t there before.” You haven’t had any incidents in the last week, and the incident the week before was only a small group of rioters who were unhappy about the new curfew. What do you do?

**best    worst**

- ☐    ☐    a. Comply with orders and head back.
- ☐    ☐    b. Radio Higher for permission to search or destroy the vehicle.
- ☐    ☐    c. Stop the unit and send an element to assess the vehicle.
- ☐    ☐    d. Note the location of the vehicle and report it to the S-2; ask if vehicles were used in neighboring villages to attack government buildings.
- ☐    ☐    e. Provide SITREP to Higher and request instructions.

“e, a” is the best answer, “c” is the worst answer

7. When returning to your compound after a routine patrol the civilian traffic in front of you is backed up. Your unit is traveling in reinforced HMMWVs. You notice several groups of children along the side of the road who are waving to you. The lead vehicle begins to move when an explosion occurs in front of it. The children and civilians along the road are screaming. You receive small arms fire and realize that the enemy is firing from somewhere behind where the children are grouping together. How do you respond?

**best    worst**

- ☐    ☐    a. Order your men to break contact.
- ☐    ☐    b. Move your unit out of the kill zone.
- ☐    ☐    c. Find out if your men have sustained any injuries
- ☐    ☐    d. Request reinforcements.
- ☐    ☐    e. Dismount a squad from its current location and have the Soldiers move toward the firing.

“b” is the best answer, “d” is the worst answer

8. You are patrolling on foot with several local police in training attached to your unit. The buildings in the area are mostly 3-story and made of concrete. As you move past an alleyway fire breaks out from down the alley and overhead. Insurgents pop up on rooftops as your men scramble to return fire. In the meantime the local police huddle together near the wall of a concrete building. What action do you take?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Run to the police and tell them to spread out.                             |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Yell to your men to instruct the police what to do.                        |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Focus on returning fire and engaging the insurgents.                       |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Question the police trainees to determine if they knew this was an ambush. |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. While seeking cover, physically grab the police and move them to cover.    |

"c" is the best answer, "d" is the worst answer

9. Your platoon's mission was to clear and secure a building on the outskirts of town. You have successfully completed your mission, your men are resting, and you are monitoring the radio. You hear gunfire and another platoon leader reports that his platoon is being attacked. How should you respond?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Continue to monitor the radio for further information.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Alert your platoon and go to 100% security.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Begin preparation for your platoon to assist the other platoon.  |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Plan to leave a squad to secure your building in the event you are directed to assist the other platoon. |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Conduct a terrain analysis of routes to reach the other platoon.   |

"b" is the best answer, "a" is the worst answer

10. Your platoon is advancing into possible hostile territory. It is 0100. You hear noises and people start running away from your location. What do you do?

**best    worst**

- |                       |                       |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | a. Move quickly and attempt to halt fleeing people.                              |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | b. Advance at a slow and measured pace until you are certain of what is ahead.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | c. Call helicopters in to scan the area using thermal sights.                    |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | d. Fire three warning shots.   |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | e. Call your adjacent platoon to see if they can block people from running away. |

"b" is the best answer, "d" is the worst answer

### Small Unit Leader (Platoon Leader) SJT

Frequencies (Percentages) Items Correct	SJT – Version A		SJT – Version B	
	Best (n = 78)	Worst (n = 74)	Best (n = 71)	Worst (n = 71)
0				1 (1)
1	3 (2)	1 (1)	2 (1)	3 (2)
2	4 (2)	8 (5)	4 (2)	1 (1)
3	11 (6)	13 (7)	9 (5)	11 (6)
4	13 (7)	23 (13)	6 (3)	18 (10)
5	18 (10)	16 (9)	14 (8)	8 (5)
6	19 (11)	11 (6)	17 (10)	16 (9)
7	9 (5)	2 (1)	12 (7)	12 (7)
8	1 (1)		6 (3)	1 (1)
9			1 (1)	
<b>Mean (SD)</b>	4.76 (1.61)	4.16 (1.33)	5.27 (1.85)	4.76 (1.74)

*Note.* International students were not included in the analyses.

## Appendix F

### BOLC CLASS EVALUATION FORM

Prior to observing class, review the BOLC Master CD you were provided. It should contain a copy of the BOLC Course Program of Instruction (POI) and lesson plans for each of the classes. In the narrative portion of this evaluation form capture any discrepancies noted. If a USAIS lesson plan was not provided please indicate so in the narrative. If using a computer to complete this form, **bold** your selection instead of circling the response.

Class Observed: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Include POI class number, if provided.)

(Include window if multiple days)

Observer: \_\_\_\_\_ Type of Training (circle): Academic Nonacademic

Instructor: \_\_\_\_\_

#### Section I. Training Observed (Explain discrepancies in narrative.)

1. Percentage of training observed (circle): <25% >25% 50% 75% 80% 90% 100%  
(Base company-level training percentage on instructional content (number of task training observed), not number of hours in an overall training period. For example, if several tasks are run concurrently and are repeated over several days, if one iteration of each task was observed, then 100% of the training was observed. For platoon-level internal training with an observer with each platoon, use hourly percentage.)

2. Was the training correctly posted in the unit training schedule/added on/rescheduled?

3. Did the training take place at the location identified in the training schedule? If not, explain why a change occurred, if known, in the narrative and the impact, if any, the change had on the training observation.

4. Was a Visitor Folder present and designed specifically for that class or was it borrowed from a similar class? A visitor folder should be prominently displayed in the rear of the classroom or be in the possession of the NCOIC. It contains a lesson outline that includes TLOs and ELOs and identifies training tasks. Recommend you review it, if one is available.

#### Section II. Training Times (Explain discrepancies in narrative.)

5. Did the actual training start time differ from the scheduled training time?

6. Were there internal unit delays that caused training times to be adjusted (e.g., 1SG had administrative announcements, transportation not laid on, armorer/supply SGT late, times changed to accommodate late return from the night before, buses late, etc.)?

7. Were travel times correctly calculated to accommodate the distance to the training site?

8. Was the training time adequate to teach all of the tasks?
9. Did the actual training completion time differ from the scheduled training completion time?  
If not, explain why in the narrative.
10. Was the available training time utilized to the maximum extent?

**Section III. Class Structure.** If a lesson plan was provided by USAIS, compare it to the class to determine what changes occurred, if any. Explain any discrepancies in the narrative and whether you feel if the changes should be incorporated into the base BOLC POI and/or lesson plans.

11. At what level was the class taught (circle)?  
Company      Platoon      SGI      Squad      Individual      Other: \_\_\_\_\_

12. Location (circle):  
Classroom      Training Site      Field Site      Range      Other: \_\_\_\_\_

13. Who provided the instructors (circle)?  
Schoolhouse      Cadre      Committee Group      Other: \_\_\_\_\_

14. Type of Instruction (circle all that apply):  
Lecture      PE      Demonstration      Discussion      Hands-On

15. Instructional Materials (circle):      Slides      Handouts      Video      GTAs  
Simulators      Actual Equipment      Test Equipment      Computer Presentation

16. List any other instructional training material/aids used in conjunction with the class:

17. Did you estimate the ratio of students per equipment item such as radio or simulation, etc and provide it in the narrative? Explain situation in narrative.

18. Did all students have reasonable access to the equipment item?

19. Equipment to support training (circle):

Slide Projector	Computer	Tents	Video Projector	Trainer
Steps/Ladders to access equipment	Test Sets	Specialized Training Facility	Medics	
Protective Equipment	Motorola Radios	Training Sets	Water Trailers/Buffaloes	
Vehicles	MILES Equipment	Classroom/Field/Computer Tables	Binoculars	Tables/Chairs
Batteries	Pencils/Pens/Markers	Heaters	Public Address System	Blank Adaptors



Loud Speaker/Bull Horn      Microphone      Satellite Navigation Set      Support Personnel      Compasses  
Television Monitors      10-gal water cooler      Ice Blankets      Ice Chests      Equipment Display

20. List any other equipment used to support the class:
21. Did the instructor demonstrate proficiency with the computer/video/projection equipment, if used?
22. If equipment or simulation was used, was the audience able to adequately see what was occurring via an overhead display or assistant instructors positioned at key locations to aid students and/or mirror the actions?
23. Were video clips/examples germane to the class or a training distraction?
24. Were there too many video clips/examples?
25. Could the instructor/assistant instructors be adequately heard?
26. Was the class site free of training distractions? Explain discrepancies in narrative.
27. Were there an adequate number of lanes, firing points, or sub-sites available to support the training?
28. Were there an adequate number of assistant instructors, coaches, or lane NCOs present to accommodate training?
29. Were training areas or lanes of sufficient size to conduct the training? Provide physical characteristics such as training organization, route lengths, dispersion, etc. in narrative.
30. Did the training areas mirror the dimensions provided in the USAIS CD? If not, describe the layout and how it differs from the USAIS standard.
31. Did the class mirror the BOLC POI? Explain discrepancies in narrative.
32. Did the class mirror the USAIS lesson plans? Explain discrepancies in narrative.
33. Was concurrent training conducted as part of the training?
34. If concurrent training was conducted, was it to standard and was it relevant to the primary subject being taught?
35. Were training standards clearly identified and articulated to the students?
36. Was there a specific uniform requirement such as a rucksack for a road march? Is there an SOP that covers preparation/content/weighing of the rucksack/inspections by cadre?
37. After the training was completed, did you obtain applicable scores such as APFT scores,

weapon qualification scores, and number of event failures?

38. Was the class size/structure adequate for the class? Explain in your overall assessment if the class size/structure was/was not adequate for the class in the narrative. Was it different from the USAIS organization? Note any discrepancies/shortfalls/highlights in the narrative.

**Section IV. Live Fire Training/Ammunition/Pyrotechnics** (Explain discrepancies in narrative.)

39. How was the range and training organized? Identify physical characteristics of ranger layout/how many lanes were used/number of assistant instructors used.

40. Were you able to identify the rounds per student per iteration requirement and address it in the narrative?

41. Did the students or cadre install/zero/boresight the add-on devices? If cadre did it to save time, is there subsequent training to teach the students proper installation/boresight/zero?

42. Was lack of ammunition a driving force in curtailment or altering the training? If so, explain discrepancies in narrative.

43. Was any ammunition not issued, such as Mk-19 or M2 .50 Cal ammunition from the U.S. Weapons Familiarization class? If so, please address in the narrative.

44. Were individual firers issued the appropriate amount of ammunition for each phase/portion/iteration of the training? Capture issued amounts for each iteration/firing in narrative.

45. Was each independently maneuvering element provided with red-colored pyrotechnics to be used for cease fires/MEDEVACs?

46. If ammunition was required for this training, was the supply adequate for the class?

47. If pyrotechnics were required for this training, was the supply adequate for the class? Explain discrepancies in narrative.

**Section V. Sequence of Events.** Capture the sequence of events in the table below from class introduction through closing remarks. List the major performance tasks/phases of training, start and completion times, and as a result of the class, the status of whether you feel the students were adequately trained (T) or not trained (NT) on each performance task. NT entries must be addressed in the body of the narrative. Use the lesson plans, if available, to help identify the specific phases of training or performance tasks. Explain any noted discrepancies in the narrative.

#	Performance Task or Phase of Training	Training Times	Status

Status: Trained (T) Not Trained (NT)

**Section VI. Narrative:** Sequentially capture the training events as they occurred, stressing discrepancies and highlighted training noted along the way. Include the item numbers from any highlighted observation (mentioned in 1-47, above) in the text. For example, the class you observed at Fort Sill was the U.S. Weapons Class and included the AT4 Antitank Missile, M203 Grenade Launcher, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), the M249B Machine Gun, M2 .50 Cal. Heavy Machine Gun, M9 Pistol, and MK19 Grenade Machine Gun. Include item # 31 in the narrative when addressing that the M9 Pistol was taught at Fort Sill and not at Fort Benning. Review your comments once completed to ensure that what you said adequately captures how the training evolved.

## Appendix G

ARI PT No. 60-81

### End of Course Survey Responses: Lieutenants\* (166 Lieutenants – Does not include international students)

#### Section I: *BOLC II Course (POI & Training)*

Frequencies (Percentages)	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. As a result of this course, I feel better prepared for the rest of my officer training.	18 (11)	60 (36)	82 (49)	6 (4)
2. I think the information covered in this course will be relevant to my future job as an Army officer.	2 (1)	29 (18)	123 (74)	12 (7)
3. The BOLC II course was taught in a logical sequence.	38 (23)	78 (47)	50 (30)	
4. The pace of BOLC II provided me with enough time to learn all the material.	19 (11)	52 (31)	82 (49)	11 (7)
5. The lectures and discussions in this course were appropriate for my skill level.	37 (22)	57 (34)	72 (43)	
6. The field exercises in this course were appropriate for my skill level.	27 (16)	49 (30)	85 (51)	3 (2)
7. During the overnight field training, evening/night training opportunities were maximized.	41 (25)	61 (37)	60 (36)	3 (2)
8. The classroom land navigation training was a good refresher.	49 (30)	49 (30)	66 (40)	2 (1)
9. The BOLC II Land Navigation requirement is a reasonable standard for officer training.	11 (7)	29 (18)	112 (68)	13 (8)
10. BOLC II helped me learn how to prepare an operation order.	94 (57)	61 (37)	11 (7)	
11. BOLC II training furthered my understanding of the troop-leading procedure (TLP).	46 (28)	66 (40)	52 (31)	2 (1)
12. The BOLC II physical requirements are reasonable standards for officer training.	58 (35)	35 (21)	67 (40)	4 (2)
13. The <i>normal</i> physical fitness training (unit runs and exercises) during BOLC II adequately sustained me for my APFT.	128 (77)	31 (19)	6 (4)	1 (1)
14. The BOLC II <i>field</i> physical fitness training (combatives, road marches) adequately sustained me for my APFT.	74 (45)	48 (29)	40 (24)	4 (2)

*Note.* Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

## Section II: Cadre

Frequencies (Percentages)	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. The cadre members were knowledgeable about the topics they taught.	4 (2)	13 (8)	112 (68)	36 (22)
2. The cadre effectively facilitated the course.	17 (10)	62 (37)	75 (45)	11 (7)
3. The cadre presented information in a clear, easy-to-understand manner.	12 (7)	35 (21)	107 (65)	10 (6)
4. Questions about BOLC II were answered to my satisfaction.	43 (26)	71 (43)	48 (29)	4 (2)
5. During BOLC II, there were sufficient cadre members available to assist during training.	50 (30)	41 (25)	67 (40)	8 (5)
6. The cadre helped me understand what it means to be a leader.	24 (15)	55 (33)	78 (47)	8 (5)
7. The cadre members were good mentors.	15 (9)	42 (25)	88 (53)	19 (11)
8. I would recommend the cadre members as role models.	19 (11)	61 (37)	67 (40)	16 (10)
9. I feel that the cadre's leadership perspective and philosophy are good examples to follow.	15 (9)	54 (33)	83 (50)	9 (5)
10. The cadre helped me learn field craft.	12 (7)	46 (28)	98 (59)	10 (6)
11. The cadre explained why we were doing specific tasks in BOLC II.	38 (23)	54 (33)	68 (41)	4 (2)
12. I was comfortable going to the cadre with problems or concerns.	16 (10)	45 (27)	84 (51)	19 (11)

**Note.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

## Section III: Leadership Training & Counseling

Frequencies (Percentages)	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I will be a better leader as a result of BOLC II.	33 (20)	51 (31)	74 (45)	6 (4)
2. The leadership training during BOLC II adequately prepared me for my role as a platoon leader.	52 (31)	86 (52)	22 (13)	
3. The classroom instruction on doctrinal leadership (FM 22-100) was useful to me.	49 (30)	70 (42)	42 (25)	
4. During BOLC II, student leadership opportunities were rotated to provide comparable leadership experiences to all students.	33 (20)	33 (20)	92 (55)	7 (4)
5. As a result of this course, I am confident in my ability to guide my NCOs in preparing for physical training.	50 (30)	70 (42)	45 (27)	
6. Role playing was an effective way of learning elements of counseling.	50 (30)	59 (36)	40 (24)	2 (1)
7. Event-based counseling (PT Test, Land Nav Test, etc.) was appropriate.	42 (25)	35 (21)	77 (46)	6 (4)

Frequencies (Percentages)	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
8. Counseling my peers (other lieutenants) was a worthwhile experience.	74 (45)	51 (31)	24 (15)	
9. Being counseled by my peers (other lieutenants) was a worthwhile experience.	65 (39)	52 (31)	30 (18)	1 (1)
10. Counseling by the cadre was useful to me.	30 (18)	50 (30)	80 (48)	4 (2)
11. I took peer counseling seriously.	35 (21)	43 (26)	69 (42)	11 (7)
12. The BOLC II class as a whole took counseling seriously.	65 (39)	64 (39)	35 (21)	1 (1)
13. The cadre was adequately prepared to teach counseling.	41 (25)	57 (34)	60 (36)	
14. As a result of BOLC II counseling, I will be a better leader.	53 (32)	62 (37)	47 (28)	1 (1)

**Note.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

#### **Section IV: Platoon Climate**

Frequencies (Percentages)	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. My platoon had good camaraderie and team spirit.	4 (2)	12 (7)	85 (51)	65 (39)
2. My peers helped me learn field craft.	7 (4)	23 (14)	107 (65)	27 (16)
3. I helped my peers learn field craft.	3 (2)	24 (15)	119 (72)	18 (11)
4. My platoon appeared to be doing the same training as other platoons were doing.	22 (13)	50 (30)	84 (51)	9 (5)
5. My platoon seemed to use the same standards as the other platoons.	36 (22)	67 (40)	57 (34)	5 (3)
6. The overall BOLC II training was conducted to standard, not to available time.	83 (50)	55 (33)	23 (14)	4 (2)

**Note.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

# Section V: Preparation for BOLC II Warrior Battle Drills

Using the scale below, please fill in the bubble completely to indicate how well prepared you are to lead a platoon in the execution of each of the following Warrior Battle Drills.

BATTLE DRILLS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Prepared/ Very Well Prepared	Extremely Prepared – Could Teach This to Others
	Frequencies (Percentages)				
<b>1. React to contact (visual, IED, direct fire [includes RPG])</b> Prior Service ( <i>n</i> = 51) No Prior Service ( <i>n</i> = 113)  OCS ( <i>n</i> = 8) ROTC ( <i>n</i> = 114) USMA ( <i>n</i> = 29) Direct ( <i>n</i> = 7) Warrant Officers ( <i>n</i> = 5) State OCS ( <i>n</i> = 1)  Male ( <i>n</i> = 130) Female ( <i>n</i> = 35)			8 (16) 18 (16)  2 (25) 18 (16) 4 (14) 1 (14)  1	34 (67) 79 (70)  5 (63) 78 (69) 20 (69) 6 (86) 4 (80)	9 (18) 16 (14)  1 (13) 18 (16) 5 (17) 1 (20)
<b>2. React to ambush (blocked)</b> Prior Service No Prior Service  OCS ROTC USMA Direct Warrant Officers State OCS  Male Female		1 (2)   1 (13)     1 (1)	8 (16) 24 (21)  1 (13) 21 (18) 17 (24) 1 (14) 1 (20) 1  25 (19) 7 (20)	34 (67) 79 (70)  5 (63) 80 (70) 19 (66) 6 (86) 3 (60)	8 (16) 10 (9)  1 (13) 13 (11) 3 (10) 1 (20)
<b>3. React to ambush (unblocked)</b> Prior Service No Prior Service  OCS ROTC USMA Direct Warrant Officers State OCS  Male Female			6 (12) 20 (18)  1 (13) 17 (15) 6 (21) 1 (14)  1  20 (15) 6 (17)	35 (69) 77 (68)  6 (75) 79 (69) 17 (59) 6 (86) 4 (80)	10 (20) 16 (14)  1 (13) 18 (16) 6 (21) 1 (20)

BATTLE DRILLS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Prepared/ Very Well Prepared	Extremely Prepared – Could Teach This to Others
	Frequencies (Percentages)				
<b>4. React to indirect fire</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	3 (6)	31 (61)	15 (29)
No Prior Service			10 (9)	66 (58)	37 (33)
OCS				1 (13)	6 (75)
ROTC		1 (1)	11 (10)	66 (58)	36 (32)
USMA			1 (3)	17 (59)	11 (38)
Direct				6 (86)	1 (14)
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male		1 (1)	8 (6)	75 (58)	45 (35)
Female			5 (14)	22 (63)	8 (23)
<b>5. React to a chemical attack</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	4 (8)	10 (20)	26 (51)	10 (20)
No Prior Service	1 (1)	15 (13)	29 (26)	56 (50)	12 (11)
OCS		1 (13)	1 (13)	6 (75)	
ROTC	2 (2)	17 (15)	23 (20)	59 (52)	13 (11)
USMA		1 (3)	10 (35)	10 (35)	8 (28)
Direct			3 (43)	4 (57)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	2 (2)	13 (10)	32 (25)	66 (51)	17 (13)
Female		6 (17)	7 (20)	17 (49)	5 (14)
<b>6. Break contact</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	7 (14)	32 (63)	11 (22)
No Prior Service		1 (1)	15 (13)	76 (67)	21 (19)
OCS			2 (25)	5 (63)	1 (13)
ROTC		2 (2)	13 (11)	75 (66)	24 (21)
USMA			3 (10)	20 (69)	6 (21)
Direct			3 (43)	4 (57)	
Warrant Officers				4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male		2 (2)	17 (13)	83 (64)	28 (22)
Female			5 (14)	25 (71)	5 (14)



BATTLE DRILLS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Prepared	Somewhat Prepared	Prepared/ Very Well Prepared	Extremely Prepared – Could Teach This to Others
	Frequencies (Percentages)				
<b>7. Dismount a vehicle</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)		8 (16)	31 (61)	9 (18)
No Prior Service	1 (1)		10 (9)	85 (75)	17 (15)
OCS				5 (63)	3 (38)
ROTC	1 (1)		12 (11)	80 (70)	19 (17)
USMA	1 (3)		2 (7)	23 (79)	3 (10)
Direct			2 (29)	5 (71)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	2 (2)		14 (11)	92 (71)	22 (17)
Female			4 (11)	25 (71)	4 (11)
<b>8. Evacuate injured personnel from a vehicle</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	5 (10)	15 (29)	20 (39)	7 (14)
No Prior Service	9 (8)	11 (10)	37 (33)	47 (42)	9 (8)
OCS	1 (13)	1 (13)		4 (50)	2 (25)
ROTC	8 (7)	10 (9)	37 (33)	47 (41)	11 (10)
USMA	3 (10)	5 (17)	7 (24)	13 (45)	1 (3)
Direct			6 (86)	1 (14)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	2 (40)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male	7 (5)	14 (11)	39 (30)	54 (42)	16 (12)
Female	5 (14)	3 (9)	13 (37)	13 (37)	
<b>9. Secure at a halt</b>					
Prior Service			6 (12)	35 (69)	9 (18)
No Prior Service		1 (1)	15 (13)	83 (73)	14 (12)
OCS				6 (75)	2 (25)
ROTC		1 (1)	15 (13)	82 (72)	15 (13)
USMA			4 (14)	20 (69)	5 (17)
Direct			2 (29)	5 (71)	
Warrant Officers				4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS				1	
Male			18 (14)	91 (70)	21 (16)
Female		1 (3)	3 (9)	28 (80)	2 (6)

Note. Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

## Section VI: Execution of BOLC II Warrior Tasks

Using the scale below, please fill in the bubble completely to rate how confident you are in your ability to execute the following tasks.

BOLC II WARRIOR TASKS	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
	Frequencies (Percentages)				
Shooting Tasks					
1. Qualify with assigned weapon: M16/M4					
Prior Service (n = 51)		3 (6)	5 (10)	26 (43)	20 (39)
No Prior Service (n = 113)		1 (1)	10 (9)	76 (67)	26 (23)
OCS (n = 8)		1 (13)		6 (75)	1 (13)
ROTC (n = 114)		3 (3)	11 (10)	68 (60)	31 (27)
USMA (n = 29)			3 (10)	17 (59)	9 (31)
Direct (n = 7)			1 (14)	6 (86)	
Warrant Officers (n = 5)				1 (20)	4 (80)
State OCS (n = 1)					1
Male (n = 130)		1 (1)	9 (7)	77 (59)	43 (33)
Female (n = 35)		3 (9)	6 (17)	22 (63)	3 (9)
2. Correct malfunctions of assigned weapon: M16/M4					
Prior Service			3 (6)	21 (41)	26 (51)
No Prior Service			5 (4)	70 (62)	38 (34)
OCS			1 (13)	3 (38)	4 (50)
ROTC			6 (5)	67 (59)	40 (35)
USMA				14 (48)	15 (52)
Direct			1 (14)	5 (72)	1 (14)
Warrant Officers				1 (20)	4 (80)
State OCS				1	
Male			2 (2)	71 (55)	57 (44)
Female			6 (17)	21 (60)	7 (20)
3. Employ M18 Claymore mine & hand grenades					
Prior Service	5 (10)	8 (16)	18 (35)	12 (24)	6 (12)
No Prior Service	34 (30)	22 (20)	30 (27)	24 (21)	3 (3)
OCS		2 (25)	2 (25)	4 (50)	
ROTC	27 (24)	20 (18)	35 (31)	23 (20)	7 (6)
USMA	6 (21)	5 (17)	9 (31)	8 (28)	1 (3)
Direct	5 (71)		2 (29)		
Warrant Officers	1 (20)	2 (40)		1 (20)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	28 (22)	24 (19)	38 (29)	32 (25)	7 (5)
Female	11 (31)	6 (17)	10 (29)	5 (14)	2 (6)

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>Engage targets with the following weapons:</b>					
<b>4. M240B (Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service		4 (8)	16 (31)	24 (47)	6 (12)
No Prior Service	2 (2)	21 (19)	27 (24)	57 (51)	6 (5)
OCS		2 (25)		6 (75)	
ROTC	1 (1)	17 (15)	32 (28)	55 (48)	8 (7)
USMA	1 (3)	3 (10)	6 (21)	15 (52)	4 (14)
Direct		3 (43)	3 (43)	1 (14)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	4 (80)	
State OCS			1		
Male		18 (14)	32 (25)	69 (53)	11 (9)
Female	2 (6)	7 (20)	11 (31)	13 (37)	1 (3)
<b>5. M249 (Machine Gun-SAW)</b>					
Prior Service		2 (4)	13 (26)	26 (51)	9 (18)
No Prior Service	2 (2)	15 (13)	26 (23)	61 (54)	8 (7)
OCS		1 (13)	1 (13)	5 (63)	1 (13)
ROTC	1 (1)	12 (11)	27 (24)	61 (54)	11 (10)
USMA	1 (3)	1 (3)	7 (24)	16 (55)	4 (14)
Direct		3 (43)	2 (29)	2 (29)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male		11 (9)	28 (22)	74 (57)	16 (12)
Female	2 (6)	6 (17)	11 (31)	14 (40)	1 (3)
<b>6. M2 (Cal. 50 Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	8 (16)	14 (28)	22 (43)	5 (10)
No Prior Service	5 (4)	27 (24)	30 (27)	48 (43)	3 (3)
OCS		2 (25)	2 (25)	4 (50)	
ROTC	3 (3)	26 (23)	29 (25)	49 (43)	6 (5)
USMA	2 (7)	2 (7)	9 (31)	15 (52)	1 (3)
Direct	1 (14)	4 (57)	2 (29)		
Warrant Officers		1 (20)	1 (20)	2 (40)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	2 (2)	28 (22)	32 (25)	61 (47)	7 (5)
Female	4 (11)	7 (20)	12 (34)	10 (29)	1 (3)

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>7. MK19 (40 mm Grenade Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	7 (14)	16 (31)	22 (41)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	16 (14)	23 (20)	33 (29)	37 (33)	4 (4)
OCS	1 (13)	1 (13)	3 (38)	2 (25)	
ROTC	13 (11)	21 (18)	31 (27)	43 (38)	5 (4)
USMA	5 (17)	2 (7)	11 (38)	10 (34)	1 (3)
Direct		5 (71)	2 (29)		
Warrant Officers		1 (20)	1 (20)	3 (60)	
State OCS			1		
Male	14 (11)	24 (19)	36 (28)	50 (39)	6 (5)
Female	5 (14)	6 (17)	13 (37)	9 (26)	1 (3)
<b>Correct malfunctions of the following weapons:</b>					
<b>8. M240B (Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	6 (12)	15 (29)	20 (39)	6 (12)
No Prior Service	7 (6)	29 (26)	36 (32)	36 (32)	5 (4)
OCS	1 (13)	1 (13)		6 (75)	
ROTC	6 (5)	27 (24)	40 (35)	33 (29)	7 (6)
USMA	1 (3)	4 (14)	7 (24)	13 (45)	4 (14)
Direct	2 (29)	2 (29)	3 (43)		
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	4 (80)	
State OCS		1			
Male	6 (5)	28 (22)	34 (26)	51 (39)	11 (9)
Female	4 (11)	8 (23)	17 (49)	5 (14)	
<b>9. M249 (Machine Gun-SAW)</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	5 (10)	14 (28)	22 (43)	8 (16)
No Prior Service	7 (6)	29 (26)	33 (29)	36 (32)	8 (7)
OCS	1 (13)			6 (75)	1 (13)
ROTC	5 (4)	25 (22)	38 (33)	36 (32)	9 (8)
USMA	1 (3)	4 (14)	6 (21)	13 (45)	5 (17)
Direct	1 (14)	4 (57)	2 (29)		
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS		1			
Male	5 (4)	26 (20)	30 (23)	53 (41)	16 (12)
Female	3 (9)	9 (26)	17 (49)	5 (14)	

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>10. M2 (Cal. 50 Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	11 (22)	13 (26)	29 (37)	4 (8)
No Prior Service	13 (12)	36 (32)	38 (34)	24 (21)	2 (2)
OCS	1 (13)	1 (13)	2 (25)	4 (50)	
ROTC	11 (10)	33 (29)	37 (33)	27 (24)	5 (4)
USMA	2 (7)	8 (28)	9 (31)	9 (31)	1 (3)
Direct	2 (29)	3 (43)	2 (29)		
Warrant Officers		1 (20)	1 (20)	3 (60)	
State OCS		1			
Male	12 (9)	35 (27)	37 (29)	40 (31)	6 (5)
Female	4 (11)	13 (37)	14 (40)	3 (9)	
<b>11. MK19 (40 mm Grenade Machine Gun)</b>					
Prior Service	4 (8)	10 (20)	13 (26)	19 (37)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	16 (14)	34 (30)	43 (38)	18 (16)	2 (2)
OCS	1 (13)	2 (25)	2 (25)	3 (38)	
ROTC	14 (12)	26 (23)	43 (38)	25 (22)	4 (4)
USMA	4 (14)	9 (31)	9 (31)	6 (21)	1 (3)
Direct	1 (14)	5 (71)	1 (14)		
Warrant Officers		1 (20)	1 (20)	3 (60)	
State OCS		1			
Male	15 (12)	32 (25)	45 (35)	31 (25)	5 (4)
Female	5 (14)	13 (37)	11 (31)	5 (14)	
<b>Engage targets with a weapon using the following night vision sights:</b>					
<b>12. AN/PVS-4 (Individual WPN Night Sight)</b>					
Prior Service	17 (33)	7 (14)	9 (18)	14 (27)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	39 (35)	23 (20)	30 (27)	17 (15)	4 (4)
OCS	3 (38)	1 (13)		3 (38)	1 (13)
ROTC	42 (37)	17 (15)	31 (27)	19 (17)	4 (4)
USMA	5 (17)	9 (31)	6 (21)	7 (24)	2 (7)
Direct	4 (57)	2 (29)	1 (14)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		1 (20)	2 (40)	
State OCS		1			
Male	46 (35)	22 (17)	30 (23)	26 (20)	6 (5)
Female	11 (31)	8 (23)	9 (26)	5 (14)	1 (3)

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>13. AN/PAS-13 (Thermal WPN Sight)</b>					
Prior Service	32 (63)	9 (10)	7 (14)	4 (8)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	81 (72)	21 (19)	5 (4)	6 (5)	
OCS	4 (50)	2 (25)	1 (13)	1 (13)	
ROTC	84 (74)	14 (12)	10 (9)	4 (4)	2 (2)
USMA	16 (55)	8 (28)		5 (17)	
Direct	6 (86)	1 (14)			
Warrant Officers	3 (60)		1 (20)		
State OCS		1			
Male	93 (72)	17 (13)	8 (6)	9 (7)	2 (2)
Female	21 (60)	9 (26)	4 (11)	1 (3)	
<b>14. AN/TVS-5 (Crew Served WPN Night Vision Sight)</b>					
Prior Service	33 (65)	6 (12)	4 (8)	5 (10)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	84 (74)	20 (18)	4 (4)	5 (5)	
OCS	4 (50)	2 (25)	1 (13)	1 (13)	
ROTC	86 (75)	14 (12)	7 (6)	5 (4)	2 (2)
USMA	17 (59)	8 (28)		4 (14)	
Direct	6 (86)	1 (14)			
Warrant Officers	4 (80)				
State OCS		1			
Male	95 (73)	17 (13)	6 (5)	9 (7)	2 (2)
Female	23 (66)	9 (26)	2 (6)	1 (3)	
<b>Engage targets using the following aiming lights:</b>					
<b>15. AN/PEQ-2A (Aiming Light)</b>					
Prior Service	20 (39)	6 (12)	12 (24)	10 (20)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	63 (56)	13 (12)	16 (14)	19 (17)	
OCS	4 (50)	2 (25)		2 (25)	
ROTC	62 (54)	13 (11)	19 (17)	16 (14)	2 (2)
USMA	11 (38)	3 (10)	5 (17)	10 (35)	
Direct	4 (57)	1 (14)	1 (14)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		1 (20)	1 (20)	
State OCS		1			
Male	70 (54)	15 (12)	17 (13)	24 (19)	2 (2)
Female	14 (40)	4 (11)	11 (31)	5 (14)	

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>16. AN/PAQ-4 (Aiming Light)</b>					
Prior Service	23 (45)	7 (14)	10 (20)	8 (16)	2 (4)
No Prior Service	67 (59)	16 (14)	15 (13)	13 (12)	
OCS	4 (50)	2 (25)		2 (25)	
ROTC	68 (60)	16 (14)	15 (13)	11 (10)	2 (2)
USMA	11 (38)	4 (14)	6 (21)	8 (28)	
Direct	5 (71)	1 (14)	1 (14)		
Warrant Officers	2 (40)		2 (40)		
State OCS		1			
Male	74 (57)	17 (13)	16 (12)	19 (15)	2 (2)
Female	17 (49)	6 (17)	9 (26)	2 (6)	
<b>Communicate</b>					
<b>17. Perform voice communications: SITREP/SPOTREP</b>					
Prior Service			10 (20)	39 (57)	12 (24)
No Prior Service	2 (2)	1 (1)	18 (16)	81 (72)	11 (10)
OCS			2 (25)	6 (75)	
ROTC	1 (1)		18 (16)	75 (66)	20 (18)
USMA	1 (3)		4 (14)	23 (79)	1 (3)
Direct		1 (14)	3 (43)	3 (43)	
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male	2 (2)		17 (13)	92 (71)	19 (15)
Female		1 (3)	11 (31)	19 (54)	4 (11)
<b>18. Perform voice communications: Call for Fire</b>					
Prior Service		3 (6)	17 (33)	21 (41)	10 (20)
No Prior Service		8 (7)	32 (28)	67 (59)	6 (5)
OCS		1 (13)	2 (25)	5 (63)	
ROTC		5 (4)	39 (34)	58 (51)	12 (11)
USMA		2 (7)	4 (14)	21 (72)	2 (7)
Direct		2 (29)	3 (43)	2 (29)	
Warrant Officers		1 (20)		2 (40)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male		6 (5)	39 (30)	69 (53)	16 (12)
Female		5 (14)	11 (31)	19 (54)	

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>19. Perform voice communications: MEDEVAC</b>					
Prior Service			17 (33)	24 (47)	10 (20)
No Prior Service	1 (1)	3 (3)	30 (27)	68 (60)	11 (10)
OCS			2 (25)	6 (75)	
ROTC		2 (2)	35 (31)	61 (54)	16 (14)
USMA	1 (3)		5 (17)	21 (72)	2 (7)
Direct		1 (14)	4 (57)	2 (29)	
Warrant Officers				2 (40)	3 (60)
State OCS			1		
Male	1 (1)		34 (26)	76 (59)	19 (15)
Female		3 (9)	14 (40)	16 (46)	2 (6)
<b>20. Use visual signaling techniques</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	4 (8)	9 (18)	25 (49)	10 (20)
No Prior Service	3 (3)	6 (5)	23 (20)	67 (59)	14 (12)
OCS		1 (13)	2 (25)	5 (63)	
ROTC	5 (4)	6 (5)	21 (18)	64 (56)	18 (16)
USMA	1 (3)		5 (17)	19 (66)	4 (14)
Direct		3 (43)	3 (43)	1 (14)	
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male	5 (4)	8 (6)	23 (18)	77 (59)	17 (13)
Female	1 (3)	2 (6)	9 (26)	16 (46)	7 (20)
<b>Joint Urban Operations</b>					
<b>21. Perform movement techniques during urban operations</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	9 (18)	37 (73)	4 (8)
No Prior Service		1 (1)	11 (10)	91 (81)	10 (9)
OCS		1 (13)	1 (13)	6 (75)	
ROTC		1 (1)	14 (12)	88 (77)	11 (10)
USMA			2 (7)	25 (86)	2 (7)
Direct			2 (29)	5 (71)	
Warrant Officers				4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male		2 (2)	15 (12)	100 (77)	13 (10)
Female			5 (14)	29 (83)	1 (3)



	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>22. Engage targets during urban operations</b>					
Prior Service			7 (14)	39 (77)	5 (10)
No Prior Service		1 (1)	9 (8)	91 (81)	12 (11)
OCS			1 (13)	7 (88)	
ROTC		1 (1)	10 (9)	90 (79)	13 (11)
USMA			2 (7)	23 (79)	4 (14)
Direct			2 (29)	5 (71)	
Warrant Officers				5 (100)	
State OCS			1		
Male		1 (1)	10 (8)	103 (79)	16 (12)
Female			6 (17)	28 (80)	1 (3)
<b>23. Enter a building during urban operations</b>					
Prior Service			3 (6)	40 (79)	8 (17)
No Prior Service		1 (1)	7 (6)	85 (75)	
OCS			1 (13)	6 (75)	1 (13)
ROTC		1 (1)	6 (5)	88 (77)	19 (17)
USMA			1 (3)	21 (72)	6 (21)
Direct			1 (14)	5 (71)	1 (14)
Warrant Officers				5 (100)	
State OCS			1		
Male		1 (1)	6 (5)	97 (75)	25 (19)
Female			4 (11)	29 (83)	2 (6)
<b>Move</b>					
<b>24. Determine location on ground (terrain association, map &amp; GPS)</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	5 (9)	34 (67)	11 (22)
No Prior Service		3 (3)	8 (7)	83 (74)	19 (17)
OCS			1 (13)	7 (88)	
ROTC		3 (3)	6 (5)	83 (73)	22 (19)
USMA		1 (3)	3 (10)	19 (66)	6 (21)
Direct			2 (29)	5 (72)	
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male		4 (3)	7 (5)	90 (69)	29 (22)
Female			7 (20)	27 (77)	1 (3)

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>25. Navigate from one point to another (dismounted)</b>					
Prior Service			5 (10)	32 (63)	14 (28)
No Prior Service			7 (6)	77 (68)	29 (26)
OCS			1 (13)	5 (63)	2 (25)
ROTC			5 (4)	79 (69)	30 (26)
USMA			3 (10)	17 (59)	9 (31)
Direct			2 (29)	5 (72)	
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS			1		
Male			7 (5)	82 (63)	41 (32)
Female			5 (14)	28 (80)	2 (6)
<b>26. Move over, through, or around obstacles (except minefields)</b>					
Prior Service	2 (4)	2 (4)	3 (6)	34 (67)	10 (20)
No Prior Service	2 (2)	1 (1)	15 (13)	78 (69)	16 (14)
OCS		1 (13)		5 (63)	2 (25)
ROTC	3 (3)	1 (1)	12 (11)	79 (69)	18 (16)
USMA	1 (3)		5 (17)	18 (62)	5 (17)
Direct		1 (14)		6 (86)	
Warrant Officers				4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	4 (3)	1 (1)	11 (9)	89 (68)	24 (19)
Female		2 (6)	7 (20)	24 (69)	2 (6)
<b>27. Prepare a vehicle in a convoy</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	1 (2)	16 (31)	28 (55)	5 (10)
No Prior Service	14 (12)	6 (5)	30 (27)	57 (50)	6 (5)
OCS	1 (13)		2 (25)	5 (63)	
ROTC	13 (11)	7 (6)	29 (25)	55 (48)	10 (9)
USMA	1 (3)		9 (31)	19 (66)	
Direct			4 (57)	3 (43)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	14 (11)	4 (3)	33 (25)	69 (53)	10 (8)
Female	1 (3)	3 (9)	14 (40)	16 (46)	1 (3)
<b>Fight</b>					

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>28. Move under direct fire</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	8 (16)	35 (69)	7 (14)
No Prior Service		4 (4)	22 (20)	72 (64)	15 (13)
OCS			2 (25)	6 (75)	
ROTC		4 (4)	22 (19)	71 (62)	17 (15)
USMA		1 (3)	5 (17)	18 (62)	5 (17)
Direct			1 (14)	6 (86)	
Warrant Officers				5 (100)	
State OCS				1	
Male		2 (2)	17 (13)	90 (69)	21 (16)
Female		3 (9)	13 (37)	18 (51)	1 (3)
<b>29. React to indirect fire (dismounted &amp; mounted)</b>					
Prior Service		2 (4)	6 (12)	33 (65)	10 (20)
No Prior Service		2 (2)	7 (6)	86 (76)	18 (16)
OCS		1 (13)	1 (13)	6 (75)	
ROTC		2 (2)	9 (8)	83 (73)	20 (18)
USMA		1 (3)	2 (7)	19 (66)	7 (24)
Direct				7 (100)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS				1	
Male		4 (3)	8 (6)	94 (72)	24 (19)
Female			6 (17)	25 (71)	1 (3)
<b>30. React to direct fire (dismounted &amp; mounted)</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	5 (10)	39 (77)	6 (12)
No Prior Service		4 (4)	7 (6)	86 (76)	16 (14)
OCS		1 (13)	1 (13)	6 (75)	
ROTC		3 (3)	9 (8)	86 (75)	16 (14)
USMA		1 (3)	1 (3)	21 (72)	6 (21)
Direct			1 (14)	6 (86)	
Warrant Officer				5 (100)	
State OCS				1	
Male	16 (12)	9 (7)	39 (28)	96 (74)	21 (16)
Female		5 (4)	8 (6)	29 (83)	1 (3)

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>31. React to unexploded ordnance hazard</b>					
Prior Service	4 (8)	1 (2)	13 (26)	30 (59)	3 (6)
No Prior Service	5 (4)	10 (9)	22 (20)	70 (62)	6 (5)
OCS	1 (13)		2 (25)	5 (63)	
ROTC	5 (4)	5 (4)	28 (25)	68 (60)	8 (7)
USMA	3 (10)	4 (14)	4 (14)	17 (59)	1 (3)
Direct		2 (29)	1 (14)	4 (57)	
Warrant Officers				5 (100)	
State OCS				1	
Male	7 (5)	8 (6)	23 (18)	84 (65)	8 (6)
Female	2 (6)	3 (9)	13 (37)	16 (46)	1 (3)
<b>32. React to man-to-man contact (Combatives)</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	16 (31)	29 (57)	5 (10)
No Prior Service		8 (7)	33 (29)	60 (53)	12 (11)
OCS		1 (13)	1 (13)	6 (75)	
ROTC		7 (6)	37 (33)	62 (54)	8 (7)
USMA		1 (3)	6 (21)	13 (45)	9 (31)
Direct			4 (57)	3 (43)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	4 (80)	
State OCS				1	
Male		5 (4)	34 (26)	78 (60)	13 (10)
Female		4 (11)	15 (43)	12 (34)	4 (11)
<b>33. React to chemical or biological attack/hazard</b>					
Prior Service	2 (4)	2 (4)	12 (24)	29 (57)	6 (12)
No Prior Service		15 (13)	39 (35)	54 (48)	5 (4)
OCS			2 (25)	6 (75)	
ROTC	2 (2)	15 (32)	37 (33)	51 (45)	9 (8)
USMA		2 (7)	7 (24)	18 (62)	2 (7)
Direct			3 (43)	4 (57)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	2 (2)	13 (10)	39 (30)	67 (52)	9 (7)
Female		4 (11)	13 (37)	16 (46)	2 (6)

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>34. Decontaminate yourself &amp; individual equipment using chemical decontaminating kits</b>					
Prior Service	3 (6)	2 (4)	13 (26)	27 (53)	6 (12)
No Prior Service	8 (7)	14 (12)	35 (31)	53 (47)	3 (3)
OCS		1 (13)	1 (13)	6 (75)	
ROTC	5 (4)	12 (11)	38 (33)	53 (47)	6 (5)
USMA	5 (17)	3 (10)	4 (14)	15 (52)	2 (7)
Direct	1 (14)		3 (43)	3 (43)	
Warrant Officers			1 (20)	3 (60)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	8 (6)	12 (9)	40 (31)	64 (49)	6 (5)
Female	3 (9)	4 (11)	9 (26)	16 (46)	3 (9)
<b>35. Maintain equipment (individual and crew served weapons)</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	3 (6)	11 (22)	28 (55)	8 (16)
No Prior Service	1 (1)	11 (10)	23 (20)	71 (63)	7 (6)
OCS		1 (13)		7 (88)	
ROTC	2 (2)	11 (10)	28 (25)	63 (55)	10 (9)
USMA		1 (3)	3 (10)	21 (72)	4 (14)
Direct		1 (14)	2 (29)	5 (57)	
Warrant Officers				4 (80)	1 (20)
State OCS			1		
Male	2 (2)	7 (5)	26 (20)	82 (63)	13 (10)
Female		7 (20)	8 (23)	18 (52)	2 (6)
<b>36. Evaluate a casualty</b>					
Prior Service			5 (10)	31 (61)	15 (29)
No Prior Service		3 (3)	19 (17)	74 (66)	15 (13)
OCS			1 (13)	5 (63)	2 (25)
ROTC		2 (2)	20 (18)	71 (62)	19 (17)
USMA		1 (3)	2 (7)	21 (72)	5 (17)
Direct			1 (14)	6 (86)	
Warrant Officers				1 (20)	4 (80)
State OCS				1	
Male		2 (2)	17 (13)	83 (64)	28 (22)
Female		1 (3)	7 (20)	22 (63)	3 (9)

	Never Done This Before	Not at All Confident	Somewhat Confident	Confident/ Very Confident	Extremely Confident – Could Teach This to Others
<b>37. Perform first aid for open wound (abdominal, chest, &amp; head)</b>					
Prior Service		1 (2)	5 (10)	30 (59)	15 (29)
No Prior Service		5 (4)	19 (17)	77 (68)	12 (11)
OCS				7 (88)	1 (13)
ROTC		4 (4)	18 (16)	72 (63)	20 (18)
USMA		2 (7)	2 (7)	23 (79)	2 (7)
Direct			3 (43)	4 (57)	
Warrant Officers				1 (20)	4 (80)
State OCS			1		
Male		6 (5)	15 (12)	85 (65)	24 (19)
Female			9 (26)	23 (66)	3 (9)
<b>38. Perform first aid for bleeding of extremity</b>					
Prior Service			6 (12)	29 (57)	16 (31)
No Prior Service		4 (4)	15 (13)	77 (68)	17 (15)
OCS				5 (63)	3 (38)
ROTC		3 (3)	16 (14)	72 (63)	23 (20)
USMA		1 (3)	2 (7)	23 (79)	3 (10)
Direct			2 (29)	5 (72)	
Warrant Officers				1 (20)	4 (80)
State OCS			1		
Male		4 (3)	16 (12)	81 (62)	29 (22)
Female			5 (14)	26 (74)	4 (11)
<b>39. Select temporary fighting position</b>					
Prior Service	1 (2)	4 (8)	5 (10)	28 (55)	13 (26)
No Prior Service	2 (2)	6 (5)	8 (7)	90 (80)	7 (6)
OCS			1 (13)	7 (88)	
ROTC	1 (1)	6 (5)	11 (10)	81 (71)	15 (13)
USMA	2 (7)	2 (7)		22 (76)	3 (10)
Direct		2 (29)	1 (14)	4 (57)	
Warrant Officers				3 (60)	2 (40)
State OCS				1	
Male	3 (2)	6 (5)	9 (7)	94 (72)	18 (14)
Female		4 (11)	4 (11)	25 (72)	2 (6)

*Note. Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.*

## Section VII: Time Allocated for BOLC II Activities

Using the scale below, please fill in the bubble completely to describe your feeling about the amount of training time you received on each task/activity.

Frequencies (Percentages)	Task/ Activity Not Covered	Not Nearly Enough	Not Quite Enough	About Right	A Little Too Much	Entirely Too Much
1. <b>Warrior Battle Drills</b>		8 (5)	32 (19)	64 (39)	11 (7)	4 (2)
<b>Warrior Tasks</b>						
2. <b>Shoot</b> (e.g., engage targets, employ M18 Claymore mine and hand grenades)	20 (12)	43 (26)	48 (29)	43 (26)	7 (4)	3 (2)
3. <b>Move</b> (e.g., determine location on ground; prepare a vehicle in a convoy)	4 (2)	14 (8)	62 (37)	77 (46)	8 (5)	1 (1)
4. <b>Communicate</b> (e.g., make a spot report; use visual signaling techniques)	2 (1)	14 (8)	47 (28)	90 (54)	9 (5)	1 (1)
5. <b>Fight</b> (e.g., move under direct fire; select a temporary fighting position; evaluate a casualty)		7 (4)	45 (27)	98 (59)	16 (10)	
6. <b>Joint Urban Operations</b> (e.g., perform movement techniques and engage targets during urban operations)		22 (13)	43 (26)	95 (57)	5 (3)	1 (1)
<b>Classroom and Field Training</b>						
7. Classroom time before hands-on training		10 (6)	22 (13)	69 (42)	45 (27)	19 (11)
8. Field exercises to reinforce the classroom instruction		10 (6)	60 (36)	75 (45)	15 (9)	4 (2)
9. Physical training (PT)	13 (8)	131 (79)	14 (8)	6 (4)	1 (1)	
10. Combatives	2 (1)	48 (29)	62 (37)	45 (27)	6 (4)	2 (1)
11. Preparation for my leadership positions	11 (7)	50 (30)	53 (32)	48 (29)	1 (1)	
12. Fair evaluation in my leadership positions	13 (8)	33 (20)	32 (19)	85 (51)	1 (1)	
13. Individual Movement Techniques (IMT Buddy Shoot)		9 (5)	29 (18)	109 (66)	16 (10)	2 (1)
14. Squad STX Instruction	35 (21)	18 (11)	23 (14)	64 (39)	17 (10)	7 (4)
15. Squad STX Execution	39 (24)	16 (10)	30 (18)	61 (37)	13 (8)	4 (2)
16. Platoon STX	3 (2)	24 (15)	41 (25)	75 (45)	18 (11)	1 (1)
17. Night Infiltration Course	3 (2)	2 (1)	10 (6)	88 (53)	19 (11)	42 (25)

Frequencies (Percentages)	Task/ Activity Not Covered	Not Nearly Enough	Not Quite Enough	About Right	A Little Too Much	Entirely Too Much
18. Confidence Course	145 (87)	2 (1)	3 (2)	9 (5)		3 (2)
19. Command directed classes (e.g., Equal opportunity, sexual harassment, suicide prevention)	7 (4)	5 (3)	11 (7)	95 (57)	29 (18)	18 (11)
<b>BOLC TASKS</b>						
<b>Medical Tasks</b>						
20. Manage the airway	4 (2)	4 (2)	23 (14)	129 (78)	3 (2)	2 (1)
21. Perform CPR	2 (1)	9 (5)	20 (12)	128 (77)	4 (2)	2 (1)
22. Splint suspected fracture	19 (11)	8 (5)	28 (17)	106 (64)	3 (2)	1 (1)
23. Administer nerve agent antidote	7 (4)	8 (5)	24 (15)	122 (74)	4 (2)	
24. Perform tactical combat casualty care	4 (2)	11 (7)	35 (21)	112 (68)	2 (1)	
25. Transport a casualty	5 (3)	9 (5)	38 (23)	109 (66)	3 (2)	
26. Perform field sanitation and preventive medicine fieldcraft (measures)	18 (11)	17 (10)	44 (27)	83 (50)	3 (2)	
<b>Shooting Tasks</b>						
27. Plan for and adjust indirect fire	5 (3)	32 (19)	68 (41)	58 (35)	2 (1)	
28. Introduction to M203 (Grenade Launcher)		27 (16)	39 (24)	93 (56)	4 (2)	1 (1)
29. Introduction to M136 AT-4	131 (79)	10 (6)	7 (4)	13 (8)	1 (1)	
<b>Leadership &amp; Counseling Tasks</b>						
30. Take charge of a platoon	14 (8)	35 (21)	56 (34)	56 (34)	2 (1)	
31. Counsel subordinates (BOLC Counseling)	59 (36)	33 (20)	41 (25)	24 (15)	2 (1)	4 (2)
32. Conduct troop leading procedures	6 (4)	33 (20)	54 (33)	59 (36)	8 (5)	3 (2)
33. Fundamentals of small unit operations and tactics		19 (11)	43 (26)	85 (51)	11 (7)	6 (4)
<b>Other BOLC Tasks</b>						
34. Employ close air support	82 (49)	39 (24)	32 (19)	12 (7)		
35. Conduct pre-combat inspections	7 (4)	21 (13)	20 (12)	96 (58)	14 (8)	7 (4)
36. Locate mine & booby trap indicators by visual means	72 (43)	31 (19)	31 (19)	30 (18)		
37. React and identify UXO/IED	3 (2)	25 (15)	56 (34)	79 (48)	2 (1)	



Frequencies (Percentages)	Task/ Activity Not Covered	Not Nearly Enough	Not Quite Enough	About Right	A Little Too Much	Entirely Too Much
38. Employ basic measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts/attacks	30 (18)	30 (18)	51 (31)	53 (32)	1 (1)	
39. Handle EPW/civilians on the battlefield and tactical training	5 (3)	22 (13)	56 (34)	79 (48)	2 (1)	1 (1)
40. Set up/operate checkpoint/road block	28 (17)	46 (28)	51 (31)	39 (24)	1 (1)	
41. Participate in a media interview	54 (33)	42 (25)	35 (21)	25 (15)	6 (4)	
42. Conduct patrol base operations	12 (7)	40 (24)	54 (33)	53 (32)	3 (2)	2 (1)
43. Conduct a risk assessment	62 (37)	29 (18)	46 (28)	26 (16)		
44. Establish a forward operating base (FOB)	57 (34)	35 (21)	28 (17)	29 (18)	9 (5)	6 (4)
<b>Personnel Activities</b>						
45. Finance (SI, O1E pay, TDY settlement, direct deposit, etc.)	5 (3)	43 (26)	36 (22)	66 (40)	7 (4)	4 (2)
46. Personnel administration (ID cards, wills, power of attorney, DEERS assistance, etc.)	3 (2)	26 (16)	32 (19)	89 (54)	5 (3)	6 (4)
47. Medical (e.g., TMC, dispensary, hospital, inoculations, physicals)	1 (1)	16 (10)	19 (11)	112 (68)	7 (4)	6 (4)
48. Dental (X-rays, emergency care, etc.)	2 (1)	10 (6)	17 (10)	118 (71)	8 (5)	6 (4)

**Note.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

#### **Section VIII: Your Overall BOLC II Experience**

Frequencies (Percentages)	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. As a result of this course, I am excited about starting my career as an Army officer.	39 (24)	66 (40)	54 (33)	5 (3)
2. My commitment to the Army has risen as a result of the BOLC II experience.	63 (38)	71 (43)	28 (17)	2 (1)
3. I learned a lot during BOLC II.	40 (24)	52 (31)	65 (39)	5 (3)

**Note.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

Frequencies (Percentages)	Much Worse Than I Expected	Worse Than I Expected	Neither Better or Worse Than I Expected	Better Than I Expected	Much Better Than I Expected
4. Considering your overall experiences, compare BOLC II to what you thought it would be like.	56 (34)	64 (39)	36 (22)	8 (5)	1 (1)

**Note.** Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

5. How would you rate BOLC II in developing you as a competent and confident officer who is grounded in Warrior tasks and able to lead Soldiers in the contemporary operational environment? Please provide a rating from 1 to 10 where 1 is the worst training you have ever received and 10 is the best training you have ever received.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
14 (8)	15 (9)	36 (22)	36 (22)	21 (13)	17 (10)	18 (11)	5 (3)	1 (1)	

6. Please list 3 things that are good/going well in BOLC II.
7. Please list 3 things that most need improvement in BOLC II.
8. What are the most important skills you learned during BOLC II?
9. Please identify any BOLC II training areas that are *not* relevant or appropriate for your career as an Army officer?
10. If you thought that too little or too much time was allocated for any of the BOLC II activities, please explain why you feel this way.
11. Please provide any additional comments as well as your suggestions for improving the course.

## Appendix H

### End of Course Leadership Assessment Report

**Based on your observations during the course, rate this lieutenant on the following Army Values, Warrior Ethos, and Leader Attributes / Skills / Actions.**

**Use the rating scale provided below to rate this lieutenant on each dimension.**

<b>1 = Needs much improvement</b> – rarely or never behaves this way <b>2 = Needs some improvement</b> – sometimes behaves this way <b>3 = Satisfactory</b> – usually behaves this way <b>4 = Excellent</b> – always or almost always behaves this way <b>NA =</b> Training situations did not allow lieutenant to display this quality often enough to accurately rate						
<b>PART I - CHARACTER:</b> Combination of values, attributes, and skills affecting leader actions						
<b>ARMY VALUES</b>						
	<b>NA</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Mean (SD)</b>
<b>Lieutenants (n = 95 – 169)</b>	<b>Frequencies (Percentages)</b>					
1. <b>Loyalty:</b> Shows faith and allegiance to the Army; shows commitment to the unit and all Soldiers.	1 (1)		5 (3)	82 (49)	80 (47)	3.45 (.56)
2. <b>Duty:</b> Fulfills all obligations; takes initiative and carries out mission requirements in the absence of directions from others based on a sense of what is morally right.			5 (3)	102 (60)	61 (36)	3.33 (.53)
3. <b>Respect:</b> Treats all Soldiers with dignity and regard; is discreet and tactful when correcting or questioning others.			6 (4)	82 (49)	80 (47)	3.44 (.57)
4. <b>Selfless service:</b> Puts the welfare of other Soldiers first; gives credit for success to others; sustains team morale.		1 (1)	4 (2)	95 (56)	67 (40)	3.37 (.56)
5. <b>Honor:</b> Lives up to all the Army values; doesn't lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those actions by others.			1 (1)	97 (57)	70 (41)	3.41 (.51)
6. <b>Integrity:</b> Acts honestly and does what is right legally and morally, especially in challenging and stressful conditions.			4 (2)	98 (58)	66 (39)	3.37 (.53)

7. <b>Personal courage:</b> Overcomes fear of bodily harm to successfully complete tasks or mission; takes responsibility for decisions and actions.	9 (5)		3 (2)	111 (66)	45 (27)	3.26 (.48)
<b>WARRIOR ETHOS ATTRIBUTES</b>						
	<b>NA</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Mean (SD)</b>
1. <b>Perseverance:</b> Works through adversity. Does not give up.			7 (4)	68 (40)	93 (55)	3.51 (.58)
2. <b>Sets Priorities:</b> Accomplishes tasks and mission according to appropriate priorities.	1 (1)		8 (5)	116 (69)	43 (25)	3.21 (.51)
3. <b>Makes Tradeoffs:</b> Makes correct tradeoffs between personal sacrifice and the appropriate application of tactics, techniques, and procedures to accomplish tasks or mission.	21 (12)		6 (4)	123 (73)	18 (11)	3.08 (.40)
4. <b>Adaptability:</b> Reacts smoothly to unexpected changes in tasks or mission; finds ways to overcome obstacles and/or improve team effectiveness.			24 (14)	66 (39)	78 (46)	3.32 (.71)
5. <b>Acts Responsibly toward Other Soldiers:</b> Continues to perform tasks or mission despite being weakened or incapacitated (e.g., wounded by enemy, accident, illness).	19 (11)	1 (1)	5 (3)	99 (59)	44 (26)	3.25 (.54)
6. <b>Relies Appropriately on Other Soldiers:</b> Works as a team member to accomplish tasks or mission and ensures the ability of the team to fight again.	1 (1)		10 (6)	108 (64)	49 (29)	3.23 (.55)
7. <b>Motivated by a Higher Calling:</b> Demonstrates clear understanding of the importance of achieving proficiency in Warrior tasks and collective missions.	7 (4)		11 (7)	90 (53)	60 (36)	3.30 (.59)
<b>LEADER ATTRIBUTES:</b> Fundamental qualities and characteristics						
	<b>NA</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Mean (SD)</b>
1. <b>Mental:</b> Demonstrates desire, will, initiative and discipline.			7 (4)	87 (52)	73 (43)	3.40 (.57)
2. <b>Physical:</b> Displays appropriate level of physical fitness and military bearing.		2 (1)	15 (9)	91 (54)	60 (36)	3.24 (.66)
3. <b>Emotional:</b> Displays self-control; calm under pressure.	6 (4)	2 (1)	13 (8)	87 (52)	60 (36)	3.27 (.66)
<b>LEADER SKILLS:</b> Skill development is part of self-development; prerequisite to action						

	NA	1	2	3	4	Mean (SD)
1. <b>Conceptual:</b> Demonstrates sound judgment, critical/creative thinking, moral reasoning.	4 (2)		8 (5)	109 (65)	47 (28)	3.24 (.53)
2. <b>Interpersonal:</b> Shows skill with people; coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating and empowering.	9 (5)		19 (11)	95 (56)	45 (27)	3.16 (.62)
3. <b>Technical:</b> Demonstrates the necessary expertise to accomplish all tasks and functions.	1 (1)		25 (15)	104 (62)	38 (23)	3.08 (.61)
4. <b>Tactical:</b> Demonstrates proficiency in required professional knowledge, judgment, and warfighting.	1 (1)		32 (19)	95 (56)	40 (24)	3.05 (.66)
<b>LEADER ACTIONS:</b> Major activities leaders perform; influencing, operating, and improving						
<b>INFLUENCING:</b> Method of reaching goals while operating/improving						
	NA	1	2	3	4	Mean (SD)
1. <b>Communicating:</b> Displays good oral, written, and listening skills for individual/groups.		1 (1)	10 (6)	105 (62)	53 (31)	3.24 (.58)
2. <b>Decision-making:</b> Employs sound judgment, logical reasoning, and uses resources wisely.	6 (4)		10 (6)	113 (67)	40 (24)	3.18 (.52)
3. <b>Motivating:</b> Inspires, motivates, and guides others toward mission accomplishment.	9 (5)	1 (1)	21 (12)	101 (60)	36 (21)	3.08 (.62)
<b>OPERATING:</b> Short-term mission accomplishment						
	NA	1	2	3	4	Mean (SD)
1. <b>Planning:</b> Develops detailed, executable plans that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable.	14 (8)		5 (3)	119 (70)	29 (17)	3.16 (.45)
2. <b>Executing:</b> Shows tactical proficiency, meets mission standards, and takes care of people / resources.	2 (1)		16 (10)	101 (60)	49 (29)	3.20 (.60)
3. <b>Assessing:</b> Uses after-action and evaluation tools to facilitate consistent improvement.	32 (19)		11 (7)	98 (58)	27 (16)	3.12 (.52)
<b>IMPROVING:</b> Long-term improvement in the Army, its people, and organizations						
	NA	1	2	3	4	Mean (SD)

1. <b>Developing:</b> Invests adequate time and effort to develop individual subordinates as leaders.	73 (43)		9 (5)	70 (41)	16 (10)	3.07 (.51)
2. <b>Building:</b> Spends time and resources improving teams, groups, and units; fosters ethical climate.	42 (25)		7 (4)	103 (61)	16 (10)	3.07 (.42)
3. <b>Learning:</b> Seeks self-improvement and organizational growth; envisioning, adapting, and leading change.	20 (12)		7 (4)	78 (46)	62 (37)	3.37 (.58)
<b>Part II - OVERALL NET ASSESSMENT</b>						
Taking into consideration all of the preceding values and attributes, circle the number that best reflects your overall rating:						
<b>NA</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Mean (SD)</b>	
0	1 (1)	14 (8)	87 (52)	66 (39)	3.30 (.64)	

*Notes.* Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data. International students were not included in the analyses.

## Appendix I

### End of Course Adaptability Rating Scale

The following pages provide descriptions of 4 dimensions of small unit leader adaptability.

- Mental
- Interpersonal
- Lead an Adaptive Team
- Physical

1. First, read the description of each dimension and then the examples of the **best** or **most effective behaviors** for each dimension.
2. **Use the examples** as a guide for making your ratings of the lieutenant's skill level on each dimension.
3. Then, **rate this lieutenant** on each aspect of each dimension using the rating scale below.

1 = Needs much improvement – rarely or never behaves this way  
 2 = Needs some improvement – sometimes behaves this way  
 3 = Satisfactory – usually behaves this way  
 4 = Excellent – always or almost always behaves this way  
 NA = Training situations (e. g., inadequate time) did not allow lieutenant to display this quality often enough to rate.

**Mental Adaptability** – Adjusting one's thinking in new situations to overcome obstacles or improve effectiveness. This involves handling emergency or crisis situations, handling stress, learning new things, and creative problem solving.

#### 1a. Demonstrating Mental Adaptability – Handling Emergencies or Crisis Situations

- Reacts with appropriate urgency in threatening, dangerous or emergency situations.
- Makes quick decisions based on clear and focused thinking.
- Maintains emotional control and objectivity during emergencies while maintaining focus on the situation at hand.
- Takes appropriate initiative in emergencies and/or in dangerous situations as appropriate.

#### Frequency(Percentage)

17 (10)

101 (60)

48 (28)

**Needs much improvement**

**Needs some improvement**

**Satisfactory**

**Excellent**

3 (2)

NA

#### 1b. Demonstrating Mental Adaptability – Handling Work Stress

- Remains composed and cool when faced with difficult circumstances or a highly demanding workload/schedule.
- Does not overreact to unexpected news or situations.
- Demonstrates resilience and high levels of professionalism in stressful circumstances.
- Acts as a calming and settling influence that others look to for guidance.

#### Frequency(Percentage)

1 (1)

12 (7)

88 (52)

66 (39)

**Needs much improvement**

**Needs some improvement**

**Satisfactory**

**Excellent**

2 (1)

NA

### 1c. Demonstrating Mental Adaptability – Solving Problems Creatively

- Employs unique analyses, and generates innovative ideas in complex areas.
- Thinks problems through from different perspectives to determine fresh, new approaches.
- Integrates seemingly unrelated information to develop highly creative solutions.
- Considers wide-ranging possibilities others may miss; thinks “outside the box” to see if there is a more effective approach.

#### Frequency(Percentage)

1 (1)	Needs much improvement	4 (2)	NA
15 (9)	Needs some improvement		
104 (62)	Satisfactory		
44 (26)	Excellent		

### 1d. Demonstrating Mental Adaptability – Dealing Effectively with Unpredictable or Changing Work Situations

- Takes effective action when necessary without having to know the total picture or have all the facts at hand.
- Readily and easily changes plans in response to unexpected events and circumstances.
- Effectively adjusts plans, goals, actions, or priorities to deal with changing situations, and does whatever is necessary to successfully complete the job/mission.
- Does not need things to be black or white, refuses to be paralyzed by uncertainty.

#### Frequency(Percentage)

1 (1)	Needs much improvement	0	NA
9 (5)	Needs some improvement		
90 (53)	Satisfactory		
69 (41)	Excellent		

**2. Interpersonal Adaptability** – Adjusting what one says and does to make interactions with other people run more smoothly and effectively. This includes trying to understand the needs and motives of other people – especially people from other cultures or backgrounds.

### Demonstrating Interpersonal Adaptability

- Demonstrates flexible, open-minded, and cooperative behaviors when dealing with others.
- Listens to and considers others' viewpoints and opinions, and alters one's opinion when appropriate.
- Open and accepting of negative or developmental feedback regarding work.
- Works well and develops effective relationships with diverse individuals.
- Tailors own behavior to persuade, influence, or work effectively with others.

#### Frequency(Percentage)

1 (1)	Needs much improvement	0	NA
12 (7)	Needs some improvement		
90 (53)	Satisfactory		
69 (41)	Excellent		



**3. Leading an Adaptable Unit** – Ability while occupying a leadership position to help develop adaptability in the unit by encouraging and rewarding adaptive behavior and ensuring everyone works together in a coordinated fashion.

**Demonstrating Ability to Develop an Adaptable Unit**

- Models adaptive behavior for unit members by learning from experience and seeking self-improvement in weak areas.
- Provides accurate, timely, motivational and constructive feedback to subordinates.
- Helps unit members learn from mistakes in order to be more adaptable in the future.
- Involves unit members in decisions and keeps them informed of consequences of their actions.
- Encourages shared understandings of situations among unit members through appropriate communications to facilitate coordinated actions.

**Frequency(Percentage)**

1 (1)	Needs much improvement
19 (11)	Needs some improvement
99 (59)	Satisfactory
35 (21)	Excellent

15 (9) NA

**5. Physical Adaptability** – Effectively adjusts to varied and challenging physical conditions and climates.

**Demonstrating Physical Adaptability**

- Adjusts to tough environmental states such as extreme heat, humidity, cold, etc.
- Frequently pushes self physically to complete strenuous or demanding tasks.
- Adjusts weight/muscular strength or improves proficiency in performing physical tasks needed to be successful for job/training mission.

**Frequency(Percentage)**

2 (1)	Needs much improvement
13 (8)	Needs some improvement
83 (49)	Satisfactory
71 (42)	Excellent

0 NA

*Notes.* Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data. International students were not included in the analyses.

## Appendix J

### BOLC II End of Course Survey: Cadre (22 Cadre Members)

This survey asks you for your feedback concerning the ICP and BOLC II pilot training and events. We have not asked for your name and encourage you to provide detailed feedback of the training. We want to emphasize that all of your responses will be kept anonymous.

Please check whether you are: Infantry: 7 (32%) or Non-Infantry: 15 (68%)

#### **Section I: ICP Training & Instruction**

1. Have you taught the classes that you were assigned to teach for the BOLC II pilot before?

**Yes:** 9 (41%) **No:** 12 (55%)

2. How well do you think the entire Instructor Certification Program (**25 April - 8 July**) prepared you to teach your assigned classes? **Using the scale below, please circle the number to indicate how you feel about the item.**

<b><u>Knowledge</u></b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
	<b>Frequency(Percentage)</b>			
3. The ICP provided me with additional information that I did not already know in these areas.	2 (9)	4 (18)	13 (59)	3 (14)
4. The ICP provided information that helped me prepare for my classes.	1 (5)	8 (36)	12 (55)	1 (5)
5. The ICP provided useful information that I included in my classes.	2 (9)	2 (9)	16 (73)	2 (9)
<b><u>Teaching</u></b>				
6. The ICP provided various techniques, tips, etc., for how to effectively teach lieutenants.	5 (23)	6 (27)	7 (32)	2 (9)
7. The ICP provide ample time for me to rehearse my classes.	5 (23)	6 (27)	7 (32)	3 (14)

*Note.* Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

8. Using the scale below, please place a check mark to indicate the percentage of time, outside formal classes, **during the ICP (25 April - 10 June)**, that you spent preparing to teach your assigned classes (includes murder boards, reading materials, reviewing vault files, etc.).

5%: 7(32)

20%: 1 (5)

30%: 1 (5)

40%: 2 (9)

50%: 3 (14)  
 60%: 1 (5)  
 70%: 2 (9)  
 80%: 2 (9)  
 90%: 2 (9)

9. Using the scale below, please place a check mark to indicate the percentage of time **between the official end of your ICP (10 June) and the start of the BOLC II Pilot (10 July)** that you spent preparing to teach your assigned classes (includes murder boards, reading materials, reviewing vault files, etc.).

20%: 1 (5)  
 30%: 2 (9)  
 40%: 3 (14)  
 60%: 3 (14)  
 80%: 2 (9)  
 90%: 3 (14)  
 100%: 7 (32)

10. How much time would you need to prepare for a class you have already taught before?

11. How much time would you need to prepare for a class you have never taught before?

12. Looking back on the ICP, would you recommend any additional courses/classes that you feel new BOLC II cadre members should have **before attending the ICP** at Fort Benning?

13. Using the scale below, circle the number to indicate how well the instruction provided in the following classes prepared you to effectively train lieutenants in these areas.

Classes	Did Not Prepare Me in Any Way to Train Lieutenants	Familiarized Me with the Material, but Did Not Prepare Me to Train Lieutenants	Somewhat Prepared Me to Train Lieutenants	Fully Prepared Me to Train Lieutenants
TCC: Intro to Army Operations	6 (27)	6 (27)	7 (32)	2 (9)
TCC: Operational Terms/Symbols	8 (36)	6 (27)	3 (14)	4 (18)
TCC: Troop Leading Procedures	3 (14)	6 (27)	7 (32)	5 (23)
TCC: Offensive Operations	3 (14)	6 (27)	6 (27)	5 (23)
TCC: Defensive Operations	4 (18)	7 (32)	5 (23)	5 (23)
Counseling	5 (23)	8 (36)	4 (18)	4 (18)
Land Navigation	3 (14)	4 (18)	7 (32)	7 (32)
IED	4 (18)	7 (32)	4 (18)	6 (27)
AMU – Zeroing	1 (5)	4 (18)	9 (41)	7 (32)
AMU – Reflexive Firing	1 (5)	4 (18)	7 (32)	9 (41)
Urban Operations			9 (41)	12 (55)
AIMSS		3 (14)	11 (50)	7 (32)
First Aid	8 (36)	6 (27)	3 (14)	4 (18)
Call for Fire	4 (18)	9 (41)	5 (23)	3 (14)
Warrior Battle Drills	1 (5)	5 (23)	9 (41)	6 (27)

Note. Numbers may not equal 100% due to missing data.

Assuming the ICP cannot be extended, what, in your opinion, would the ideal ICP look like? The table below summarizes the organization of the ICP you recently completed by week. Please circle the classes that should be included in the new ICP and include additional classes in the spaces provided for each week. If the sequence of instruction should be changed, please indicate the week the particular class should be taught next to the class you have circled or added. For week 4, if you feel only selected Warrior tasks and battle drills should be included, please list them in the comments section at the top of page 5.

Week	Classes taught in your ICP (Circle classes to include in new ICP)	Week Class should be taught	Classes to add for new ICP	Week new class should be taught
1	- TCC: Introduction to Army Operations			
	- TCC: Operational Terms and Symbols			
	- TCC: Troop Leading Procedures			
	- TCC: Offensive Operations			
	- TCC: Defensive Operations			
	- Small Group Instruction			
2	- Machine Gun Theory			
	- Hot Weather Injuries/Use of Supplements			
	- Call for Fire			
	- Leadership Development and			
	- Counseling			
	- Communications (operate a SINGGARS)			
	- NBC			
3	- Land Navigation			
	- ARM (Classroom Instruction)			
	- ARM (Zero an M4 Rifle using Iron Sights)			
	- ARM (Zero an M4 Rifle using the CCO)			
	- ARM (Reflexive Fire)			
	- Night Infiltration Course			
	- Convoy Operations Training (Check fire)			
4	- Counter IEDs - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures			
	- First Aid			
	- Warrior Tasks			
	- Warrior Battle Drills			
5	- Extended Land Navigation (TEWT)			
	- Urban Operations			
6	- AIMSS Training (Classroom)			
	- U.S. Weapons			
	- AIMSS Training (1-2) - M4 Confirmation Zero and Qualification			
7	- Convoy Blank/Live Fire			

14. Continued). Comments concerning restructuring of ICP.

15. How would you ensure cadre are both proficient in the Warrior tasks and prepared to teach new lieutenants after completion of the ICP? How would you organize the training to accomplish both objectives?

### **Section II: BOLC Single Site Pilot**

1. What aspects of the **single site pilot (10 July - 26 August)** did you think were **useful/effective** and should be included in the multi-site pilot?
2. What aspects of the **single site pilot (10 July - 26 August)** did you think were **not useful/effective** that you would like to see modified before the next pilot?

### **Section III: Leadership & Counseling**

1. In your opinion, were the BOLC II events such as urban operations, extended land navigation, and convoy operations correctly structured to allow you to fully assess the leadership qualities of the lieutenants?  
**Yes: 8 (36%) No: 14 (64%)** If **No**, what could be done differently during these events that would allow you to effectively assess lieutenants' leadership skills, particularly decision making and adaptive thinking?
2. Was the Leadership Assessment Report book an effective tool for conducting counseling?  
**Yes: 5 (23%) No: 14 (64%)** Please explain your answer.
3. Was the Leadership Assessment Report book easy to use? **Yes: 9 (41%) No: 12 (55%)** If you answered **No**, what made the book difficult to use?
4. Did you have enough time to practice using the Leadership Assessment Report book, e.g., watching film clips of good/poor leadership characteristics and rating the actions observed?  
**Yes: 11 (50%) No: 7 (32%)**  
If you answered **No**, how much time would you need to feel comfortable using the book?
5. How could the Leadership Assessment Report book be improved?

## Appendix K

### Warrior Battle Drills and Tasks

Students rated how prepared they were to lead a platoon in the execution of each of the following Warrior Battle Drills:

	Mean Pre BOLC II	Mean Post BOLC II	Mean Paired Differences	SE	t	df
10. React to contact (visual, IED, direct fire [includes RPG])	2.69	3.41	.72	.09	7.83***	154
11. React to ambush (blocked)	2.43	3.24	.82	.10	8.43***	142
12. React to ambush (unblocked)	2.52	3.42	.90	.10	9.21***	149
13. React to indirect fire	2.94	3.84	.89	.09	9.67***	159
14. React to a chemical attack	2.40	2.95	.55	.10	5.60***	154
15. Break contact	2.97	3.49	.52	.10	5.39***	158
16. Dismount a vehicle	1.83	3.53	1.70	.11	14.85***	104
17. Evacuate injured personnel from a vehicle	1.98	2.84	.86	.14	6.13***	94
18. Secure at a halt	2.59	3.44	.85	.11	7.66***	139

Notes. Results reflect missing data. International students were not included in the analyses.

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Students rated their level of confidence pre and post BOLC II in executing the following tasks:

	Mean Pre BOLC II	Mean Post BOLC II	Mean Paired Differences	SE	t	df
<b>Shooting Tasks</b>						
16. Qualify with assigned weapon: M16/M4	3.82	3.80	-.02	.09	-.20	162
17. Correct malfunctions of assigned weapon: M16/M4	3.60	4.12	.52	.08	6.90***	162
18. Employ M18 Claymore mine and hand grenades	2.77	2.42	-.35	.11	-3.29**	118
<b>Engage targets with the following weapons:</b>						
19. M240B (Machine Gun)	2.65	2.95	.31	.10	2.93**	123
20. M249 (Machine Gun-SAW)	2.81	3.14	.33	.09	3.60***	141

	Mean Pre BOLC II	Mean Post BOLC II	Mean Paired Differences	SE	t	df
21. M2 (Cal. 50 Machine Gun)	2.40	2.79	.40	.12	3.29**	100
22. MK19 (40 mm Grenade Machine Gun)	2.11	2.76	.65	.11	5.73***	83
<b>Correct malfunctions of the following weapons:</b>						
23. M240B (Machine Gun)	2.15	2.69	.54	.10	5.19***	100
24. M249 (Machine Gun-SAW)	2.38	2.90	.52	.10	5.11***	114
25. M2 (Cal. 50 Machine Gun)	1.82	2.43	.61	.13	4.58***	71
26. MK19 (40 mm Grenade Machine Gun)	1.63	2.39	.76	.14	5.37***	61
<b>Engage targets with a weapon using the following night vision sights:</b>						
27. AN/PVS-4 (Individual Weapon Night Sight)	2.22	2.54	.31	.15	2.05*	53
28. AN/PAS-13 (Thermal Weapon Sight)	2.10	2.24	.14	.26	.55	20
29. AN/TVS-5 (Crew Served Weapon Night Vision Sight)	2.15	2.25	.10	.32	.32	19
<b>Engage targets using the following aiming lights:</b>						
30. AN/PEQ-2A (Aiming Light)	2.39	2.71	.32	.20	1.55	37
31. AN/PAQ-4 (Aiming Light)	2.47	2.53	.05	.21	.26	37
<b>Communicate</b>						
32. Perform voice communications: SITREP/SPOTREP	2.85	3.40	.55	.08	6.80***	156
33. Perform voice communications: Call for fire	2.18	2.93	.75	.08	9.22***	157
34. Perform voice communications: MEDEVAC	2.47	3.14	.67	.08	8.40***	154
35. Use visual signaling techniques	2.77	3.23	.46	.10	4.59***	142
<b>Joint Urban Operations</b>						
36. Perform movement techniques during urban operations	2.08	3.48	1.40	.11	13.09***	91
37. Engage targets during urban operations	2.24	3.56	1.33	.12	11.42***	84
38. Enter a building during urban operations	2.44	3.71	1.28	.11	11.18***	86

	Mean Pre BOLC II	Mean Post BOLC II	Mean Paired Differences	SE	t	df
<b>Move</b>						
39. Determine location on ground (terrain association, map & GPS)	3.37	3.61	.24	.08	2.93**	160
40. Navigate from one point to another (dismounted)	3.58	3.80	.22	.07	2.97**	163
41. Move over, through, or around obstacles (except minefields)	3.10	3.56	.46	.08	5.41***	148
42. Prepare a vehicle in a convoy	2.09	3.12	1.03	.14	7.58***	67
<b>Fight</b>						
43. Move under direct fire	2.81	3.33	.52	.08	6.11***	142
44. React to indirect fire (dismounted & mounted)	2.62	3.62	1.00	.10	10.24***	145
45. React to direct fire (dismounted & mounted)	2.66	3.51	.85	.10	8.54***	143
46. React to unexploded ordnance hazard	2.18	3.20	1.02	.14	7.51***	87
47. React to man-to-man contact (Combatives)	2.74	3.28	.54	.10	5.17***	110
48. React to chemical or biological attack/hazard	2.25	2.75	.50	.08	5.88***	152
49. Decontaminate yourself & individual equipment using chemical decontaminating kits	2.19	2.73	.53	.09	6.16***	134
50. Maintain equipment (individual and crew served weapons)	2.63	3.05	.43	.09	4.68***	146
51. Evaluate a casualty	2.88	3.47	.60	.09	6.77***	155
52. Perform first aid for open wound (abdominal, chest, & head)	2.66	3.39	.73	.08	8.64***	151
53. Perform first aid for bleeding of extremity	2.95	3.60	.65	.10	6.83***	150
54. Select temporary fighting position	2.96	3.37	.41	.09	4.52***	153

Notes. Results reflect missing data. International students were not included in the analyses. Some students responded that they had never performed certain tasks (e.g., joint urban operations) prior to attending BOLC II; these responses were coded as missing and were not included in the analyses.

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .



## Appendix L

### Acronyms

AAC	U.S. Army Accessions Command
AAR	After-Action Review
AIMSS	Advanced Infantry Marksmanship Strategies and Standards
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
ARI	Army Research Institute
ARM	Advanced Rifle Marksmanship
ASI	Additional Skill Identifier
ATLDP	Army Training and Leader Development Panel
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BNCOC	Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course
BOLC	Basic Officer Leader Course
BQ	Branch Qualified
BRM	Basic Rifle Marksmanship
CATD	Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate
CCO	Close Combat Optic
CDR	Commander
CIF	Central Issuing Facility
COA	Course Of Action
COB	Civilians On the Battlefield
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
DCSOPS&T	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GED	General Educational Development Test
GPS	Global Positioning System
GT	General Technical
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
IAW	In Accordance With
ICP	Instructor Certification Program
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMT	Individual Movement Techniques
KD	Known Distance
LCE	Load Carrying Equipment (pistol, belt & suspenders)
LFX	Live Fire Exercise
METT-TC	Factors of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time available and Civilian concerns
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCO	Noncommissioned officer
OBC	Officer Basic Course
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OES	Officer Education System
OIC	Officer in Charge
OPFOR	Opposing force
OPORD	Operation Order

OPTEMPO	Operation Tempo
PE	Practical Exercise
POI	Program of Instruction
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SJT	Situational Judgment Test
SME	Subject Matter Experts
STX	Situational Training Exercise
TCC	Tactics Certification Course
TEWT	Tactical Exercise Without Troops
TLP	Troop Leading Procedures
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
USAIS	U.S. Army Infantry School
USAMTU	U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit
USMA	United States Military Academy